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Hayabusa and Chainsaw Guide: Fast Sigma Triage of Windows Event Logs

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 8 November 2026 11 min read
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When a Windows host is suspected of compromise, responders need to know within minutes what the event logs show, and loading gigabytes of EVTX into a SIEM or reading them in Event Viewer is too slow. Hayabusa and Chainsaw are free, Rust-based command-line tools that run Sigma and their own detection rules directly against EVTX files and produce a prioritised timeline of suspicious events. This guide explains what each tool does, how they differ, how to run them safely on evidence and live hosts, and how to turn their findings into better detections. It goes deeper than the Open Source DFIR Tools Landscape Guide and is for incident responders, threat hunters and SOC analysts. Commands and options were checked against the projects' repositories (Hayabusa 4.2.1 and Chainsaw 2.17.1 source versions) on 27 October 2026; both tools change quickly, so confirm against --help for the version you deploy.

This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on the public documentation for Chainsaw and Hayabusa as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by WithSecure or Yamato Security. Product features change, so confirm settings against each project's current documentation.

Key takeaways

  • Both tools apply detection logic offline. They read EVTX (and JSON-formatted logs) directly, so triage works on collected evidence with no SIEM, agent or network connection.
  • Hayabusa is the timeline engine; Chainsaw is the multi-artefact hunter. Hayabusa focuses on event log timelines with full Sigma support, including correlation rules; Chainsaw adds MFT rules, Shimcache and Amcache execution timelines, SRUM analysis and event log gap detection.
  • Hayabusa 4.0 changed the command line. csv-timeline and json-timeline were merged into dfir-timeline with -t csv|json|jsonl; older runbooks need updating.
  • Rule choice controls noise. Hayabusa's scan wizard maps to Sigma rule packages (core, core+, core++, plus emerging threats and threat hunting add-ons); start with core for triage and widen deliberately.
  • Expect EDR alerts on the tools themselves. Rule files contain strings such as "mimikatz"; plan scoped exclusions or verified builds before an incident, not during one.

What the tool does

Both projects parse Windows XML event logs at high speed, match each record against detection rules and output only what matters, with timestamps, computer, event ID, rule title and level. They are complementary rather than competing.

AttributeHayabusaChainsaw
MaintainerYamato SecurityWithSecure Labs (originally WithSecure Countercept)
Language and platformsRust; Windows, Linux, macOSRust; Windows, Linux, macOS
LicenceTool AGPLv3; Sigma and Hayabusa rules under the Detection Rule License 1.1GPL-3.0
InputsEVTX files or directories, live local logs (-l, administrator), JSON or JSONL logs (-J)EVTX (XML or JSON), MFT, registry hives, Amcache, SRUM and ESE databases
Detection rulesSigma (converted to Hayabusa format, including v2 correlation rules) and Hayabusa rules, updated with update-rulesSigma via a mapping file (mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.yml) and Chainsaw rules (EVTX and MFT)
Main commandsdfir-timeline, logon-summary, eid-metrics, computer-metrics, log-metrics, pivot-keywords-list, search, extract-base64, level-tuninghunt, search, analyse shimcache, analyse srum, analyse gaps, dump
OutputsCSV (default), JSON, JSONL; HTML summary report (-H); Timesketch profilesTerminal tables, CSV, JSON, log format
EnrichmentMITRE ATT&CK tactic and tag columns, GeoIP (MaxMind database), field data mapping, Base64 decoding, record carving from slack space (-x)Amcache enrichment of Shimcache, near timestamp pairing, SRUM table resolution from the SOFTWARE hive

Hayabusa rule sets and output profiles

  • Scan wizard: enabled by default for dfir-timeline. core loads test or stable rules at high or critical; core+ lowers to medium; core++ adds experimental rules; Emerging Threats and Threat Hunting add-ons are optional. -w disables the wizard and loads all rules.
  • Filtering: -m sets the minimum level, -E scans only common event IDs, -P loads only proven rules, and noisy or deprecated rules are off unless -n or -D is set. Channel filtering skips rules that cannot match the logs loaded, which is a large part of its speed.
  • Profiles: minimal, standard (default), verbose, all-field-info, all-field-info-verbose, super-verbose, and timesketch-minimal or timesketch-verbose for import.
  • Time: output is local time by default; use -U for UTC, -O for original ISO 8601 (always UTC) or -Z "+HH:MM" for a fixed offset. Standardise on UTC for multi-host cases.

