Hospitals receive a Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security (MDS2) and a software bill of materials (SBOM) for most new connected devices, and too often both files go straight into a procurement folder that security never opens. Read properly at the point of purchase, they tell you how a device authenticates users, what it logs, which ports it opens, which third-party software it carries, when that software stops being supported and what the manufacturer will do about vulnerabilities. Read after go-live, they mostly tell you what you should have negotiated. This guide is for clinical engineering, procurement, information security and vendor risk teams in healthcare delivery organisations (HDOs). It covers how to read the ANSI/NEMA HN 1-2019 MDS2 form question by question, how to evaluate a device SBOM, which red flags should change a purchasing decision and how to turn the answers into contract terms and ongoing monitoring. It does not cover SBOM basics or what manufacturers must submit to the FDA; for those see the SBOM Guide and the FDA Medical Device Cybersecurity Guide.
Key takeaways
- Ask before the purchase order. Make a current, revision-controlled MDS2 and a machine-readable SBOM a condition of tender, scored alongside clinical and price criteria.
- Read the MDS2 for operating constraints. Authentication, audit logging, malware protection, remote service and patching answers decide how the device will fit your network, identity and monitoring controls.
- Read the SBOM for life cycle risk. Component end-of-support dates and the operating system version predict how long the device can stay safely in service.
- Turn answers into contract terms. The HSCC Model Contract Language (MC2 v2) gives ready clauses for patch timelines, vulnerability notice, end-of-support notice and SBOM monitoring.
- Keep both documents alive. Store them against the asset record, request updates at each software release, and match SBOM components against new vulnerabilities for the device's whole service life.
What the MDS2 and device SBOM are, and where they come from
The MDS2 is published by NEMA as ANSI/NEMA HN 1-2019, "Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security": a standard form plus instructions that manufacturers complete to help HDO risk assessors manage device security. Earlier editions (HN 1-2008, published jointly with HIMSS) focused on electronic protected health information (ePHI) and ran to about 20 numbered questions. The 2019 form is far broader and is organised into lettered sections, each with question IDs such as MPII-2.1 or AUDT-2.8.1, answered Yes, No or N/A with notes. The DICOM Standards Committee likewise encourages HDOs to evaluate security documentation such as the MDS2 to decide how to deploy imaging systems safely.
The SBOM is now a regulatory artefact in the US. FDA's final guidance "Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions" (dated February 2026, superseding the June 2025 version) recommends machine-readable SBOMs consistent with the NTIA minimum elements, plus, for each component, its level of support and end-of-support date. Its labelling section says manufacturers should provide or make SBOM information available to users on a continuous basis, and that a revision-controlled MDS2 may address many of the labelling recommendations. That gives an HDO firm ground to ask for both. The regulatory detail is in the FDA Medical Device Cybersecurity Guide; this page is about using what you receive.
Reading the MDS2 section by section
The 2019 form groups questions into the sections below. Not every answer matters equally: the right-hand column is what a hospital reviewer should actually check and what a poor answer means for deployment.
| Section (code) | What to check | Why it matters to the HDO |
|---|---|---|
| Device Description (DOC) | Model, software version, date and revision of the form | An MDS2 for a different software version is not evidence for the device you are buying |
| Management of Personally Identifiable Information (MPII) | Whether the device stores or transmits patient data, where, and how it is removed | Drives privacy impact, data retention and decommissioning sanitisation |
| Automatic Logoff (ALOF) | Configurable session timeout and screen lock | Shared clinical workstations need locking that clinicians can live with |
| Audit Controls (AUDT) | Which events are logged, log export method and format | Determines whether the device can feed your SIEM at all |
| Authorization (AUTH) and Person Authentication (PAUT) | Role-based access, unique user accounts, directory integration, password policy, default accounts | Shared generic logins break accountability and access reviews |
| Node Authentication (NAUT) | How the device authenticates to other systems (certificates, keys) | Non-human credentials you will have to inventory and rotate |
| Cybersecurity Product Upgrades (CSUP) | Who installs patches, how they are validated, typical lead time, operating system updates | Sets your patch cadence and whether you can apply operating system fixes yourself |
| Malware Detection/Protection (MLDP) | Pre-installed or customer-installable anti-malware, allow-listing, validated products | Decides whether endpoint protection is possible or compensating controls are needed |
| Connectivity Capabilities (CONN) | Network interfaces, wireless, ports and protocols | Input to segmentation design and firewall rules |
| Remote Service (RMOT) | Remote access method, who initiates, logging, customer control | Vendor remote access is a common route into clinical networks |
| Data Backup and Disaster Recovery (DTBK) and Emergency Access (EMRG) | Configuration backup, restore procedure, break-glass access | Clinical recovery and downtime planning |
| Health Data Integrity and Authenticity (IGAU), Transmission Confidentiality (TXCF), Transmission Integrity (TXIG), Data Storage Confidentiality (STCF) | Encryption at rest and in transit, integrity checks, supported protocol versions | Plaintext clinical protocols need network compensating controls |
| Health Data De-identification (DIDT) | Built-in de-identification for exports | Research and teaching use of device data |
| Physical Locks (PLOK) | Locks on removable media and ports | Devices in public areas |
| Roadmap for Third Party Components (RDMP), Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) | Whether an SBOM is provided, and the plan for third-party components over the life cycle | The bridge between the MDS2 and SBOM review |
| System and Application Hardening (SAHD), Security Guidance (SGUD) | Hardening baseline, disabled services, availability of a security guide | Tells you what you are allowed to change without breaking validation |
Reading technique: treat every "No" as a design input, not a disqualification. A device with no anti-malware support may be perfectly acceptable on an isolated, allow-listed segment. Treat every "N/A" with suspicion and ask for the note. Check the revision date on the form against the software version on the quote; a form two releases old is the most common gap.
