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Vulnerability Disclosure Policy Template: Safe Harbour, Scope and Response Commitments

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 10 min read
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Security researchers find flaws in your systems whether or not you invite them, and without a published vulnerability disclosure policy (VDP) they have no safe, clear way to tell you. A VDP states what researchers may test, how to report, what they can expect in return and that good-faith research will not be pursued legally. Publishing one is now expected or required in several regimes: US federal civilian agencies under CISA Binding Operational Directive 20-01, manufacturers of consumer connectable products under the UK Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (PSTI) regime, and manufacturers of products with digital elements under the EU Cyber Resilience Act. This template gives a publishable policy, written in plain language, with the internal handling steps behind it. It is for product security, application security and legal teams. Have counsel review the authorisation wording for your jurisdiction before you publish.

How to use this template

  • Two parts: the public policy text is in the numbered sections, written to researchers ("you"); internal handling notes follow each section under "Internal handling". Publish only the public text.
  • Replace bracketed text: [Organisation], [[email protected]], [scope list] and timings. Timings in brackets are suggestions; publish only commitments you can meet.
  • Publish it where researchers look: a stable URL such as [https://example.com/security/vdp], linked from a security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt as defined in RFC 9116, which requires the Contact and Expires fields and supports a Policy field pointing to this page.
  • A VDP is not a bug bounty: it does not promise payment. If you later add rewards, keep this policy as the baseline. See the Bug Bounty and Vulnerability Disclosure Guide for choosing between them.

Requirements this template is designed to meet

RegimeWho it applies toWhat the VDP must provideWhere in this template
CISA BOD 20-01US federal civilian executive branch agenciesPublished VDP with scope, authorisation, reporting channel and expectations; CISA's template commits to acknowledge within 3 business days and to bring all internet-accessible systems into scope over timeSections 1 to 3, 7
UK PSTI security requirements (SI 2023/1007, Schedule 1 paragraph 2, in force 29 April 2024)Manufacturers of relevant connectable productsAt least one point of contact for reporting security issues; when the reporter gets an acknowledgement and status updates until resolution; accessible, free, in English, without requiring personal informationSections 2, 3, 7
EU Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847)Manufacturers of products with digital elementsA coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and a way to receive reports, with reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities to authoritiesSections 2, 3, 7
ISO/IEC 29147:2018Vendors that choose to practise disclosureReceiving reports and publishing remediation information, with handling processes in ISO/IEC 30111All sections

For the CRA reporting duties see the EU Cyber Resilience Act Vulnerability and Incident Reporting Guide, and for the ISO process see the ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 Vulnerability Disclosure and Handling Guide.

1. Scope and triggers

1.1 Introduction

[Organisation] is committed to the security of our customers, products and services. This policy tells you which systems you may test, how to send us a vulnerability report and what to expect from us. We welcome reports from anyone, including those who find a problem by accident.

1.2 Authorisation (safe harbour)

If you make a good-faith effort to follow this policy during your security research, we will consider your research to be authorised. We will work with you to understand and resolve the issue quickly, and [Organisation] will not recommend or pursue legal action related to your research. If a third party brings legal action against you for activities that complied with this policy, we will make this authorisation known.

1.3 Scope

  • In scope: [*.example.com], [example-app.com], [mobile apps: Example for iOS and Android], [products: Example Router, firmware 3.x and later], [public source repositories at github.com/example].
  • Out of scope: [systems run by our suppliers, such as hosted payment pages and customer support platforms; report those to the supplier], [any system not listed above].
  • Not sure? Contact us at [[email protected]] before testing.

Internal handling: keep the scope list current. Add new internet-facing services at launch, or use wildcards so they are covered automatically. Review scope quarterly against your attack surface inventory.

2. Roles and contacts

2.1 How to contact us

  • Web form (preferred): [https://example.com/security/report], served over HTTPS.
  • Email: [[email protected]]. If you need to encrypt, use our key at [URL], also listed in our security.txt Encryption field.
  • Anonymous reports: you do not need to give your name or contact details. If you do not, we cannot acknowledge or update you.
  • Languages: [English], as listed in our security.txt Preferred-Languages field.

Internal handling: route the mailbox and form to a ticket queue watched by the [Product security team], with a named owner and deputy, and an out-of-hours escalation route for critical reports. Restrict access to the queue: reports may contain sensitive data or working proof of concept. Name a [Legal contact] and [Communications contact] for researcher disputes and public disclosure.

3. Detection and triage

3.1 What to include in your report

  • Where the vulnerability is (URL, product and version, component).
  • What it could allow and how you assess its impact.
  • Steps to reproduce, and any proof of concept needed to show the issue.
  • Whether you have shared it with anyone else.

3.2 What you can expect from us

  • We will acknowledge your report within [3] business days.
  • We will confirm whether we can reproduce it, and give you our initial assessment, within [10] business days.
  • We will send status updates at least every [30] days until the issue is resolved, including if remediation is delayed.

