If an attacker turns off Windows auditing before acting, every detection that depends on the Security log goes quiet, and the SOC sees an absence rather than an alert. MITRE ATT&CK T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log is the sub-technique of T1685 Disable or Modify Tools, in the Defense Impairment tactic (TA0112), that covers stopping or disabling the EventLog service, changing audit policy, disabling individual log channels and editing the Autologger sessions that feed them. This guide goes deeper than the T1685 Disable or Modify Tools Defensive Guide: it covers the specific event IDs, registry locations and tool usage that reveal event log tampering, sample detection logic, the controls that make tampering hard, and how to respond. Clearing logs is a separate sub-technique, T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs, and is only touched on here. It is for detection engineers, Windows platform owners and incident responders, and covers defence only.
Key takeaways
- Tampering has a small, well-defined footprint. Security 4719 (audit policy changed), Security 1100 (EventLog service shut down), System 7035 (service control), Sysmon 13 on EventLog, WINEVT channel and Autologger keys, and process creation for auditpol and wevtutil cover most methods.
- 4719 is always written. Microsoft documents that the audit policy change event is logged regardless of the Audit Policy Change subcategory setting, so treat every unplanned 4719 as an investigation.
- The last event before silence matters most. Forward events off the host in near real time, because once logging stops locally the only copy of the tampering evidence is the one already collected.
- Detect the gap as well as the change. Some methods take effect only after a reboot or leave no event; per-host heartbeat and per-channel volume analytics catch what event rules miss.
- It needs administrator rights, mostly. ATT&CK notes one Autologger route works without admin rights before a reboot; the rest require local admin, so privilege reduction is the main preventive control.
What T1685.001 covers
ATT&CK v20 describes the Windows Event Log as the record of user and system activity, such as logons and process creation, that security tools and analysts rely on, and the EventLog service as the component that maintains it. The audit policy, set through Local Security Policy, Group Policy or auditpol, decides which security events are written. The sub-technique groups four kinds of tampering:
| Method | What changes | Effect | Primary evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| EventLog service stopped or disabled | Service state or the Start value under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog | All channels stop recording, immediately or after reboot | Security 1100, System 7035, Sysmon 13 on the service key, then a gap |
| Audit policy reduced or cleared | Basic or advanced audit policy categories and subcategories | Selected security events, such as logon or process creation, stop being written | Security 4719 with the subcategory and the change, auditpol process creation |
| Individual channel disabled | The Enabled value under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\<channel>, or wevtutil set-log with the enabled option set to false | One channel, for example PowerShell Operational or Sysmon, goes silent | Sysmon 13 with value 0, wevtutil process creation, channel volume drop |
| Autologger session altered | Start values under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Security, EventLog-System or EventLog-Application | The affected log stops after the next reboot | Sysmon 13 on the Autologger keys, then a gap after restart |
ATT&CK also lists the MiniNT registry key, which disables Event Viewer, under its registry permissions mitigation, and records Threat Group-3390 using appcmd.exe to disable IIS logging on a server, which shows that application logs are in scope as well as the core channels. Related sub-techniques: T1685.002 for cloud logs, T1685.004 for the Linux audit system and T1685.005 for clearing. For deleting artefacts more broadly, see the T1070 Indicator Removal Defensive Guide.
Who uses it and when
ATT&CK v20 records the following procedures for T1685.001:
- APT29, SolarWinds compromise: used auditpol to prevent the collection of audit logs.
- Sandworm Team, 2016 Ukraine electric power attack: disabled event logging on compromised systems.
- Magic Hound: executed scripts to disable the event log service.
- Threat Group-3390: used appcmd.exe to disable logging on a victim server.
- HomeLand Justice campaign: deleted Windows events and application logs.
The pattern is consistent: tampering happens after privileged access is gained and shortly before the actions the attacker most wants hidden, such as credential theft, lateral movement, data theft or ransomware deployment. A 4719 or channel disable on a server is therefore an early warning of a larger intrusion, not an isolated configuration error.
