When a Windows host is suspected of compromise, responders need to know within minutes what the event logs show, and loading gigabytes of EVTX into a SIEM or reading them in Event Viewer is too slow. Hayabusa and Chainsaw are free, Rust-based command-line tools that run Sigma and their own detection rules directly against EVTX files and produce a prioritised timeline of suspicious events. This guide explains what each tool does, how they differ, how to run them safely on evidence and live hosts, and how to turn their findings into better detections. It goes deeper than the Open Source DFIR Tools Landscape Guide and is for incident responders, threat hunters and SOC analysts. Commands and options were checked against the projects' repositories (Hayabusa 4.2.1 and Chainsaw 2.17.1 source versions) on 27 October 2026; both tools change quickly, so confirm against --help for the version you deploy.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on the public documentation for Chainsaw and Hayabusa as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by WithSecure or Yamato Security. Product features change, so confirm settings against each project's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Both tools apply detection logic offline. They read EVTX (and JSON-formatted logs) directly, so triage works on collected evidence with no SIEM, agent or network connection.
- Hayabusa is the timeline engine; Chainsaw is the multi-artefact hunter. Hayabusa focuses on event log timelines with full Sigma support, including correlation rules; Chainsaw adds MFT rules, Shimcache and Amcache execution timelines, SRUM analysis and event log gap detection.
- Hayabusa 4.0 changed the command line.
csv-timelineandjson-timelinewere merged intodfir-timelinewith-t csv|json|jsonl; older runbooks need updating. - Rule choice controls noise. Hayabusa's scan wizard maps to Sigma rule packages (core, core+, core++, plus emerging threats and threat hunting add-ons); start with core for triage and widen deliberately.
- Expect EDR alerts on the tools themselves. Rule files contain strings such as "mimikatz"; plan scoped exclusions or verified builds before an incident, not during one.
What the tool does
Both projects parse Windows XML event logs at high speed, match each record against detection rules and output only what matters, with timestamps, computer, event ID, rule title and level. They are complementary rather than competing.
| Attribute | Hayabusa | Chainsaw |
|---|---|---|
| Maintainer | Yamato Security | WithSecure Labs (originally WithSecure Countercept) |
| Language and platforms | Rust; Windows, Linux, macOS | Rust; Windows, Linux, macOS |
| Licence | Tool AGPLv3; Sigma and Hayabusa rules under the Detection Rule License 1.1 | GPL-3.0 |
| Inputs | EVTX files or directories, live local logs (-l, administrator), JSON or JSONL logs (-J) | EVTX (XML or JSON), MFT, registry hives, Amcache, SRUM and ESE databases |
| Detection rules | Sigma (converted to Hayabusa format, including v2 correlation rules) and Hayabusa rules, updated with update-rules | Sigma via a mapping file (mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.yml) and Chainsaw rules (EVTX and MFT) |
| Main commands | dfir-timeline, logon-summary, eid-metrics, computer-metrics, log-metrics, pivot-keywords-list, search, extract-base64, level-tuning | hunt, search, analyse shimcache, analyse srum, analyse gaps, dump |
| Outputs | CSV (default), JSON, JSONL; HTML summary report (-H); Timesketch profiles | Terminal tables, CSV, JSON, log format |
| Enrichment | MITRE ATT&CK tactic and tag columns, GeoIP (MaxMind database), field data mapping, Base64 decoding, record carving from slack space (-x) | Amcache enrichment of Shimcache, near timestamp pairing, SRUM table resolution from the SOFTWARE hive |
Hayabusa rule sets and output profiles
- Scan wizard: enabled by default for
dfir-timeline.coreloadstestorstablerules athighorcritical;core+lowers tomedium;core++addsexperimentalrules; Emerging Threats and Threat Hunting add-ons are optional.-wdisables the wizard and loads all rules. - Filtering:
-msets the minimum level,-Escans only common event IDs,-Ploads only proven rules, and noisy or deprecated rules are off unless-nor-Dis set. Channel filtering skips rules that cannot match the logs loaded, which is a large part of its speed. - Profiles:
minimal,standard(default),verbose,all-field-info,all-field-info-verbose,super-verbose, andtimesketch-minimalortimesketch-verbosefor import. - Time: output is local time by default; use
-Ufor UTC,-Ofor original ISO 8601 (always UTC) or-Z "+HH:MM"for a fixed offset. Standardise on UTC for multi-host cases.
