Join our Newsletter — 33% off our NHI Course
Home› Guides› Active Directory vs Entra ID: What Changes When…
Guide Identity & Access Management (IAM)

Active Directory vs Entra ID: What Changes When Identity Moves to the Cloud

PDF for newsletter subscribers · free to read online

← All guides
By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 14 November 2026 17 min read
On this page

Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID share a vendor and part of a name, but they authenticate with different protocols, enforce policy at different points and fail in different ways, so controls copied from one to the other usually miss. Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) is a network directory built on Kerberos, LDAP and Group Policy; Entra ID is a cloud identity provider built on OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, SAML and Conditional Access. This guide compares them as security systems: what each trusts, how each is attacked, where machine identities live, and which attack paths cross between them. It is for identity architects and engineers choosing between cloud-only and hybrid, or running both. The general model is in Directory Service vs Identity Provider; this page covers the Microsoft specifics.

This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.

Key takeaways

  • Entra ID is not AD in the cloud. Where AD uses organisational units, Group Policy, LDAP and Kerberos, Entra ID uses administrative units, Intune and token issuance with Conditional Access evaluated per sign-in. Microsoft Entra Domain Services exists for apps that need the old protocols.
  • The enforcement point moves. In AD, policy lives on the domain-joined device and in ticket issuance; in Entra ID it lives at token issuance, after first-factor authentication, using user, device, location, app and risk signals.
  • Hybrid creates bridges in both directions. Entra Connect, Seamless SSO's AZUREADSSOACC account, pass-through agents and federation let on-premises compromise reach the cloud; cloud Kerberos trust and device management let cloud compromise reach on-premises.
  • Machine identities change shape. AD service accounts and gMSAs inherit permissions in the domain; Entra uses application objects, service principals and managed identities, each with its own credential and consent model.
  • Keep the two admin planes apart. Microsoft's guidance is cloud-only accounts for Entra and Microsoft 365 privileged roles, and no on-premises account or synchronised group in a privileged cloud role.

The short answer

Use Entra ID as the control point for anything that speaks modern protocols: SaaS, web and API applications, mobile and Entra-joined devices, and workloads in Azure. Keep AD DS only for what still needs Kerberos, NTLM, LDAP or Group Policy, and shrink that footprint deliberately. Entra ID can replace AD DS where every app and device is cloud-ready; an app that binds to LDAP or needs a Kerberos service ticket must first move to Entra Domain Services, application proxy or a rebuild. Most enterprises run both for years, so the question is stopping each being the way into the other.

Microsoft describes Entra ID as "the new control plane for accessing apps versus relying on networking controls". The plan for leaving AD is in Retiring Active Directory; this page is about defending both while they coexist.

Side-by-side comparison

DimensionActive Directory Domain ServicesMicrosoft Entra ID
What it isReplicated directory on domain controllers, scoped by forest and domainMulti-tenant cloud identity provider and directory, scoped by tenant
Authentication protocolsKerberos (TCP/UDP 88), NTLM, LDAP bind (389, LDAPS 636)OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, SAML 2.0, WS-Federation over HTTPS
Credential artefactKerberos TGT and service tickets, NTLM responsesID tokens, access tokens, refresh tokens, Primary Refresh Token on devices
Directory accessLDAP queries and Global Catalog (3268, 3269)Microsoft Graph API
Administrative scopingDomains, organisational units and delegated ACLsBuilt-in and custom RBAC roles, administrative units, Privileged Identity Management
Policy on devicesGroup Policy Objects linked to sites, domains and OUsIntune configuration and compliance policies, read by Conditional Access
Access policyACLs on resources and group membership in the Kerberos PACConditional Access at token issuance: block, or grant with controls such as MFA, authentication strength, compliant or hybrid-joined device
GroupsStatic security and distribution groups, nestingAssigned or dynamic (query-based) membership, plus entitlement management access packages
Credentials for peoplePassword policy (length, expiry, complexity), certificates, smart cardsPassword protection with smart lockout and banned passwords, MFA, FIDO2 and other passwordless methods, self-service reset
Machine identitiesUser-based service accounts, gMSAs, computer accounts, SPNsApplication objects and service principals (secrets, certificates, federated credentials), managed identities
Crown jewelsNTDS.dit password hashes, KRBTGT key, replication rights, Domain and Enterprise AdminsGlobal Administrator and other privileged roles, app credentials with high Graph permissions, federation and sync trust
Main logsDomain controller Security log (for example 4768, 4769, 4662), Directory Service logSign-in logs (interactive, non-interactive, service principal, managed identity) and audit logs