Event ID and telemetry reference
| Log | Event | Meaning | Detection use |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security | 4719 | System audit policy was changed; fields include Subcategory, Subcategory GUID and Changes (success or failure added or removed) | Alert on any "removed" change outside approved Group Policy refreshes |
| Security | 1100 | The event logging service has shut down; also written at normal shutdown, not at emergency reset | Correlate with absence of a matching system restart (System 6006 and 6005) |
| Security | 1102 | The audit log was cleared (T1685.005) | Often paired with T1685.001 in the same session; include in the same alert bundle |
| System | 7035 | Service Control Manager sent a control (start or stop) to a service | ATT&CK lists it for EventLog service control in DET0187 |
| System | 104 | A non-Security log was cleared | Collected in the Microsoft WEF baseline alongside 1102 |
| Sysmon | 13, 14 | Registry value set; key or value renamed | EventLog service Start, WINEVT Channels Enabled, Autologger Start, MiniNT key |
| Sysmon / Security | 1 / 4688 | Process creation with command line | auditpol, wevtutil, sc, PowerShell service cmdlets, appcmd, reg |
| Sysmon | 16 | Sysmon configuration changed; cannot be filtered | Sysmon's own channel being reconfigured is the same intent against a different log |
The Windows Event Log Guide covers channel architecture and audit policy design; this page assumes it.
Detection patterns and sample logic
ATT&CK's DET0187 (analytic AN0535) combines registry changes, service state changes, process execution and anomalies in event record sequences, with three tuning elements: authorised admin accounts, a correlation time window and the list of monitored services. The pseudo-queries below use Sysmon and Security field names; port them to your SIEM. The SigmaHQ rules "Audit Policy Tampering Via Auditpol" and "Disable Windows Event Logging Via Registry" implement patterns 2 and 3 and are tagged T1685.001.
| Pattern | Sample logic (pseudo-query) | Severity | Tuning notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Audit subcategory removed | EventID = 4719 AND Changes contains "removed" AND SubjectUserName NOT IN authorised_admins AND NOT during GPO change window | High | Policy applied by Group Policy appears with the computer account as subject; compare against the intended policy rather than suppressing the account |
| 2. auditpol tampering | process OriginalFileName = AUDITPOL.EXE AND command line contains any of (disable, clear, remove, restore) | High | Backup and get are benign; restore is included because it can load a weaker policy |
| 3. Channel disabled via registry | Sysmon 13 AND TargetObject contains \WINEVT\Channels\ AND ends with \Enabled AND Details = DWORD 0 AND Image NOT IN (wevtutil during installs, DrvInst, TiWorker, TrustedInstaller) | High | Installers register disabled channels; SigmaHQ filters these |
| 4. Channel disabled via wevtutil | process = wevtutil AND command line contains (sl or set-log) AND enabled option set to false | High | Rare in normal operations |
| 5. EventLog service start type changed | Sysmon 13 AND TargetObject = \Services\EventLog\Start AND Details != DWORD 2 | Critical | Automatic start (2) is the expected value |
| 6. Autologger session edited | Sysmon 13 AND TargetObject contains \WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Security OR EventLog-System OR EventLog-Application AND value name = Start | Critical | Takes effect at next reboot; alert immediately so the host can be checked before restart |
| 7. Service stop without restart | Security 1100 OR System 7035 targeting EventLog, with no System 6006 within 2 minutes | Critical | Planned shutdowns write both; patch windows can be suppressed by maintenance calendar |
| 8. MiniNT key created | Sysmon 12 or 13 AND TargetObject = HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNT | High | Should not exist on a running production system |
| 9. Host or channel silence | host last event older than (normal interval x 3) OR Security channel event rate < 10 percent of 14-day median for that host | Medium, raise if paired | Exclude hosts known to be powered off; reconcile with asset inventory |
| 10. Record ID discontinuity | for each host and channel, EventRecordID jumps or resets without a 1102 or 104 | Medium | Requires the SIEM to keep record IDs; useful forensic signal |
Correlations that raise confidence
- Tamper then act: any of patterns 1 to 8 followed within 30 minutes by a new service install, LSASS access, remote logon to another host or mass file changes. This is the sequence seen before ransomware deployment.
