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Latin American Banking Trojans Guide: how Grandoreiro, Mispadu and Astaroth work and how to stop them

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 10 min read
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Latin American banking trojans are Windows malware families, mostly written in Delphi and sold as a service, that wait for a victim to open their bank's website and then take over the session with fake screens, keylogging and remote control. Grandoreiro, Mispadu and Astaroth are three of the most reported. They began with Brazilian, Mexican and other Spanish and Portuguese-speaking banks, then spread to Spain, Portugal and beyond: IBM X-Force reported in 2024 that a reworked Grandoreiro targets more than 1,500 banking applications and websites in over 60 countries. This guide is for SOC analysts, email and endpoint engineers, and bank fraud and security teams. It explains how the families work, where they show up, their impact, and how to detect and prevent them. For trojans in general see the Trojans Guide; for the mobile equivalent see the Android Banking Trojans Guide.

Key takeaways

  • They act only when you visit the bank. ATT&CK records Grandoreiro and Mispadu monitoring browser activity for online banking and showing full-screen overlay images to block the user while the operator works.
  • Delivery is mail with a local flavour. Lures copy tax authorities and utilities such as Mexico's SAT and CFE, Argentina's revenue service and South Africa's SARS, and carry ZIP, MSI, LNK or .url files rather than Office macros.
  • They abuse built-in Windows tools. Microsoft documented Astaroth running entirely through WMIC, BITSAdmin, Certutil and Regsvr32; Mispadu used a SmartScreen bypass (CVE-2023-36025) with .url files.
  • Infected users become senders. X-Force saw Grandoreiro send phishing from the victim's own Outlook client and delete the sent items.
  • Takedowns slow them, not stop them. Brazilian Federal Police and ESET disrupted Grandoreiro in January 2024; X-Force tracked new campaigns from March 2024.

How the attack works

The families differ in detail but follow the same four stages: lure, loader, wait and hijack.

StageGrandoreiro (S0531)Mispadu (S1122)Astaroth / Guildma (S0373)
First seen2016 per ATT&CK; ESET tracked it from late 20172019 (ESET)Public since at least late 2017 per ATT&CK
Language and modelDelphi, malware as a serviceDelphi, malware as a serviceJavaScript-driven chain with DLL payloads
Typical lureTax and utility notices linking to a ZIP with a bloated loader, often over 100 MB (X-Force); malicious Google Ads and compromised sites (ATT&CK)Malicious email links; ZIP with a .url file exploiting CVE-2023-36025 (Unit 42)Email link to a ZIP containing an LNK (Microsoft)
Loader tricksMSI files running DLLs (T1218.007), fake PDF CAPTCHA, sandbox and country checksRundll32 injector (T1218.011), exits unless language is Spanish or Portuguese (T1614.001)WMIC with XSL scripts (T1220), BITSAdmin, Certutil decoding, Regsvr32 (T1218.010), alternate data streams (T1564.004)
PersistenceRun keys and startup LNKs; configuration stored in the registry (T1027.011)Startup folder link and Run keys (T1547.001)Startup item; payload hollowed into userinit.exe (Microsoft)
Command and controlDomain generation algorithm: ESET found 105 configurations, X-Force a sample with 14 seeds giving 14 domains a dayOpenSSL-encrypted C2 (T1573.002)DGA (T1568.002); C2 details on YouTube, Facebook and cloud hosting (T1102.001)
TheftKeylogging, screen blocking, mouse and keyboard simulation, fake pop-ups, cookie theft for session reuse (T1539)Keylogging, screenshots, Chrome credentials, clipboard Bitcoin address swap, browser extensionsKeylogging, clipboard, NetPass password recovery

The hijack stage is manual. ESET notes that a Grandoreiro operator must interact with the victim's machine to steal money: the overlay tells the victim the bank is "updating" while the operator uses the authenticated session, and fake pop-up windows can be used to prompt the victim for whatever the bank asks next, such as a token value. This is why server-side session and transaction controls matter as much as endpoint detection.

Where it shows up

  • Geography: ESET's hardcoded country values put about 41% of Grandoreiro victims in Brazil, 30% in Mexico and 28% in Spain, with focus moving towards Mexico and Argentina in 2023. X-Force saw the reworked version spread to South Africa and over 60 countries. Unit 42 found Mispadu focused on Mexico, with France and Spain next in its data.
  • Victims: mainly consumers and small businesses who bank online from Windows PCs, plus employees who open the same lures at work.
  • Targets inside the browser: bank websites, banking desktop software and crypto services. Grandoreiro checks for Trusteer and the Warsaw GAS Tecnologia banking protection module, and can block Warsaw at the firewall (ATT&CK T1686.002). Mispadu matches browser history against 15 hashed target groups (Unit 42).
  • Corporate mailboxes: Grandoreiro harvests addresses from Outlook .pst files (T1087.003) and sends phishing from the victim's account, so an infected employee becomes a sender to partners.

Related operators also use commodity RATs: see the Blind Eagle Threat Actor Profile Guide, whose modified Quasar RAT keylogs when Colombian bank windows open.

Where identity fits

These trojans are identity attacks that happen inside a session the user has already authenticated. That has three consequences for identity and fraud teams.

  • Login MFA is not enough: the operator works inside a session that already passed MFA, so step-up authentication must be tied to the transaction (payee and amount), not only to the login.
  • Cookies are credentials: Grandoreiro steals cookies to duplicate the session from another device (T1539). Short session lifetimes, device binding and revocation on risk signals reduce their value. See the Infostealer Logs and Session Token Abuse Guide.
  • Mailboxes are distribution channels: a compromised Outlook profile sends lures to everyone the user knows, so mailbox audit logging and alerts on unusual sending are part of the defence, as is phishing-resistant MFA for webmail.