Defender use cases

Use caseTool and commandWhat it surfacesRelated ATT&CK technique
First look at a suspect hostHayabusa dfir-timeline with core rules and -H reportHigh and critical detections grouped by rule and host, first and last detection times(broad)
Brute force and sprayingHayabusa logon-summary; event count correlation rules on 4625Successful and failed logons by account and source; threshold alertsT1110.001 Password Guessing, T1110.003 Password Spraying
Lateral movementChainsaw hunt with lateral_movement and rdp_attacks rules; Hayabusa logon rulesNetwork, RDP and service logons and their sourcesT1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
PersistenceEither tool; Chainsaw service_installation and persistence rulesNew services (System 7045), scheduled tasks, Run key changes from SysmonT1543.003 Windows Service, T1053.005 Scheduled Task
Account manipulationChainsaw account_tampering rulesUsers created or added to sensitive groupsT1136.001 Local Account, T1098 Account Manipulation
Log tamperingChainsaw log_tampering rules and analyse gapsSecurity log cleared (1102), event log service stopped, EventRecordID holes and long silent windowsT1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs, T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log
Security tool impairmentChainsaw antivirus and defense_evasion rulesDefender and other AV detections and configuration changesT1685 Disable or Modify Tools
Obfuscated PowerShellHayabusa extract-base64; PowerShell rules in bothDecoded script blocks and encoded command lines (4104, 4103)T1059.001 PowerShell, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
Execution without process loggingChainsaw analyse shimcache with --amcache and --tspair; MFT rules for known toolingExecution timeline and presence of tools such as remote access and credential dumping utilitiesT1204.002 Malicious File
Scoping unusual entitiesHayabusa pivot-keywords-list, computer-metrics, eid-metricsLists of suspicious users, hosts and processes to pivot on; logging coverage per host(scoping)

A triage workflow

  1. Collect: copy C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs (and Sysmon logs if deployed) with a triage collector, hash the package and work on a copy. See the KAPE and Triage Collection Guide.
  2. Check coverage: run eid-metrics and log-metrics to see which channels exist, their time span and whether key events (4688, 4104, Sysmon) were logged at all.
  3. Prioritise: run Hayabusa dfir-timeline with core rules, -U and -H report.html; read critical and high results first.
  4. Cross-check: run Chainsaw hunt with Sigma plus Chainsaw rules, and analyse gaps to test whether logs were selectively deleted.
  5. Pivot: take accounts, hosts and times from detections into search, into a full Plaso timeline, or into SIEM queries. See the Plaso Guide.
  6. Widen: rerun with core+ or core++ only when core results do not explain the activity, and record which rule set produced each finding.

Event ID meanings and audit policy prerequisites are in the Windows Event Log Guide. At scale, both tools are commonly run through Velociraptor artifacts across many endpoints; see the Velociraptor Guide.

Deployment and safe use

  • Obtain verified builds: download release binaries from the official GitHub releases pages and verify them, or build from source (cargo build --release for Chainsaw). Both projects advise compiling yourself if you are concerned about supply chain risk.
  • Plan for AV and EDR: both projects document that security products may flag the binary or rule files because rules contain attacker strings. Pre-agree a narrow exclusion for a dedicated forensic directory on analysis hosts, rather than disabling real-time protection during an incident. Never add broad exclusions on production endpoints. See the EDR Tuning and Exclusions Management Guide.
  • Prefer offline analysis: run against collected logs on a forensic workstation. Live analysis (-l) requires administrator rights on a possibly compromised host and changes its state; use it only when collection is impossible and record that you did.
  • Pin rule versions: update-rules syncs Hayabusa rules from the hayabusa-rules repository; for Chainsaw clone SigmaHQ separately. Record the rule commit or date with each case so results can be reproduced, and test updated rules on a reference log set before using them in a live case.
  • Handle output as evidence: timelines contain usernames, hostnames, IP addresses and command lines that may include secrets. Hash output files and store them with the case. See the Evidence Handling and Chain of Custody Guide.
  • Licensing: internal use, consulting and incident response are permitted under AGPLv3 (Hayabusa) and GPL-3.0 (Chainsaw). Modified versions provided to others, including Hayabusa offered as a network service, carry source-sharing obligations; the Detection Rule License requires attribution when rules are reused. Have legal review any productised use.

