An attacker who switches off your sensors does not need to evade them, and the first sign is often silence rather than an alert. MITRE ATT&CK T1685 Disable or Modify Tools is the main technique of the Defense Impairment tactic (TA0112): stopping, degrading or reconfiguring EDR, antivirus, logging agents, cloud audit trails and the pipelines that carry their data. It was created in ATT&CK v19 (April 2026) to replace the revoked Impair Defenses technique and absorbs its tool, logging and indicator-blocking sub-techniques. This guide covers all seven v20 sub-techniques, the detection strategies and log sources MITRE maps to them, and the hardening that makes tampering hard and visible. It is for detection engineers, endpoint and cloud platform owners and incident responders, and covers defence only.
Key takeaways
- T1685 is one ID for many controls. Endpoint agents, Windows Event Log, cloud logs, Linux auditd, Unix log files, security tool user interfaces and AI-assisted defences all sit under it.
- It is the ransomware precursor. ATT&CK v20 links T1685 to 33 groups, 9 campaigns and more than 80 malware families; operators such as Akira, Play and Medusa Group disable tooling before encryption.
- Tampering needs privilege. Local admin, root, a cloud logging permission or an EDR console role. Removing standing privilege prevents more than any single detection.
- Detect the change and the gap. Pair event-based alerts (Security 1102, Defender 5001 and 5013, CloudTrail StopLogging) with heartbeat and drift analytics, because a well-executed tamper may leave no event.
- Protect the platform, not just the agent. Tamper protection, immutable audit configuration, off-host log storage and organisation-level cloud guardrails stop a local admin from silently removing visibility.
How the attack works
ATT&CK describes T1685 as disabling, degrading or tampering with security tools "to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities": stopping services, killing processes, editing configuration files and registry keys, or blocking updates. It also covers blocking or redirecting telemetry, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) sensors, event log configuration and SIEM forwarding, and more advanced methods such as abusing legitimate drivers to make tools non-functional. That driver route overlaps with T1687 Exploitation for Defense Impairment; see the BYOVD and EDR Killers Guide.
| Sub-technique (v20) | Platforms | What is impaired | Replaces |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1685 (parent) | Windows, Linux, macOS, ESXi, containers, IaaS, network devices | EDR, AV, IDS, sensors, update and forwarding mechanisms | Impair Defenses parent, Disable or Modify Tools and Indicator Blocking |
| T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log | Windows | EventLog service, audit policy, log channels and Autologger sessions | Disable Windows Event Logging |
| T1685.002 Disable or Modify Cloud Log | IaaS, SaaS, identity provider, office suite | CloudTrail and similar trails, log sinks, mailbox auditing, SaaS log exports | Disable or Modify Cloud Logs |
| T1685.003 Modify or Spoof Tool UI | Windows, Linux, macOS | Status displays showing protection as healthy after it was disabled | Spoof Security Alerting |
| T1685.004 Disable or Modify Linux Audit System Log | Linux | auditd service, audit.rules, auditd.conf | Disable or Modify Linux Audit System |
| T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs | Windows | System, Application and Security logs and .evtx files | Clear Windows Event Logs (formerly under Indicator Removal) |
| T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs | Linux, macOS | Files under /var/log such as auth.log, secure and wtmp | Clear Linux or Mac System Logs (formerly under Indicator Removal) |
| T1685.007 Impair Autonomous Defenses | Windows, SaaS | LLM-assisted triage and malware analysis, misled by embedded prompt text | New in v19 |
T1685.007 is worth noting: ATT&CK describes malware that carries fake system messages or embedded prompts so that an LLM-based analyser aborts, truncates or reports nothing. See the Prompt Injection Guide. For the tactic-level picture and the full revoked ID map, see the ATT&CK Stealth and Defense Impairment Tactics Guide.
Where it shows up
- Windows fleets: agent services stopped, Defender settings lowered or exclusions added, audit policy cleared and Security logs wiped, usually from a compromised admin or deployment account. ATT&CK records APT29 using AUDITPOL to stop audit collection and disabling monitoring services during the SolarWinds compromise.
- Cloud control planes: trails stopped or deleted, multi-region logging or log file validation turned off, sinks redirected, mailbox audit bypass set. ATT&CK records APT29 disabling Purview Audit on targeted accounts before stealing email.
- Linux and ESXi: auditd, rsyslog, journald and agent daemons stopped, audit rules edited, ESXi syslog reconfigured or hostd and vpxa stopped. See the ESXi Logs Detection Guide.
- Network devices: logging hosts, AAA and SNMP traps removed by configuration commit, a pattern ATT&CK records for Salt Typhoon, which disabled logging and forwarding to aggregators.
- Containers: security sidecars or admission controllers deleted, seccomp or AppArmor profiles modified, in-container agents killed.
Impact
- Blind period: everything after the tamper is invisible to the affected control, which is why ransomware crews do it shortly before encryption and exfiltration.
- Broken investigation: cleared logs and gaps in telemetry stop responders proving what was accessed, which affects breach notification decisions.