Defender use cases
| Use case | Tool and command | What it surfaces | Related ATT&CK technique |
|---|---|---|---|
| First look at a suspect host | Hayabusa dfir-timeline with core rules and -H report | High and critical detections grouped by rule and host, first and last detection times | (broad) |
| Brute force and spraying | Hayabusa logon-summary; event count correlation rules on 4625 | Successful and failed logons by account and source; threshold alerts | T1110.001 Password Guessing, T1110.003 Password Spraying |
| Lateral movement | Chainsaw hunt with lateral_movement and rdp_attacks rules; Hayabusa logon rules | Network, RDP and service logons and their sources | T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
| Persistence | Either tool; Chainsaw service_installation and persistence rules | New services (System 7045), scheduled tasks, Run key changes from Sysmon | T1543.003 Windows Service, T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
| Account manipulation | Chainsaw account_tampering rules | Users created or added to sensitive groups | T1136.001 Local Account, T1098 Account Manipulation |
| Log tampering | Chainsaw log_tampering rules and analyse gaps | Security log cleared (1102), event log service stopped, EventRecordID holes and long silent windows | T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs, T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log |
| Security tool impairment | Chainsaw antivirus and defense_evasion rules | Defender and other AV detections and configuration changes | T1685 Disable or Modify Tools |
| Obfuscated PowerShell | Hayabusa extract-base64; PowerShell rules in both | Decoded script blocks and encoded command lines (4104, 4103) | T1059.001 PowerShell, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information |
| Execution without process logging | Chainsaw analyse shimcache with --amcache and --tspair; MFT rules for known tooling | Execution timeline and presence of tools such as remote access and credential dumping utilities | T1204.002 Malicious File |
| Scoping unusual entities | Hayabusa pivot-keywords-list, computer-metrics, eid-metrics | Lists of suspicious users, hosts and processes to pivot on; logging coverage per host | (scoping) |
A triage workflow
- Collect: copy
C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs(and Sysmon logs if deployed) with a triage collector, hash the package and work on a copy. See the KAPE and Triage Collection Guide. - Check coverage: run
eid-metricsandlog-metricsto see which channels exist, their time span and whether key events (4688, 4104, Sysmon) were logged at all. - Prioritise: run Hayabusa
dfir-timelinewith core rules,-Uand-H report.html; read critical and high results first. - Cross-check: run Chainsaw
huntwith Sigma plus Chainsaw rules, andanalyse gapsto test whether logs were selectively deleted. - Pivot: take accounts, hosts and times from detections into
search, into a full Plaso timeline, or into SIEM queries. See the Plaso Guide. - Widen: rerun with core+ or core++ only when core results do not explain the activity, and record which rule set produced each finding.
Event ID meanings and audit policy prerequisites are in the Windows Event Log Guide. At scale, both tools are commonly run through Velociraptor artifacts across many endpoints; see the Velociraptor Guide.
Deployment and safe use
- Obtain verified builds: download release binaries from the official GitHub releases pages and verify them, or build from source (
cargo build --releasefor Chainsaw). Both projects advise compiling yourself if you are concerned about supply chain risk. - Plan for AV and EDR: both projects document that security products may flag the binary or rule files because rules contain attacker strings. Pre-agree a narrow exclusion for a dedicated forensic directory on analysis hosts, rather than disabling real-time protection during an incident. Never add broad exclusions on production endpoints. See the EDR Tuning and Exclusions Management Guide.
- Prefer offline analysis: run against collected logs on a forensic workstation. Live analysis (
-l) requires administrator rights on a possibly compromised host and changes its state; use it only when collection is impossible and record that you did. - Pin rule versions:
update-rulessyncs Hayabusa rules from the hayabusa-rules repository; for Chainsaw clone SigmaHQ separately. Record the rule commit or date with each case so results can be reproduced, and test updated rules on a reference log set before using them in a live case. - Handle output as evidence: timelines contain usernames, hostnames, IP addresses and command lines that may include secrets. Hash output files and store them with the case. See the Evidence Handling and Chain of Custody Guide.
- Licensing: internal use, consulting and incident response are permitted under AGPLv3 (Hayabusa) and GPL-3.0 (Chainsaw). Modified versions provided to others, including Hayabusa offered as a network service, carry source-sharing obligations; the Detection Rule License requires attribution when rules are reused. Have legal review any productised use.