- Tamper plus clear: a pattern from this page and a 1102 or 104 in the same logon session (link by SubjectLogonId). Together they indicate deliberate anti-forensics.
- Fleet-wide change: the same 4719 or registry change on many hosts within minutes, without a matching Group Policy change record, suggests a compromised deployment or management account.
Prevention and hardening
| Control | Setting or approach | ATT&CK mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Least privilege | Remove standing local admin rights; use tiered admin accounts and just-in-time elevation; restrict who can edit audit-related Group Policy objects | M1018 User Account Management |
| Enforced audit policy | Deliver advanced audit policy through domain Group Policy so local changes are reverted at the next refresh, and review auditpol output for admin accounts periodically | M1047 Audit |
| Registry permissions | Keep default ACLs on the EventLog, WINEVT Channels and Autologger keys; monitor any ACL change on them | M1024 Restrict Registry Permissions |
| File permissions | Protect .evtx files under C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs with default permissions | M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions |
| Off-host collection | Windows Event Forwarding (source-initiated subscriptions to a collector) or an agent forwarding to the SIEM in near real time | Supports detection after local loss (NIST SP 800-53 AU-9(2)) |
| Log sizing | Size Security and key Operational channels so events survive collector outages; Microsoft notes the client log is WEF's only buffer and overwrites give no notice of loss | Supports AU-5 response to logging failures |
| Endpoint tamper protection | Turn on EDR and antivirus tamper protection so the agents that watch the event log cannot themselves be switched off | See the parent T1685 guide |
Microsoft's WEF guidance is clear that forwarding is passive: it cannot enable channels, change log sizes or set audit policy, so the source device must already be configured correctly. Group Policy enforcement and off-host collection together are what make T1685.001 visible.
Rolling out the detections
- Confirm the foundations: advanced audit policy delivered by Group Policy with Audit Policy Change enabled for success and failure; Sysmon or EDR registry monitoring covering the four key paths; command line capture for process creation.
- Forward the evidence: add 4719, 1100, 1102, 104, 7035 and the Sysmon registry events for these keys to the baseline forwarding subscription for every Windows host, not only servers.
- Turn on high-fidelity rules first: patterns 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 rarely fire legitimately. Run them in alert mode from day one.
- Tune 4719 and channel rules: run patterns 1 and 3 for two weeks as reports, document legitimate sources (GPO refresh, installers), then alert.
- Add silence analytics: build per-host heartbeat and per-channel volume baselines (patterns 9 and 10) once the SIEM holds 14 days of data.
- Test and roll back safely: exercise each rule on an isolated test host with approved test tooling; if a rule floods the SOC, lower it to a report and fix the filter rather than deleting it.
Small and large estates: small organisations can rely on EDR registry and process rules plus a simple "host stopped reporting" alert, which together cover most methods. Large estates with thousands of servers should invest in the fleet-wide correlation and record ID analytics, and should treat their Group Policy and management tooling accounts as tier 0, since one compromised account can change audit policy everywhere at once.
Responding to event log tampering
- Treat it as an intrusion: unplanned audit or logging changes on a production host are presumed hostile until the change owner confirms otherwise.
- Find the account: take SubjectUserName and SubjectLogonId from 4719 or the user from the process event, and trace that logon (4624) back to its source host.
- Bound the blind period: use the last forwarded event and the first event after recovery to set the window, then fill it from other sources: EDR telemetry, network flow, firewall, proxy and identity provider logs.
- Restore logging: force a Group Policy refresh, reset the registry values to the baseline and restart the EventLog service where needed, and confirm events resume at the collector.
- Preserve evidence: keep the forwarded events, a copy of the .evtx files, the registry hives and a memory capture if the host has not been rebooted.
