Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID share a vendor and part of a name, but they authenticate with different protocols, enforce policy at different points and fail in different ways, so controls copied from one to the other usually miss. Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) is a network directory built on Kerberos, LDAP and Group Policy; Entra ID is a cloud identity provider built on OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, SAML and Conditional Access. This guide compares them as security systems: what each trusts, how each is attacked, where machine identities live, and which attack paths cross between them. It is for identity architects and engineers choosing between cloud-only and hybrid, or running both. The general model is in Directory Service vs Identity Provider; this page covers the Microsoft specifics.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Entra ID is not AD in the cloud. Where AD uses organisational units, Group Policy, LDAP and Kerberos, Entra ID uses administrative units, Intune and token issuance with Conditional Access evaluated per sign-in. Microsoft Entra Domain Services exists for apps that need the old protocols.
- The enforcement point moves. In AD, policy lives on the domain-joined device and in ticket issuance; in Entra ID it lives at token issuance, after first-factor authentication, using user, device, location, app and risk signals.
- Hybrid creates bridges in both directions. Entra Connect, Seamless SSO's AZUREADSSOACC account, pass-through agents and federation let on-premises compromise reach the cloud; cloud Kerberos trust and device management let cloud compromise reach on-premises.
- Machine identities change shape. AD service accounts and gMSAs inherit permissions in the domain; Entra uses application objects, service principals and managed identities, each with its own credential and consent model.
- Keep the two admin planes apart. Microsoft's guidance is cloud-only accounts for Entra and Microsoft 365 privileged roles, and no on-premises account or synchronised group in a privileged cloud role.
The short answer
Use Entra ID as the control point for anything that speaks modern protocols: SaaS, web and API applications, mobile and Entra-joined devices, and workloads in Azure. Keep AD DS only for what still needs Kerberos, NTLM, LDAP or Group Policy, and shrink that footprint deliberately. Entra ID can replace AD DS where every app and device is cloud-ready; an app that binds to LDAP or needs a Kerberos service ticket must first move to Entra Domain Services, application proxy or a rebuild. Most enterprises run both for years, so the question is stopping each being the way into the other.
Microsoft describes Entra ID as "the new control plane for accessing apps versus relying on networking controls". The plan for leaving AD is in Retiring Active Directory; this page is about defending both while they coexist.
Side-by-side comparison
| Dimension | Active Directory Domain Services | Microsoft Entra ID |
|---|---|---|
| What it is | Replicated directory on domain controllers, scoped by forest and domain | Multi-tenant cloud identity provider and directory, scoped by tenant |
| Authentication protocols | Kerberos (TCP/UDP 88), NTLM, LDAP bind (389, LDAPS 636) | OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, SAML 2.0, WS-Federation over HTTPS |
| Credential artefact | Kerberos TGT and service tickets, NTLM responses | ID tokens, access tokens, refresh tokens, Primary Refresh Token on devices |
| Directory access | LDAP queries and Global Catalog (3268, 3269) | Microsoft Graph API |
| Administrative scoping | Domains, organisational units and delegated ACLs | Built-in and custom RBAC roles, administrative units, Privileged Identity Management |
| Policy on devices | Group Policy Objects linked to sites, domains and OUs | Intune configuration and compliance policies, read by Conditional Access |
| Access policy | ACLs on resources and group membership in the Kerberos PAC | Conditional Access at token issuance: block, or grant with controls such as MFA, authentication strength, compliant or hybrid-joined device |
| Groups | Static security and distribution groups, nesting | Assigned or dynamic (query-based) membership, plus entitlement management access packages |
| Credentials for people | Password policy (length, expiry, complexity), certificates, smart cards | Password protection with smart lockout and banned passwords, MFA, FIDO2 and other passwordless methods, self-service reset |
| Machine identities | User-based service accounts, gMSAs, computer accounts, SPNs | Application objects and service principals (secrets, certificates, federated credentials), managed identities |
| Crown jewels | NTDS.dit password hashes, KRBTGT key, replication rights, Domain and Enterprise Admins | Global Administrator and other privileged roles, app credentials with high Graph permissions, federation and sync trust |
| Main logs | Domain controller Security log (for example 4768, 4769, 4662), Directory Service log | Sign-in logs (interactive, non-interactive, service principal, managed identity) and audit logs |
The pattern: AD trusts the network and the domain-joined machine; Entra ID trusts a signed token and the signals presented when it is issued.