Detection and hardening value
These tools are only as good as the logs they read. Every triage run is also an audit of your logging.
| Gap shown by triage | Hardening action | Framework reference |
|---|---|---|
| No 4688 or command-line data | Enable process creation auditing with command line, or deploy Sysmon; see the Sysmon Guide | NIST SP 800-53 AU-12, SI-4 |
| No PowerShell 4104 events | Enable Script Block Logging; see the PowerShell Security Guide | NIST SP 800-53 SI-4 |
| Logs roll over within days | Increase log sizes and forward off-host; see the Windows Event Forwarding Guide | NIST SP 800-53 AU-11 |
| 1102 or RecordID gaps found | Alert centrally on log clearing; protect forwarded copies | NIST SP 800-53 AU-9; T1685.005 |
| Triage detection with no SIEM alert | Deploy the same Sigma rule to the SIEM; see the Sigma Rules Guide | NIST CSF 2.0 DE.AE-02 |
Where identity fits
logon-summary and the logon rules are the fastest way to see which accounts authenticated where. Review service accounts and other non-human identities separately: an interactive or RDP logon by a service account, or one from a new source host, is a strong signal. See the Service Account Security Guide and the Active Directory Security Monitoring and Event Guide.
Measuring the capability
- Time to triage: minutes from receiving a host's logs to a reviewed critical and high detection list (target under 30 minutes).
- Coverage score: share of in-scope hosts whose logs contain 4688 or Sysmon 1, 4104, and at least 30 days of Security log.
- Detection parity: share of triage findings already alerted by the SIEM; every miss becomes a rule ticket.
- False positive rate per rule set: tracked so the team knows when core+ is worth the noise.
- Rule currency: age of the rule set on analysis hosts.
Common failure patterns
- Trusting an empty result: no detections on a host with default audit policy may mean no logging, not no attack; check
eid-metricsfirst. - Running everything at once: core++ plus noisy rules on a domain controller buries the real findings; triage in rings.
- Mixed time zones: Hayabusa defaults to local time and Chainsaw to UTC unless
--localor--timezoneis set; merge outputs only after normalising. - Stale runbooks: commands from Hayabusa 2.x and 3.x (
csv-timeline,json-timeline -L) fail on 4.x. - Disabling protection under pressure: turning off real-time protection to make a tool run on a production host creates new risk; prepare exclusions on forensic workstations in advance.
Alternatives
| Option | Choose it when | Trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| Hayabusa | You need a fast, Sigma-complete event log timeline and logon summaries | Focused on event logs |
| Chainsaw | You want event log hunting plus MFT, Shimcache, Amcache, SRUM and gap analysis in one binary | Sigma rules run through a mapping file |
| SIEM with forwarded logs | Logs are centralised and retained | Only covers what was forwarded before the incident |
| Plaso super timeline | You need events from logs, file system, registry and browsers together | Slower, with no built-in Sigma detection |
| Endpoint agent hunts (for example Velociraptor) | Fleet-wide hunting for the same indicator | Needs an agent deployed beforehand |
Small teams can keep both binaries and a pinned rule set on a forensic USB or workstation for ad hoc triage. Larger teams run them in automated pipelines on every collected triage package and push JSONL output into the SIEM or Timesketch.
Practitioner checklist
- Stage verified Hayabusa and Chainsaw binaries and pinned rule sets on forensic workstations.
- Agree narrow AV and EDR exclusions for the forensic tool directory in advance.
- Update runbooks to Hayabusa
dfir-timelinesyntax and record tool and rule versions per case. - Run coverage metrics before trusting any empty result.
- Triage with core rules, then widen to core+ and core++ deliberately.
- Run Chainsaw
analyse gapson every case where log tampering is plausible. - Normalise all output to UTC before merging timelines.
- Turn each triage-only detection into a SIEM rule and each logging gap into a hardening ticket.
Standards and references
- Yamato Security: Hayabusa repository
- Yamato Security: Hayabusa documentation
- WithSecure Labs: Chainsaw repository and README
- SigmaHQ: Sigma rules repository
- Yamato Security: Hayabusa rules repository
- MITRE ATT&CK: Clear Windows Event Logs
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- NIST: Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Open Source DFIR Tools Landscape Guide · Sigma Rules Guide · Windows Event Log Guide · Plaso Guide · Forensic Timeline Analysis Guide