- Scope the account: if the account is a domain, deployment or service account, check every host it touched in the period for the same changes.
Breach notification decisions often depend on proving what was accessed. A blind period you cannot fill may force a worst-case assumption, so record the gap and the alternative sources used in the incident report. See the If your SIEM is compromised playbook for the case where the collection tier itself is targeted.
Where identity fits
Every method on this page except one Autologger route needs administrator rights, and the fleet-wide variant needs a management or Group Policy identity. The accounts that most often enable T1685.001 at scale are deployment service accounts, configuration management agents and Group Policy delegates, which are frequently non-human identities with broad, standing rights. Inventory them, remove rights they do not use, put them behind privileged access controls and alert when they change audit settings outside their normal schedule. See the Detection Engineering for Non-Human Identities Guide.
Metrics
- Forwarding coverage: percentage of Windows hosts that sent Security events to the collector in the last 24 hours. Target above 98 percent for servers.
- Audit policy drift: number of hosts whose effective audit policy differs from the Group Policy baseline, measured weekly.
- Unplanned 4719 rate: count of 4719 removals without a change record per month, and the percentage investigated.
- Time to detect silence: median minutes between the last event from a host and the heartbeat alert.
- Detection test pass rate: percentage of quarterly T1685.001 tests that raised the expected alert.
Common failure patterns
- Collecting only on servers: workstations are where intrusions often start, and tampering there goes unseen if they do not forward.
- Batch forwarding: hourly or daily log shipping means the tamper event may never leave the host.
- Suppressing 4719 as noise: filtering it by account rather than by expected change removes the most direct signal.
- No silence detection: rules that wait for an event cannot fire when the event source has stopped.
- Ignoring application and Sysmon channels: disabling PowerShell Operational or Sysmon is the same intent as stopping the Security log, but many rule sets watch only the core logs.
- Restoring without scoping: fixing the setting on one host without checking the account that made the change leaves other hosts blind.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK v20 | T1685.001; DET0187; mitigations M1018, M1047, M1024, M1022 | Technique, analytic AN0535 and mitigations |
| MITRE ATT&CK v20 | T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs, T1112 Modify Registry, T1070 Indicator Removal | Adjacent techniques in the same sessions |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.PS-04, DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02 | Log records generated and available; monitoring; analysing adverse events |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | AU-5, AU-6, AU-9, AU-9(2), AU-12, AC-6 | Logging failure response, review, protection and off-system storage of audit records, generation, least privilege |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A | A.8.15 Logging, A.8.16 Monitoring activities | Logs must be produced, protected and analysed |
Practitioner checklist
- Deliver advanced audit policy by Group Policy, including Audit Policy Change for success and failure.
- Forward 4719, 1100, 1102, 104 and 7035 from every Windows host in near real time.
- Monitor registry writes to the EventLog service, WINEVT Channels, Autologger and MiniNT paths.
- Alert on auditpol disable, clear, remove and restore, and on wevtutil set-log disabling a channel.
- Build heartbeat and per-channel volume analytics for silence.
- Remove standing local admin and review the accounts allowed to edit audit Group Policy.
- Size local logs to survive collector outages.
- Write the response steps, including blind period reconstruction, into the SOC runbook.
- Test each detection quarterly on an isolated host.
Standards and references
- MITRE ATT&CK: Disable or Modify Tools: Disable or Modify Windows Event Log (T1685.001)
- Microsoft Learn: 4719(S) System audit policy was changed
- Microsoft Learn: 1100(S) The event logging service has shut down
- Microsoft Learn: 1102(S) The audit log was cleared
- Microsoft Learn: Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection
- Microsoft Learn: auditpol
- Microsoft Learn: wevtutil
- SigmaHQ: Disable Windows Event Logging Via Registry rule
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: T1685 Disable or Modify Tools Defensive Guide · T1070 Indicator Removal Defensive Guide · Windows Event Log Guide · Sysmon Guide · CIS Control 8 Audit Log Management Guide