Evaluating a device SBOM at purchase
A medical device SBOM review at procurement is not a full vulnerability assessment. It answers four questions: is the SBOM usable, what is the device built on, how long is it supportable, and what is already known to be wrong with it.
- Usability: is it machine-readable in an industry format (SPDX or CycloneDX, see SPDX vs CycloneDX), does it name the device model and software version, does it carry the NTIA minimum fields (supplier, component name, version, unique identifier, dependency relationship, SBOM author and timestamp), and can it be loaded into your tooling without manual rework?
- Foundation: identify the operating system, runtime and database components. These dominate vulnerability exposure and patch dependency.
- Supportability: FDA recommends a level of support and end-of-support date per component. Find the earliest end-of-support date among the major components and compare it with the planned service life of the device. A ten-year clinical asset built on an operating system leaving support in two years is a known future problem you are paying for now.
- Known vulnerabilities: match components against current vulnerability data, prioritising entries in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, which FDA expects manufacturers to account for. Ask the manufacturer for its assessment of each match. A VEX statement (see the VEX Guide) separating "affected" from "not affected" saves you weeks of triage.
Firmware and hardware components matter too for embedded devices; see the Hardware and Firmware SBOM Guide.
Red flags that should change the decision
| Finding | Risk | Response options |
|---|---|---|
| No MDS2, or MDS2 for an older software version | No reliable basis for risk assessment | Make a current form a condition of contract award |
| No SBOM or a PDF-only list | Cannot monitor components after go-live | Require machine-readable SBOM per release; score down in tender |
| Operating system end of support within the first third of planned service life | Device becomes unpatchable while in clinical use | Contract for an upgrade path at no extra cost, or shorten planned life |
| Shared or hardcoded accounts disclosed under AUTH or PAUT | No accountability; credentials cannot be rotated | Require disclosure of all accounts and a roadmap to remove hardcoded passwords |
| Vendor-initiated, always-on remote access under RMOT | Unmonitored third-party route into clinical networks | Require customer-controlled, logged access through your remote access platform |
| No log export under AUDT | Incidents on the device are invisible | Plan network-based monitoring; ask for a logging roadmap |
| Known exploited vulnerabilities in SBOM components with no manufacturer assessment | Exposure from day one | Require assessment and remediation plan before acceptance |
Turning disclosures into contract terms
The Health Sector Coordinating Council published Model Contract-Language for MedTech Cybersecurity version 2 (MC2 v2) in November 2025, updating the March 2022 original. It gives HDOs clause text they can adopt or adapt. The clauses that connect directly to MDS2 and SBOM review:
- MDS2 (clause 11): the supplier provides documentation of all required and optional services in an MDS2 document.
- SBOM (clause 44): the supplier provides an SBOM including open source software, meeting at least the minimum elements defined by FDA or other industry guidance, and monitors unsupported components for new vulnerabilities and notifies the customer.
- Patching (clauses 31 and 32): security patches applied within 30 days of patch release, with a regular patch cadence and notice of availability.
- Vulnerability notice (clauses 23 and 33): uncontrolled risks reported within 30 days of becoming aware, with detail within two days; exploited or KEV-listed vulnerabilities within three business days.
- Operating system support (clause 40): products should not run an operating system past its third-party end-of-support date, with checks for obsolescence within one year.
- End-of-life notice (clause 45): notice periods of 24 months for end of life and end of guaranteed support, and 36 months for end of support.
- Remote access and accounts (clauses 17 and 29): disclosure of the remote access method with logging of all sessions, and disclosure of all accounts and hardcoded passwords.
MC2 v2 is a model, not a mandate: manufacturers negotiate, and smaller HDOs have less leverage. Group purchasing organisations and consortium tenders are the practical route for small hospitals to get these terms. For the wider vendor risk process, see the Third-Party Risk Management Guide.