Detection and hardening value

These tools are only as good as the logs they read. Every triage run is also an audit of your logging.

Gap shown by triageHardening actionFramework reference
No 4688 or command-line dataEnable process creation auditing with command line, or deploy Sysmon; see the Sysmon GuideNIST SP 800-53 AU-12, SI-4
No PowerShell 4104 eventsEnable Script Block Logging; see the PowerShell Security GuideNIST SP 800-53 SI-4
Logs roll over within daysIncrease log sizes and forward off-host; see the Windows Event Forwarding GuideNIST SP 800-53 AU-11
1102 or RecordID gaps foundAlert centrally on log clearing; protect forwarded copiesNIST SP 800-53 AU-9; T1685.005
Triage detection with no SIEM alertDeploy the same Sigma rule to the SIEM; see the Sigma Rules GuideNIST CSF 2.0 DE.AE-02

Where identity fits

logon-summary and the logon rules are the fastest way to see which accounts authenticated where. Review service accounts and other non-human identities separately: an interactive or RDP logon by a service account, or one from a new source host, is a strong signal. See the Service Account Security Guide and the Active Directory Security Monitoring and Event Guide.

Measuring the capability

  • Time to triage: minutes from receiving a host's logs to a reviewed critical and high detection list (target under 30 minutes).
  • Coverage score: share of in-scope hosts whose logs contain 4688 or Sysmon 1, 4104, and at least 30 days of Security log.
  • Detection parity: share of triage findings already alerted by the SIEM; every miss becomes a rule ticket.
  • False positive rate per rule set: tracked so the team knows when core+ is worth the noise.
  • Rule currency: age of the rule set on analysis hosts.

Common failure patterns

  • Trusting an empty result: no detections on a host with default audit policy may mean no logging, not no attack; check eid-metrics first.
  • Running everything at once: core++ plus noisy rules on a domain controller buries the real findings; triage in rings.
  • Mixed time zones: Hayabusa defaults to local time and Chainsaw to UTC unless --local or --timezone is set; merge outputs only after normalising.
  • Stale runbooks: commands from Hayabusa 2.x and 3.x (csv-timeline, json-timeline -L) fail on 4.x.
  • Disabling protection under pressure: turning off real-time protection to make a tool run on a production host creates new risk; prepare exclusions on forensic workstations in advance.

Alternatives

OptionChoose it whenTrade-off
HayabusaYou need a fast, Sigma-complete event log timeline and logon summariesFocused on event logs
ChainsawYou want event log hunting plus MFT, Shimcache, Amcache, SRUM and gap analysis in one binarySigma rules run through a mapping file
SIEM with forwarded logsLogs are centralised and retainedOnly covers what was forwarded before the incident
Plaso super timelineYou need events from logs, file system, registry and browsers togetherSlower, with no built-in Sigma detection
Endpoint agent hunts (for example Velociraptor)Fleet-wide hunting for the same indicatorNeeds an agent deployed beforehand

Small teams can keep both binaries and a pinned rule set on a forensic USB or workstation for ad hoc triage. Larger teams run them in automated pipelines on every collected triage package and push JSONL output into the SIEM or Timesketch.

Practitioner checklist

  • Stage verified Hayabusa and Chainsaw binaries and pinned rule sets on forensic workstations.
  • Agree narrow AV and EDR exclusions for the forensic tool directory in advance.
  • Update runbooks to Hayabusa dfir-timeline syntax and record tool and rule versions per case.
  • Run coverage metrics before trusting any empty result.
  • Triage with core rules, then widen to core+ and core++ deliberately.
  • Run Chainsaw analyse gaps on every case where log tampering is plausible.
  • Normalise all output to UTC before merging timelines.
  • Turn each triage-only detection into a SIEM rule and each logging gap into a hardening ticket.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Open Source DFIR Tools Landscape Guide · Sigma Rules Guide · Windows Event Log Guide · Plaso Guide · Forensic Timeline Analysis Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 8 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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