Internal handling: triage each report with a severity score (for example CVSS) plus business context, check for duplicates, and decide whether it is in scope. Out-of-scope reports that reveal real risk are still handled. Record every report, even rejected ones, with the reason. See the PSIRT Guide for running the handling process.

4. Containment

4.1 Guidelines for researchers

  • Notify us as soon as possible after you discover a real or potential issue.
  • Avoid privacy violations, degradation of user experience, disruption to production systems and destruction or manipulation of data.
  • Use exploits only to the extent needed to confirm a vulnerability. Do not use an exploit to access more data, establish persistent access or move to other systems.
  • If you find personal data, credentials, API keys or other sensitive information, stop, tell us immediately, do not use it, and do not keep or share copies.

4.2 Test methods that are not authorised

  • Denial of service or any test that impairs access to or damages a system or data.
  • Physical testing of offices or data centres, and social engineering such as phishing or vishing of staff.
  • Testing accounts or data belonging to other people without their consent.

Internal handling: for critical reports, apply an interim mitigation (configuration change, web application firewall rule, feature flag) while a fix is built. If a report shows exposed credentials or keys, treat it as a potential incident: revoke and rotate first, then check logs for use by anyone other than the researcher. See the Secrets Rotation Runbook Template, and invoke the Incident Response Plan Template process when there is evidence of exploitation.

5. Eradication

Public text: we aim to fix confirmed vulnerabilities within timeframes that reflect their severity, and we will tell you if we expect to take longer.

Severity (internal)Target to remediate or mitigate [suggested]Approval to extend
Critical, or known exploitation[7] days[CISO]
High[30] days[Head of product security]
Medium[90] days[Product owner]
Low[180] days or next major release[Product owner]

Internal handling: fix the root cause, then search for the same flaw in sibling products, shared libraries and other environments. Track remediation in the same system as other vulnerabilities so SLAs are reported together.

6. Recovery

Public text: when a fix is ready we may ask you to confirm it resolves the issue.

Internal handling: verify the fix with the researcher's reproduction steps and a regression test, ship it, and confirm customers have a supported path to apply it (automatic update, firmware release, advisory with instructions). For products, record which versions are affected and fixed.

7. Communication and notification

7.1 Disclosure

  • Please give us a reasonable amount of time to fix the issue before you disclose it publicly. We ask for [90] days from your report, and we will agree a date with you if a fix needs longer or is ready sooner.
  • We will publish a security advisory for vulnerabilities that affect customers, and request a CVE identifier where appropriate.
  • With your consent, we will credit you in the advisory and on our acknowledgements page.
  • If the vulnerability affects other vendors, we may share details with them or with a national CSIRT for coordination. We will not share your name or contact details without your permission.

Internal handling: if a vulnerability is actively exploited, check whether regulatory reporting applies (for example CRA reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities, or incident notification rules). See the How to Read a CVE Advisory Guide for advisory content readers expect.

8. Post-incident review

Public text: questions or suggestions about this policy can be sent to [[email protected]]. This policy was last updated on [date] (version [1.0]).

Internal handling: review each critical report after closure: how was it introduced, why did internal testing miss it, and are there more like it. Review the policy itself at least annually and after any researcher dispute.

Implementation guidance

  1. Build the handling process first: intake queue, triage owner, severity model and remediation SLAs must exist before the policy goes live. A VDP that is not answered damages trust faster than having none.
  2. Agree the authorisation wording with counsel: safe harbour wording binds [Organisation], not third parties. In the US, the Department of Justice's May 2022 CFAA charging policy says good-faith security research should not be charged, but it does not bind civil claims or other countries.
  3. Start narrow if needed, then widen: small organisations can begin with their main web domain and widen scope as capacity grows. Large organisations should aim for all internet-facing assets, as BOD 20-01 requires of agencies.
  4. Publish security.txt: include Contact, Expires (keep it under a year ahead and renew it), Policy, Encryption and Preferred-Languages, and consider signing the file.
  5. Test the channel: send a test report each quarter and confirm acknowledgement within your published timing.

Measures that show it is working

  • Percentage of reports acknowledged within the published timing (target 100 per cent).
  • Median time to triage and to remediate by severity, against the SLA table.
  • Number of researcher-initiated public disclosures before a fix (target zero).
  • Share of valid reports in assets outside scope, which signals the scope list needs widening.

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceHow this template supports it
NIST CSF 2.0ID.RA-08Processes for receiving, analysing and responding to vulnerability disclosures are established
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5RA-5(11)Public disclosure programme: a reporting channel for the public
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A8.8Management of technical vulnerabilities
ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111Whole standardsDisclosure and handling processes

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Bug Bounty and Vulnerability Disclosure Guide · Vulnerability Disclosure Maturity Model · PSIRT Guide · ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 Vulnerability Disclosure and Handling Guide. This guide summarises disclosure policy requirements and is not legal advice.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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