The pattern: AD trusts the network and the domain-joined machine; Entra ID trusts a signed token and the signals presented when it is issued.

How each system decides who gets in

Active Directory: tickets, ACLs and Group Policy

A domain-joined device obtains a Kerberos ticket-granting ticket from a domain controller, and every later access to a file share, SQL Server or intranet site is a service ticket request for a service principal name (SPN). Authorisation is the resource's ACL evaluated against the SIDs in the ticket's privilege attribute certificate. A valid ticket plus a permitting ACL means access; there is no per-request policy evaluation. Device posture is enforced indirectly through Group Policy, which applies settings to computers and users by their position in the OU tree. The Kerberos Security Guide and Group Policy Security Guide cover each in depth.

Entra ID: tokens and Conditional Access

A user or workload asks Entra ID for a token for a specific resource. Microsoft describes Conditional Access as bringing "signals together, to make decisions, and enforce organizational policies", and states that policies "are enforced after first-factor authentication is completed". Signals include the user, group or agent, IP location, device platform and state, the target application, and real-time risk from Entra ID Protection. Exclusions are where risk hides; see How to Find Accounts Excluded From MFA and Conditional Access. The application then validates the token's signature, issuer, audience and expiry. See the Conditional Access Guide.

What this means for defenders

  • Revocation: disabling an AD account stops new tickets, but existing tickets live until they expire. In Entra ID, existing access and refresh tokens persist until expiry or revocation, so leaver and incident runbooks must revoke sessions, not just disable the account.
  • MFA: For Kerberos, the strong AD option is smart card or certificate logon at sign-in. Entra ID enforces MFA and authentication strengths per application.

Threat model for each system

ThreatActive DirectoryEntra ID
Credential extractionDCSync (T1003.006) using replication rights; NTDS.dit theftTheft of application access tokens (T1528) and refresh tokens from devices and pipelines
Offline crackingKerberoasting (T1558.003) against user-based service accounts with SPNsPassword spraying against cloud accounts that lack MFA (T1078.004 after success)
ForgeryGolden Ticket (T1558.001) with the KRBTGT keyForged SAML tokens (T1606.002) where federation is used
PersistenceACL backdoors, AdminSDHolder, malicious GPOs (T1484.001)New secrets or certificates on service principals (T1098.001), new federated domains (T1484.002)
Lateral movementTicket reuse and delegation abuse between hostsReuse of stolen access tokens against Graph and Azure (T1550.001)
Signature failureSilent, broad: whole forest must be considered compromisedFast, quiet at the app: tenant-wide access without touching a password

The ATT&CK technique T1556.007 Hybrid Identity exists specifically for the space between the two: tampering with sync, pass-through authentication or federation components to capture credentials or accept attacker sign-ins.

Hybrid: the bridges and which way they point

Every hybrid component is a trust relationship. Microsoft's guidance on protecting Microsoft 365 from on-premises attacks lists the components to treat as high-value targets: private network connectors for Application Proxy and Private Access, password writeback agents, Password Protection gateway machines, NPS servers with the MFA extension, Entra Connect, and federation infrastructure. It also warns that "If a SAML token-signing certificate is compromised, federation allows anyone who has that certificate to impersonate any user in your cloud."

