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PIPEDREAM (INCONTROLLER) ICS Toolkit Guide: Detection and OT Defences

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 12 min read
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PIPEDREAM, also tracked as INCONTROLLER, is a modular toolkit built to discover, manipulate and disrupt industrial controllers, and it was found before anyone is publicly known to have used it against a live plant. In April 2022 the US Department of Energy, CISA, NSA and FBI published joint advisory AA22-103A describing tools aimed at Schneider Electric and OMRON programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and at OPC UA servers. This guide explains what the toolkit does, who the public reporting says built it, which ATT&CK for ICS techniques it maps to, and how asset owners can detect and blunt it. It is written for OT security engineers, control system owners and SOC teams that monitor industrial networks. For the wider context of state conflict in cyberspace, see the Cyber Warfare Guide.

Key takeaways

  • It is a framework, not a single implant. Separate modules target Schneider Electric Modicon PLCs, OMRON Sysmac NJ and NX PLCs, OPC UA servers and Windows engineering workstations, with a console that lowers the skill needed to use them.
  • It abuses native engineering functions. Most capabilities use legitimate protocols such as CODESYS, Modbus, FINS, HTTP and OPC UA, so signature detection alone will miss modified versions.
  • Credentials are the main hinge. The tools brute force PLC passwords, log in with default or stolen OPC UA credentials and use hardcoded device credentials, so device authentication hygiene directly reduces risk.
  • Attribution is cautious. Dragos tracks the developer as CHERNOVITE and Mandiant judged a state sponsor very likely, citing circumstantial links to Russia; the US advisory names an APT actor without naming a country.
  • Preparation beats reaction. Segmentation, MFA on all OT remote access, known-good offline backups, driver load monitoring and continuous OT network monitoring are the controls the advisory prioritises.

Who they are (names and aliases)

PIPEDREAM is the name used by Dragos; INCONTROLLER is the name used by Mandiant, and MITRE ATT&CK for ICS records the software as S1045 INCONTROLLER with PIPEDREAM as an alias. Dragos calls it the seventh known ICS-specific malware, after STUXNET, HAVEX, BLACKENERGY2, CRASHOVERRIDE and TRISIS. The table summarises the components as named in public reporting.

Component (Mandiant name)TargetReported capabilities
TAGRUNOPC UA serversScans for OPC servers, enumerates structure and tags, brute forces credentials, reads and potentially writes tag values
CODECALLSchneider Electric Modicon PLCs (Mandiant names M251, M258, M221 Nano)Uses Modbus and CODESYS to scan, brute force credentials, transfer and delete files, crash devices and send raw packets
OMSHELLOMRON NX1P2 and NJ501 PLCs, R88D-1SN10F-ECT servo driveUses HTTP, Telnet and FINS to wipe program memory, reset devices, enable Telnet, load an agent and kill processes
ASRock driver exploitWindows engineering workstationsLoads a vulnerable ASRock-signed driver (AsrDrv103.sys) to run code in the kernel
ICECOREWindows hostsReconnaissance and command and control backdoor

Developer: Dragos tracks the group behind the framework as CHERNOVITE and assesses with high confidence that a state actor developed it for future operations. Mandiant wrote that INCONTROLLER is very likely linked to a state-sponsored group and that the activity is consistent with Russia's historical interest in ICS, while stating its evidence for the Russia link is largely circumstantial. AA22-103A attributes the tools to APT actors and does not name a state. Use the attribution in exactly that hedged form in briefings.

Targeting and motivation

The advisory lists the affected Schneider Electric devices as MODICON and MODICON Nano PLCs including TM251, TM241, M258, M238, LMC058 and LMC078, and the OMRON devices as Sysmac NJ and NX PLCs including NX1P2, NX-SL3300, NX-ECC203, NJ501-1300, S8VK and R88D-1SN10F-ECT. Because the CODESYS runtime is used by many controller makers, Dragos warns that CODESYS-based PLCs beyond Schneider may be exposed to the same approach.

  • Sectors: Dragos says the framework targets liquefied natural gas and electric power environments and could be adapted more broadly. Mandiant notes the targeted devices sit inside machinery across many industries, such as milling machines and presses.
  • Geography: Mandiant judged the greatest threat to be to Ukraine, NATO member states and others responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
  • Intent: Capabilities include crashing devices, wiping controller memory and modifying servo drive parameters. That points to disruption and possible physical damage rather than theft or extortion. Mandiant also noted the tooling has limited value for financially motivated operations.
  • Deployment status: Dragos assessed the framework had not been deployed in the wild. No public source we reviewed describes a confirmed operational use, so treat it as a capability to prepare for.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

The advisory stresses that the tools work once an actor already has access to the OT network. The mapping below uses the ATT&CK for ICS v20 entries recorded for S1045.