- False assurance: a spoofed UI (T1685.003) or an agent that reports healthy but has its key features off keeps compliance dashboards green.
- Wider reach: a tamper from a central console or cloud role affects every host or account in scope at once.
Detection
ATT&CK v20 maps DET0497 to the parent and a separate strategy to each sub-technique except .007. The table combines MITRE's analytics with the vendor event references.
| Target | Strategy | Signals and log sources |
|---|---|---|
| EDR and AV on Windows | DET0497 (AN1369) | Sysmon 5 (process terminated) for agent processes, Sysmon 13 and 14 on agent and Sysmon registry keys, System 7045 service install; Defender 5001 real-time protection disabled, 5007 configuration changed, 5010 and 5012 scanning disabled, 5013 tamper protection blocked a change |
| Windows Event Log | DET0187 | Security 1102, System 7035 for EventLog service control, Sysmon 13 and 14 on EventLog and Autologger keys, Sysmon 1 for auditpol and wevtutil |
| Event log clearing | DET0532 | Security 1102 correlated with Sysmon 1 and Sysmon 23 (file deleted) for files under C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\ |
| Cloud and SaaS logs | DET0289 | AWS CloudTrail StopLogging and DeleteTrail, Google Cloud UpdateSink, Entra and M365 audit configuration changes, Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation, SaaS log export integration removed |
| Linux audit | DET0062 | auditd EXECVE for auditctl or service stops, kill syscalls targeting auditd, file writes to /etc/audit/audit.rules or auditd.conf, syslog service stop messages |
| Linux and macOS log files | DET0520 | Deletion or truncation of files under /var/log/ by unusual processes or users |
| Tool UI spoofing | DET0311 | Security UI reporting healthy while the underlying service or process is stopped |
| Linux, macOS agents | DET0497 (AN1370, AN1371) | systemctl or kill against security daemons, unit file edits, launchctl unload of agent daemons, configuration profile changes |
| IaaS, containers, ESXi, network | DET0497 (AN1372 to AN1374, AN2044) | DeleteAlarms and monitoring disable calls, kubectl delete or patch of security pods, esxcli syslog changes, "no logging host" style commits |
Cloud providers add their own signals. AWS GuardDuty raises Stealth:IAMUser/CloudTrailLoggingDisabled and DefenseEvasion:IAMUser/BedrockLoggingDisabled. In Google Cloud, Admin Activity and System Event audit logs are always written and cannot be disabled or excluded, so a sink or Data Access change is itself recorded there. See the Cloud Logging and Audit Trail Guide.
Detections to build first
- Every Security 1102 and Defender 5001, 5010, 5012 outside a change window: rare in normal operations, so alert, do not just log.
- Defender 5013: a blocked tamper attempt means someone with access tried; treat it as an intrusion lead.
- New or widened AV and EDR exclusions: review 5007 and console audit logs for path, process and extension exclusions.
- Trail and sink changes: any stop, delete, retention cut or destination change for cloud audit logs.
- Silent sources: per-host and per-source heartbeat with a threshold based on normal reporting interval, and reconciliation between console "healthy" status and events actually received.
Metrics
- Sensor coverage: percentage of in-scope assets with an agent that reported in the last 24 hours. Target close to 100 percent.
- Tamper protection coverage: percentage of endpoints where
IsTamperProtectedreports True. - Median time to detect a silent source: measured with a scheduled, authorised test.
- Unattributed tamper events: 1102, 5001 and StopLogging events per month with no change record. Target zero.
- Exclusion hygiene: exclusions without an owner or past expiry.
Prevention and hardening
Endpoints
- Tamper protection (M1022, M1024): in Microsoft Defender it keeps real-time protection, behaviour monitoring and cloud protection on, ignores Group Policy changes to protected settings and raises an alert per attempt. Exclusions can be protected only when managed through Intune alone or Configuration Manager alone. Use troubleshooting mode for temporary changes instead of turning it off. Microsoft is renaming the setting controlled configuration, which must be deployed by policy.
- Driver controls (M1038): keep the Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist enforced (on by default from the Windows 11 2022 update, and enforced with memory integrity, Smart App Control or S mode), and enable the ASR rule "Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers". Microsoft advises testing an App Control blocklist in audit mode first.
- Least privilege (M1018, M1026): no standing local admin; LAPS for the built-in account; EDR console roles split so that the people who can disable protection are few, named and use phishing-resistant MFA. See the LAPS Guide.
- Remove old tools (M1042): uninstall previous security agent versions and legacy components the platform no longer needs.
Logging pipelines
- Off-host, fast (M1029): forward Windows, Linux and network logs promptly to a store host administrators cannot alter, so local clearing removes only the local copy. See the Log Management and Retention Guide.
- Restart forwarders (M1054): ATT&CK suggests relaunching forwarding mechanisms on a schedule or at logon, and change management for related configuration.