BridgeDirection of riskWhy it mattersControl
Entra Connect server and AD DS Connector accountOn-premises to cloud, and into ADThe connector account holds Replicate Directory Changes and Replicate Directory Changes All for password hash sync and, in express settings, Reset password; the ADSync service account stores the other accounts' passwords encrypted on the serverManage as control plane; dedicated admin workstations; see How to audit the Entra Connect sync account
Entra Connector accountOn-premises to cloudHolds the Directory Synchronization Accounts role, which can only be granted through the Connect wizardAlert on its sign-ins from anywhere other than the sync server; remove unused sync accounts
Seamless SSO (AZUREADSSOACC computer account)On-premises to cloudIts Kerberos decryption key is shared with Entra ID, which uses it to read tickets for the user; anyone holding the key can mint tickets Entra acceptsMicrosoft recommends rolling the key at least every 30 days; restrict who can modify the object
Pass-through authentication agentsOn-premises to cloudAgents validate cloud sign-ins against AD on Microsoft's behalfHarden hosts as control plane; alert on new agent registrations
Federation (AD FS)On-premises to cloudToken-signing certificate lets the holder impersonate any federated userMove to cloud authentication; see AD FS to Entra ID Migration
Cloud Kerberos trust (AzureADKerberos object)Cloud to on-premisesEntra ID issues partial TGTs for the AD domain through an RODC-style object; the default Password Replication Policy keeps privileged accounts outMicrosoft advises against relaxing that policy because of attack vectors from Entra ID to AD
Password and group writebackCloud to on-premisesA cloud-side change writes into ADScope writeback to the OUs that need it; never to privileged groups
Intune management of hybrid-joined devicesCloud to on-premisesScripts and apps pushed from Intune run on domain-joined machines, including admin workstationsRestrict Intune admin roles; keep control-plane devices out of broad assignment groups

In Microsoft's enterprise access model the old tier 0 "expands to become the control plane": every bridge above belongs there, on-premises or cloud. Sync hardening is in the Microsoft Entra Connect and Cloud Sync Hardening Guide.

Service accounts versus app registrations

NeedActive DirectoryEntra IDWhat changes for security
Windows service or scheduled taskgMSA (managed password) or user-based service accountNot applicable to cloud tokens; stays in AD or moves with the appConvert user-based accounts to gMSAs; see How to convert AD service accounts to gMSA
Workload in Azure calling Azure or GraphService account password in configManaged identity: system-assigned (lifecycle tied to one resource) or user-assigned (standalone, shareable)Microsoft states credentials "aren't even accessible to you", so there is nothing to leak or rotate
Application or integration outside AzureService account with LDAP bind or Kerberos keytabApplication object (one, in the home tenant) plus a service principal per tenant, with a secret, certificate or federated credentialCredentials are added to the app, so anyone who can add one can impersonate it
Multi-tenant or third-party appExternal trust or shadow accountService principal created in your tenant on consentConsent grants and app roles become the permission model; see the Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide
PermissionsGroup membership and ACLs; the app inherits the account's rightsDelegated and application permissions on APIs, Azure RBAC role assignments, directory rolesApplication permissions such as broad Graph write scopes are tenant-wide and act without a user

Two details catch teams moving from AD. Legacy service principals exist without an app registration and can still hold credentials, so an inventory that walks only app registrations misses them. A managed identity is itself a service principal with no application object, and appears in sign-in logs under its own category. Use the Azure Managed Identities Security Guide, How to detect new credentials added to an app registration and Privileged Service Principal Check for the operational work.

Attack paths that cross the boundary

Test these as tabletop scenarios: each is defended by a control on the other side of the boundary from where the attack starts.