TacticTechniqueHow INCONTROLLER uses it
DiscoveryT0846.003 Multicast Discovery; T0846.001 Port ScanUDP multicast to port 27127 to find Schneider PLCs; scans for OPC UA on TCP 4840
DiscoveryT0888 Remote System Information DiscoveryModbus requests for device identifiers
CollectionT0861 Point & Tag Identification; T0845 Program UploadReads OPC UA structure; uploads programs from Schneider PLCs over CODESYS
Lateral movementT0859 Valid Accounts; T1694.002 Hardcoded CredentialsBrute forces CODESYS passwords (UDP 1740); logs in to OMRON PLCs with hardcoded credentials
Lateral movementT0843 Program Download; T0867 Lateral Tool TransferDownloads logic to PLCs; loads an agent onto OMRON PLCs over Telnet
Initial access, lateral movementT0886 Remote ServicesUses CODESYS maintenance functions on Schneider PLCs
Command and controlT0869 Standard Application Layer Protocol; T0884 Connection ProxyHTTP or HTTPS commands to the OMRON agent; adds routes through the CODESYS gateway
Execution, evasionT0858 Change Operating ModeChanges OMRON PLC operating mode over HTTP
Impair process controlT0836 Modify Parameter; T1692.001 Command MessageModifies EtherCAT servo drive parameters; writes Modbus registers
Inhibit response functionT0809 Data Destruction; T0814 Denial of ServiceWipes OMRON PLC memory; the advisory describes denial of service and a crafted packet that crashes PLCs
Privilege escalationT0890 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationExploits the ASRock driver on Windows

For how to read ICS tactics and turn them into analytics, see the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Guide and the ATT&CK for ICS Impair Process Control Tactic Guide.

How they abuse identities and credentials

Controllers and OPC UA servers are machine identities: they authenticate engineering software, other servers and HMIs, usually with shared passwords or application certificates that rarely rotate. INCONTROLLER attacks each of those trust points.

  • PLC passwords: CODECALL brute forces CODESYS and other protocol passwords, and the advisory describes severing sessions to capture credentials when operators reconnect. Long, device-unique passwords and lockout or rate limits where the firmware supports them raise the cost.
  • Default and stolen OPC UA credentials: TAGRUN connects with default or previously compromised credentials. AA22-103A asks owners to enable OPC UA application authentication with explicit trust lists and to store certificate private keys and user passwords securely.
  • Hardcoded device credentials: ATT&CK records OMRON logins using hardcoded credentials (T1694.002). These cannot be rotated by the owner, so the compensating control is network restriction and vendor firmware updates.
  • Engineering workstation accounts: The Windows tooling targets the hosts that hold project files and PLC passwords. Admin accounts on those hosts should be used only for tasks such as software updates, as the advisory recommends, and should be managed as privileged accounts.

See the Identity for OT Environments Guide and the OT and ICS Identity and Access Guide for credential governance patterns that suit controllers.

Notable incidents

There is no public, confirmed case of PIPEDREAM causing an outage. The notable events are its discovery and disclosure.

  • 13 April 2022: DOE, CISA, NSA and FBI publish AA22-103A; Mandiant (with Schneider Electric) and Dragos publish their analyses the same day. CISA revised the advisory on 14 April (resources) and 25 May 2022 (mitigations).
  • Vendor response: Schneider Electric and OMRON worked with the agencies; the acknowledgements in AA22-103A also thank Dragos, Mandiant, Microsoft and Palo Alto Networks.
  • Lineage: PIPEDREAM sits in a short list of ICS-specific malware. Compare its design with TRITON and Industroyer in the ICS Malware History Guide.

Detection and defence

Mandiant states that indicator-based detection is unlikely to work because operators would modify the tools, so focus on behaviour and on the engineering functions the toolkit abuses.

What to monitor

SignalSourceWhy it matters
UDP 27127 multicast discovery, UDP 1740 CODESYS traffic and TCP 502 Modbus writes from hosts that are not approved engineering workstationsOT network sensor, ICS-aware firewallPorts named in AA22-103A; note UDP 27127 is also used by legitimate engineering tools, so baseline first
Repeated failed PLC or OPC UA loginsOPC UA server audit logs, controller logsBrute forcing by CODECALL and TAGRUN
Telnet enabled on OMRON PLCs, program memory wipes, resets, file transfersPLC event logs, change management recordsBehaviours Mandiant lists for OMSHELL
ARP scanning followed by unusual Modbus or CODESYS sessions; HTTP POST requests carrying OMRON API commandsNetwork monitoring, full packet captureHunting leads from Mandiant
Loading of ASRock drivers on hosts that do not need themEDR, Windows driver load telemetryAA22-103A recommends monitoring for unusual driver loads
Communication delays, failures needing reboots, slow responses to operator commandsOperator reports, historianThe advisory asks owners to investigate these as possible denial of service or connection severing

CISA's open-source ICSNPP protocol parsers for Zeek are cited in the advisory as a visibility option. See the OT Network Security Monitoring Guide.