- Immutable Linux audit configuration: end
audit.ruleswith-e 2; the auditctl manual says this locks the configuration until reboot and audits and denies change attempts. Consider failure mode-f 2only where availability trade-offs are accepted. See the Linux Logging and auditd for Defenders Guide.
Cloud and SaaS
- Organisation-level trails: run trails and sinks from a central logging account with log file integrity validation enabled (SHA-256 hashes, signed hourly digests) and MFA Delete on the digest bucket, as AWS recommends.
- Guardrails: deny permissions such as
cloudtrail:StopLoggingandcloudtrail:DeleteTrailto everything except a break-glass role through organisation policies. See the AWS CloudTrail Guide. - Mailbox and tenant auditing: monitor audit bypass settings and licence downgrades for monitored users. See the Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log Guide.
Choosing controls by size
| Organisation | Priority |
|---|---|
| Small, single EDR, managed service | Tamper protection enforced from the console, alerts on 1102 and 5001, provider SLA for silent-agent alerts |
| Mid-size, hybrid | Add off-host Windows and Linux logs, auditd immutable mode, cloud trail guardrails, exclusion reviews |
| Large, multi-cloud | Organisation trails and sinks in a dedicated account, CI tests for detection content, console reconciliation and per-platform heartbeat analytics |
Phased rollout
- Baseline: record agent versions, tamper protection state, exclusions, audit policy, auditd rules and trail settings.
- Alert in report-only: run the first-build detections for two weeks to tune out maintenance noise and tie legitimate changes to tickets.
- Enforce on a pilot ring: tamper protection, driver blocklist and
-e 2on a representative group; rollback is policy removal, plus a reboot for auditd. - Apply cloud guardrails: start with a test organisational unit, then widen.
- Test: run authorised emulations each quarter and measure detection time. See the Purple Teaming Guide.
Lessons from incidents
- Logging disabled on network devices: the Salt Typhoon telecom intrusions involved clearing logs on devices; ATT&CK also records the group disabling logging and log distribution to aggregators. Off-device syslog and configuration drift checks are the counter.
- Audit policy is a target: ATT&CK's record of AUDITPOL use in the SolarWinds compromise shows why effective audit policy should be compared with the baseline continuously.
- Cloud audit is per account: APT29 disabling Purview Audit on chosen mailboxes shows that tenant-wide "audit on" is not enough; monitor per-user bypass settings.
- Response matters: when a tamper is confirmed, contain the host, restore the control centrally and reconstruct the blind period from network, identity and cloud logs. See the EDR Tampering and BYOVD Response Playbook.
Framework mapping
| Framework | References |
|---|---|
| ATT&CK mitigations | M1018, M1047, M1022, M1042, M1054, M1038, M1024 (parent); M1029, M1041 (log clearing); M1026 (.007) |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | AU-9 Protection of Audit Information, AU-12 Audit Record Generation, SI-4 System Monitoring, SI-3 Malicious Code Protection, CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change, AC-6 Least Privilege |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.PS-04 (log records generated and available), DE.CM-09 (monitoring of software and runtime environments), PR.PS-01 (configuration management) |
| CIS Controls v8.1 | Control 8 Audit Log Management, Control 10 Malware Defenses |
| MITRE D3FEND | D3-ACH Application Configuration Hardening, D3-FIM File Integrity Monitoring, D3-PA Process Analysis |
Where identity fits
Every T1685 sub-technique needs an identity allowed to change a security control: a local administrator, a software deployment service account, an EDR console role or a cloud principal with logging permissions. Those accounts are rarely reviewed as security-critical. Inventory them, remove standing rights, require just-in-time elevation for console roles, and alert when a service account touches security tooling or audit configuration. See the Service Account Security Guide.
Practitioner checklist
- Remap old Impair Defenses content to T1685 and its sub-techniques and retest each rule.
- Alert on Security 1102, Defender 5001, 5010, 5012 and 5013, and cloud trail stop or delete events.
- Enforce tamper protection centrally and manage exclusions only from the central tool.
- Keep the vulnerable driver blocklist enforced and the vulnerable signed driver ASR rule on.
- Forward logs off-host quickly and lock Linux audit rules with immutable mode.
- Run cloud trails and sinks from a central account with integrity validation and deny guardrails.
- Build heartbeat and console reconciliation analytics for every sensor and log source.
- Review who and what can disable security tooling, including service accounts, every quarter.
- Test LLM-assisted triage against prompt text embedded in samples before trusting its verdicts.
Standards and references
- MITRE ATT&CK: Disable or Modify Tools (T1685)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Clear Windows Event Logs (T1685.005)
- MITRE ATT&CK: Disable or Modify Cloud Log (T1685.002)
- Microsoft Learn: Protect security settings with tamper protection
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Defender Antivirus event IDs and error codes
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft recommended driver block rules
- AWS: Validating CloudTrail log file integrity
- Linux man-pages: auditctl(8)
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: EDR Evasion and Defence Guide · Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver and EDR Killers Guide · Windows Event Log Guide · ATT&CK Stealth and Defense Impairment Tactics Guide · Ransomware Prevention Guide