Where identity fits
MDS2 answers are an identity inventory in disguise. AUTH and PAUT tell you whether clinicians get named accounts or a shared login; NAUT tells you which certificates and keys the device uses to talk to PACS, interface engines and middleware; RMOT tells you which vendor identities can reach it. Record each as an identity in your inventory, owned by clinical engineering, with rotation and review dates. Hardcoded service credentials disclosed under MC2 clause 29 belong on a risk register with compensating controls. See Machine Identity in Healthcare and the Healthcare Identity Security Guide.
Building the review into procurement
- Set minimum requirements: publish a short security schedule for tenders: current MDS2, machine-readable SBOM, named user accounts, log export, customer-controlled remote access, stated support period.
- Triage by exposure: full review for networked devices that store patient data or connect to clinical systems; light review for standalone devices.
- Review in parallel with clinical evaluation: security findings arrive before price negotiation, when they still have leverage.
- Record decisions: for each "No" answer, record the compensating control (segment, allow-list, monitor) and the risk owner.
- Accept on evidence: at installation, confirm the delivered software version matches the MDS2 and SBOM reviewed, accounts are as disclosed and remote access is configured as agreed.
- Operate: store both documents against the asset record, request updated SBOMs with each software release, and run continuous component matching against new vulnerability data. Feed segmentation decisions into the Hospital Clinical Network Segmentation Guide.
- Rollback and exceptions: if a device fails acceptance on a security point and clinical need is urgent, deploy it on a quarantined segment under a time-limited exception with a remediation date, rather than waiving the requirement silently.
Measuring whether it is working
- Pre-contract review rate: share of networked device purchases with MDS2 and SBOM reviewed before contract award.
- Document currency: share of in-service networked devices with an MDS2 and SBOM matching the installed software version.
- Supportability horizon: number of devices whose earliest major component end-of-support date falls within 24 months.
- Exploited vulnerability exposure: devices with SBOM components matching KEV entries and no manufacturer assessment.
- Contract coverage: share of new device contracts containing patch, notice and end-of-support clauses.
- Exception ageing: number and age of security exceptions granted at acceptance.
Framework mapping
| Activity | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 |
|---|---|---|
| Security requirements in tenders and contracts | GV.SC-05, GV.SC-06 | SA-4 Acquisition Process, SR-3 Supply Chain Controls and Processes |
| Ongoing supplier and product risk monitoring | GV.SC-07 | SR-3 |
| Device and component inventory from MDS2 and SBOM | ID.AM-02 | CM-8 System Component Inventory, SR-4 Provenance |
| Matching SBOM components to vulnerabilities | ID.RA-01, ID.RA-08 | RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning |
| End-of-support tracking | ID.RA-01 | SA-22 Unsupported System Components |
For device risk management standards on the manufacturer side, see the AAMI TIR57 and SW96 Medical Device Risk Guide and the IEC 81001-5-1 Health Software Security Lifecycle Guide.
Common failure patterns
- Filed, not read: the MDS2 arrives with the quote and is never routed to security, so known limitations surface after installation.
- Version mismatch: the reviewed MDS2 and SBOM describe a different software release from the one installed.
- One-time SBOM: the SBOM is reviewed at purchase and never matched again, although vulnerabilities in its components keep appearing for a decade.
- "No" means reject: security vetoes clinically needed devices instead of designing compensating controls, and clinicians route around the process.
- No contractual hook: the disclosures reveal an operating system near end of support, but the contract has no upgrade or notice clause, so the hospital pays later or runs an unsupported device.
- Remote access accepted as described: vendor remote access is allowed in the vendor's own form rather than through the hospital's controlled, logged platform.
Practitioner checklist
- Add current MDS2 and machine-readable SBOM requirements to every networked device tender.
- Check the MDS2 revision and software version against the quoted product.
- Review AUTH, PAUT, NAUT, AUDT, CSUP, MLDP, RMOT and CONN answers and record a compensating control for each gap.
- Find the earliest end-of-support date in the SBOM and compare it with planned service life.
- Match SBOM components against the KEV catalogue and ask for the manufacturer's assessment or VEX.
- Adopt MC2 v2 clauses for patching, vulnerability notice, operating system support, end-of-life notice and remote access.
- Add device accounts, certificates and vendor remote access identities to your identity inventory.
- Verify at acceptance that delivered software, accounts and remote access match the disclosures.
- Store both documents against the asset record and request updates with each software release.
Standards and references
- FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality Management System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions
- NEMA: ANSI/NEMA HN 1-2019 Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security
- HSCC: Model Contract-Language for MedTech Cybersecurity, Version 2
- HSCC: Medical Device and Health IT Joint Security Plan v2
- NTIA: The Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials
- DICOM Standards Committee: Security and DICOM
- HSCC: Model Contract Language for Medtech Cybersecurity (MC2)
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Medical Device Security Guide · SBOM Guide · FDA Medical Device Cybersecurity Guide · VEX Guide · DICOM and PACS Security Guide