Phased hardening plan

  1. Inventory first (weeks 1 to 4): list every Schneider, OMRON, CODESYS-based and OPC UA asset, its firmware and which workstations may talk to it. See the OT Asset Visibility Guide.
  2. Back up before you change anything: take known-good offline copies of PLC logic and configuration, hash them and store the hashes separately, as the advisory recommends. This is also your rollback point.
  3. Restrict conduits: limit controller connections to named engineering workstations, block OPC UA and FINS at the IT/OT boundary and filter insecure programming protocols. Run new firewall rules in monitor or alert mode for one maintenance cycle, then enforce; keep the previous rule set ready to restore.
  4. Fix authentication: change every default password to a device-unique value, enable OPC UA application authentication with explicit trust lists and enforce MFA on all remote access into the ICS network. Pilot on a non-critical line first.
  5. Harden engineering workstations: enable Device Guard, Credential Guard and HVCI, deploy EDR, remove unneeded applications and use the vulnerable driver blocklist where the OS supports it. Test vendor engineering software compatibility on one host before fleet rollout.
  6. Monitor and exercise: deploy continuous OT monitoring, retain logs from ICS and management subnets, and run a tabletop that walks through a PLC wipe scenario with IT, security and operations. See the OT Incident Response Guide.

Decision guidance

  • Small sites with one integrator: prioritise segmentation, password changes and offline backups; a passive sensor on the main controller switch gives most of the visibility value. Contract the integrator to the same remote access rules (see the OT Third-Party and Integrator Access Guide).
  • Large multi-site operators: add an OT SOC function with protocol-aware analytics and centrally managed allowlists of approved engineering hosts and commands.
  • Passive versus active discovery: prefer passive monitoring on fragile controllers; use active queries only in agreed windows (see the Safe Active Scanning and Testing in OT Guide).

Common failure patterns

  • Leaving OPC UA security mode set to none or accepting any client certificate, which lets TAGRUN connect with no credential at all.
  • Shared PLC passwords reused across a whole site, so one brute forced value opens every controller.
  • Backups stored on the same engineering workstation the toolkit targets, which removes the recovery path.
  • Treating slow HMI response and unexplained controller reboots as maintenance issues and never escalating them to security.
  • Flat networks where corporate hosts can reach controller ports directly.

Metrics

  • Percentage of controllers and OPC UA servers with non-default, device-unique credentials.
  • Percentage of PLCs with a verified, hashed offline backup taken in the last 90 days.
  • Number of hosts able to reach controller programming ports, against the approved list (target: equal).
  • Percentage of OT remote access sessions protected by MFA (target: 100).
  • Mean time to triage an alert on a PLC mode change or program download outside a change window.

Framework mapping

Control areaNIST CSF 2.0NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Asset inventoryID.AM-01CM-8
Segmentation and remote accessPR.IR-01SC-7, AC-17
Device and user authenticationPR.AA-01, PR.AA-03IA-2, IA-5
Least functionality and privilegePR.PS-01, PR.AA-05CM-7, AC-6
Backups and integrityPR.DS-11CP-9, SI-7
Monitoring and responseDE.CM-01, RS.MA-01SI-4, IR-4

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 gives the OT-specific interpretation of these controls; see the NIST SP 800-82 OT Security Guide.

Practitioner checklist

  • Confirm whether you run any of the Schneider Electric, OMRON, CODESYS-based or OPC UA products named in AA22-103A.
  • Take and hash offline backups of controller logic and configuration before any hardening change.
  • Restrict controller programming ports to named engineering workstations and block OPC UA and FINS at the IT/OT boundary.
  • Replace default PLC and OPC UA passwords with device-unique values and enable OPC UA application authentication with trust lists.
  • Require MFA for every remote access path into the ICS network, including vendor access.
  • Enable Credential Guard, HVCI and EDR on engineering workstations and alert on unusual driver loads.
  • Baseline UDP 27127, UDP 1740 and TCP 502 traffic and alert on new sources.
  • Exercise a PLC wipe and restore scenario with operations at least once a year.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: OT Security Guide · PLC Security Guide · Industrial Protocol Security Guide · Cyber Warfare Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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