Impact

WhoImpactNotes
Bank customersFraudulent transfers from authenticated sessions, stolen card and crypto fundsOverlay hides the fraud while it happens
BanksFraud losses, reimbursement and complaint costs, support loadDefeats controls that trust a known device and a successful login
EmployersCredential theft, mail account abuse to phish partners, reputational damageInternal phishing from a trusted account (T1534)
Everyone downstreamStolen cookies replayed from another device (T1539)Session theft bypasses passwords and some MFA

Detection

SignalData sourceFamily
wmic.exe with a /format: argument pointing at a remote XSLProcess creation (4688, Sysmon 1)Astaroth
bitsadmin.exe or certutil.exe -decode started from a script chainProcess creation; BITS-Client operational logAstaroth
Processes launched from a WebDAV or UNC path whose parent opened a .url file; WebDAV requests containing "@80"EDR process and network eventsMispadu (Unit 42 hunting guidance)
msiexec.exe installing from a user Downloads folder followed by a large unsigned executableProcess creation, Windows Installer logGrandoreiro
Repeated requests to ip-api.com/json from endpointsProxy and DNS logsGrandoreiro (X-Force)
High volume of NXDOMAIN or new domains resolved daily from one hostDNS logsDGA families
New Run keys or startup LNKs pointing to user profile foldersSysmon Event ID 13 and 11All three
Outlook sending bursts of mail then deleting sent itemsMail audit logsGrandoreiro
Unapproved browser extensions or changed browser shortcutsBrowser management reports, EDR file eventsGrandoreiro (T1547.009, T1176.001), Mispadu

Metrics

  • Script and archive attachments (.url, .lnk, .vbs, .js, .msi inside ZIP) delivered to users per month: trending to zero.
  • Endpoints with Windows updates covering CVE-2023-36025: 100%.
  • Unapproved browser extensions on managed devices: zero.
  • Bank side: share of high-value transfers confirmed with transaction signing out of band: 100%.
  • Mean time from banking trojan alert to session revocation and credential reset: under one hour.

Prevention and hardening

For organisations

  1. Week 1: block .url, .lnk, .vbs, .js, .hta and .msi files inside archives at the mail gateway; load published DGA domain lists and indicators into protective DNS. See the Protective DNS Guide.
  2. Weeks 2 to 4: confirm the November 2023 Windows update for CVE-2023-36025 (in the CISA KEV catalogue) is installed everywhere; block outbound WebDAV and SMB to the internet.
  3. Weeks 4 to 8: restrict wmic.exe, bitsadmin.exe, certutil.exe, mshta.exe and regsvr32.exe for standard users with application control or attack surface reduction rules. Run in audit mode for two weeks, review hits with IT, then enforce by department with the audit policy kept as rollback. See the Living off the Land Guide.
  4. Quarter 1: enforce a browser extension allowlist (see the Browser Extension Security Guide), monitor Outlook for mass sending and deleted sent items, and add the lures (SAT, CFE, SARS, regional tax notices) to awareness material.
  5. Response: isolate, reimage, reset the user's banking and mail credentials from a clean device, revoke sessions, and tell the user's bank and any contacts who received mail from the account.

For banks

  • Transaction signing: confirm payee and amount on a separate device so an overlay cannot hide the real transfer.
  • Session risk scoring: watch for remote-control patterns, unusual input timing and new payees right after login. See the Transaction Monitoring and Behavioural Biometrics Guide.
  • Cookie binding: bind sessions to device characteristics so stolen cookies fail elsewhere.
  • Customer messaging: tell customers the bank will never show an "updating, please wait" screen that asks for token codes.

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SI-3 Malicious Code Protection, SI-8 Spam ProtectionEndpoint and mail filtering
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5CM-7 Least Functionality, SI-2 Flaw RemediationRestricting system binaries, patching SmartScreen bypass
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SC-44 Detonation ChambersSandboxing archives and links before delivery
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AT-01, DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02Awareness, endpoint monitoring, alert analysis
MITRE D3FENDD3-EAL Executable Allowlisting, D3-DNSDL DNS Denylisting, D3-UA URL AnalysisScript host control, DGA blocking, link analysis

Lessons from incidents

  • Infrastructure weaknesses help defenders: ESET found that one cluster of 62 Grandoreiro DGA configurations accounted for about 94% of victims, which made the January 2024 operation with Brazil's Federal Police possible. See the Cybercrime Law Enforcement Takedowns Guide.
  • Expect a return: X-Force tracked reworked Grandoreiro campaigns from March 2024, only weeks after the takedown, with wider geography and Outlook-based spreading.
  • Fileless is not invisible: Microsoft caught Astaroth by behaviour monitoring of legitimate tools, not by file signatures.
  • Patched is not safe: Unit 42 notes Mispadu's techniques change often; a single bypass patch removes one route, but the archive and script controls above cover the next one.

Practitioner checklist

  • Block script, shortcut and installer files inside archives at the mail gateway.
  • Confirm CVE-2023-36025 is patched and outbound WebDAV is blocked.
  • Alert on WMIC with remote XSL, certutil decoding and BITS jobs from script chains.
  • Alert on endpoints polling ip-api.com and on DGA-like DNS patterns.
  • Enforce a browser extension allowlist and watch for modified browser shortcuts.
  • Monitor Outlook for mass sending and deleted sent items.
  • Banks: require out-of-band transaction signing and score sessions for remote control behaviour.
  • After infection, reset banking credentials from a clean device and notify the bank.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Trojans Guide · Android Banking Trojans Guide · Online Banking Security Guide · Living off the Land Guide · Blind Eagle Threat Actor Profile Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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