  1. On-premises admin to Global Administrator: a synchronised account or group holds a privileged Entra role, so domain compromise becomes tenant compromise. Defence: Microsoft says "No on-premises accounts should have administrative privileges in Microsoft 365" and that synchronised objects should have "no direct or nested assignment in trusted cloud roles or groups".
  2. Sync server to every password hash: the AD DS Connector account's replication rights are the same rights DCSync uses. Defence: control-plane management of the Connect server and alerting on replication requests from any host other than domain controllers and the sync server.
  3. Seamless SSO key to cloud sign-in: a stale AZUREADSSOACC key lets someone with domain access forge tickets Entra accepts. Defence: scheduled key rollover and monitoring of changes to the object.
  4. Federation certificate to any user: forged SAML tokens bypass MFA because the cloud trusts the federation server's assertion. Defence: move to cloud authentication, or protect the signing key in an HSM and correlate token use with on-premises authentication events.
  5. Cloud admin to domain-joined admin workstation: an attacker with Intune rights deploys a script to hybrid-joined devices used by Domain Admins. Defence: separate device management scope for control-plane devices and least-privilege Intune roles.
  6. App credential to tenant data: a client secret for a service principal with application permissions is found in a repository and used from anywhere. Defence: prefer managed identities or federated credentials, apply Conditional Access for Workload Identities where licensed, and alert on new credentials.

Decision criteria: cloud-only or hybrid

SituationLean towardsWhat you accept
New or SaaS-first organisation with no domain-joined serversCloud-only Entra ID, Entra join and IntuneLegacy apps need Entra Domain Services, application proxy or replacement
Kerberos file servers, SQL Server with Windows authentication, many GPOsHybrid with password hash sync and a shrinking ADSync and Seamless SSO become control-plane assets to protect
Policy requires on-premises password validationHybrid with pass-through authentication, hash sync kept as a documented fallbackAgent hosts on-premises, outage dependency
Several disconnected forests from acquisitionsEntra Cloud Sync per forestMicrosoft notes this avoids cross-forest trusts "which can broaden the effect of an on-premises breach"
Small IT teamAs little self-run identity infrastructure as possibleLess control over schema and protocol detail

Small versus large: a 200-person firm with Microsoft 365 and a handful of SaaS apps can often run cloud-only and retire its domain controllers within a year. A large enterprise with OT and acquired forests should plan a long hybrid period and measure progress by control-plane bridges removed, not user counts.

Worked scenario: a regional insurer

A 3,000-staff insurer runs one AD forest, Entra Connect with password hash sync and Seamless SSO, an old AD FS farm for two SaaS apps, and 140 user-based service accounts. Its Global Administrators are three synchronised accounts that are also Domain Admins.

  1. Week 1 to 4, split the admin planes: create cloud-only Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator accounts with phishing-resistant authentication through PIM, remove all synchronised accounts from Entra roles and role-assignable groups, and create two emergency access accounts. Test break-glass sign-in before removing the old assignments.
  2. Month 2, contain the bridges: move the Connect server to the control-plane management model, roll the AZUREADSSOACC key and schedule it every 30 days, alert on Directory Synchronization Accounts sign-ins from unexpected IPs, and switch the two AD FS apps to Entra SAML. Keep AD FS stopped for a full month-end before decommissioning.
  3. Month 3 to 6, fix machine identities: convert the Windows services to gMSAs, move Azure-hosted workloads to managed identities, replace client secrets with certificates or federated credentials, and assign an owner to every service principal.
  4. Month 6 onwards, cloud-first: new devices are Entra joined with Intune, new apps integrate with Entra ID only, and every remaining Kerberos or LDAP dependency has a named owner and a target date.

Rollback at each step is the previous state kept in reserve: documented role assignments, a stopped (not removed) AD FS farm, and vaulted service account passwords until each gMSA survives a release cycle.

Detection and measurement

  • AD side: event 4662 for replication rights use from non-DC hosts, 4769 service ticket requests with RC4 encryption against user accounts, changes to AZUREADSSOACC and to the AzureADKerberos object, and GPO changes. See the Active Directory Security Monitoring and Event IDs Guide.
  • Entra side: role assignment and PIM activation events, new credentials on applications and service principals, new federated domains, consent grants, and sign-ins by the sync account. See the Entra ID Audit Log Detection Guide.

Metrics:

  1. Synchronised accounts holding any privileged Entra role (target: zero).
  2. Days since the last AZUREADSSOACC key rollover (target: 30 or fewer).
  3. Percentage of service principals using managed identity, certificate or federated credential rather than a client secret.
  4. Percentage of user-based AD service accounts converted to gMSA or retired.
  5. Count of apps still authenticating through AD FS, NTLM or LDAP bind, trending down.
  6. Conditional Access exclusions with an owner and review date (target: 100 per cent).

Common failure patterns

  • Assuming OUs carry over: teams look for OU-style delegation in Entra ID and grant tenant-wide roles instead. Use administrative units and scoped roles.
  • Dual-use admin accounts: the same synchronised identity is Domain Admin and Global Administrator, making either compromise total.
  • Unowned SSO key: AZUREADSSOACC keeps its original key for years because nobody owns the rollover.
  • Disabling without revoking: an account is disabled in AD, sync runs later, and issued tokens keep working until revoked or expired.
  • Copying the service account habit: one app registration with a long-lived secret and broad Graph application permissions is shared by several integrations, recreating a domain service account in the cloud.
  • Treating Connect as a utility server: administered from ordinary workstations, with no alerting on its accounts.

Framework mapping

Control areaNIST SP 800-53 Rev 5NIST CSF 2.0ATT&CK techniques addressed
Separate privileged accounts per planeAC-6(5) Privileged Accounts, AC-2 Account ManagementPR.AA-05T1078.002, T1078.004
Protect sync, SSO and federation trustAC-6 Least Privilege, CM-7 Least FunctionalityPR.AA-01T1003.006, T1556.007, T1606.002, T1484.002
Phishing-resistant authentication and Conditional AccessIA-2PR.AA-03T1078.004
Machine identity credentialsIA-5 Authenticator Management, IA-9 Service Identification and AuthenticationPR.AA-01T1558.003, T1098.001, T1528, T1550.001
Monitoring both directoriesAU-6DE.CM-03T1484.001, T1558.001

In ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A the same work falls under 5.15 Access control, 5.16 Identity management, 5.17 Authentication information, 8.2 Privileged access rights and 8.5 Secure authentication. In CIS Controls v8.1 it maps to Control 5 Account Management and Control 6 Access Control Management.

Practitioner checklist

  • List every hybrid component (Connect, Cloud Sync agents, PTA agents, AD FS, writeback, application proxy connectors, NPS extension) and manage each as control plane.
  • Remove every synchronised account and group from privileged Entra roles; use cloud-only admins with PIM and phishing-resistant authentication.
  • Roll the AZUREADSSOACC Kerberos key on a schedule of 30 days or less, or retire Seamless SSO once devices are Entra joined.
  • Keep the default Password Replication Policy on the AzureADKerberos object.
  • Alert on Directory Synchronization Accounts sign-ins and on replication requests from hosts that are not domain controllers or the sync server.
  • Inventory application objects, service principals (including legacy ones) and managed identities, each with an owner.
  • Replace client secrets with managed identities, certificates or federated credentials; convert AD service accounts to gMSAs.
  • Make session revocation part of every leaver and incident runbook.
  • Track remaining Kerberos, NTLM and LDAP dependencies with an owner and a date.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Directory Service vs Identity Provider · Retiring Active Directory · Active Directory Fundamentals · Entra ID Security Guide · Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) Guide

PDF for subscribers

Take this guide with you

Every section, table and checklist in one PDF, with links to the sources and related guides. Subscribe to our weekly NHI & AI Identity Journal and we’ll email you a download link.

Free weekly newsletter

Subscribe to the NHI & AI Identity Journal

The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.

Bonus 33% off our NHI Course when you subscribe.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 14 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

PDF Downloads for Newsletter Subscribers

Get the guide

Enter your details and we’ll email you a download link.

The full guide is free to read online. The PDF is a thank you for subscribing.

Fill in all fields marked * and tick the PDF box to continue.