How each system decides who gets in
Active Directory: tickets, ACLs and Group Policy
A domain-joined device obtains a Kerberos ticket-granting ticket from a domain controller, and every later access to a file share, SQL Server or intranet site is a service ticket request for a service principal name (SPN). Authorisation is the resource's ACL evaluated against the SIDs in the ticket's privilege attribute certificate. A valid ticket plus a permitting ACL means access; there is no per-request policy evaluation. Device posture is enforced indirectly through Group Policy, which applies settings to computers and users by their position in the OU tree. The Kerberos Security Guide and Group Policy Security Guide cover each in depth.
Entra ID: tokens and Conditional Access
A user or workload asks Entra ID for a token for a specific resource. Microsoft describes Conditional Access as bringing "signals together, to make decisions, and enforce organizational policies", and states that policies "are enforced after first-factor authentication is completed". Signals include the user, group or agent, IP location, device platform and state, the target application, and real-time risk from Entra ID Protection. Exclusions are where risk hides; see How to Find Accounts Excluded From MFA and Conditional Access. The application then validates the token's signature, issuer, audience and expiry. See the Conditional Access Guide.
What this means for defenders
- Revocation: disabling an AD account stops new tickets, but existing tickets live until they expire. In Entra ID, existing access and refresh tokens persist until expiry or revocation, so leaver and incident runbooks must revoke sessions, not just disable the account.
- MFA: For Kerberos, the strong AD option is smart card or certificate logon at sign-in. Entra ID enforces MFA and authentication strengths per application.
Threat model for each system
| Threat | Active Directory | Entra ID |
|---|---|---|
| Credential extraction | DCSync (T1003.006) using replication rights; NTDS.dit theft | Theft of application access tokens (T1528) and refresh tokens from devices and pipelines |
| Offline cracking | Kerberoasting (T1558.003) against user-based service accounts with SPNs | Password spraying against cloud accounts that lack MFA (T1078.004 after success) |
| Forgery | Golden Ticket (T1558.001) with the KRBTGT key | Forged SAML tokens (T1606.002) where federation is used |
| Persistence | ACL backdoors, AdminSDHolder, malicious GPOs (T1484.001) | New secrets or certificates on service principals (T1098.001), new federated domains (T1484.002) |
| Lateral movement | Ticket reuse and delegation abuse between hosts | Reuse of stolen access tokens against Graph and Azure (T1550.001) |
| Signature failure | Silent, broad: whole forest must be considered compromised | Fast, quiet at the app: tenant-wide access without touching a password |
The ATT&CK technique T1556.007 Hybrid Identity exists specifically for the space between the two: tampering with sync, pass-through authentication or federation components to capture credentials or accept attacker sign-ins.
Hybrid: the bridges and which way they point
Every hybrid component is a trust relationship. Microsoft's guidance on protecting Microsoft 365 from on-premises attacks lists the components to treat as high-value targets: private network connectors for Application Proxy and Private Access, password writeback agents, Password Protection gateway machines, NPS servers with the MFA extension, Entra Connect, and federation infrastructure. It also warns that "If a SAML token-signing certificate is compromised, federation allows anyone who has that certificate to impersonate any user in your cloud."
| Bridge | Direction of risk | Why it matters | Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entra Connect server and AD DS Connector account | On-premises to cloud, and into AD | The connector account holds Replicate Directory Changes and Replicate Directory Changes All for password hash sync and, in express settings, Reset password; the ADSync service account stores the other accounts' passwords encrypted on the server | Manage as control plane; dedicated admin workstations; see How to audit the Entra Connect sync account |
| Entra Connector account | On-premises to cloud | Holds the Directory Synchronization Accounts role, which can only be granted through the Connect wizard | Alert on its sign-ins from anywhere other than the sync server; remove unused sync accounts |
| Seamless SSO (AZUREADSSOACC computer account) | On-premises to cloud | Its Kerberos decryption key is shared with Entra ID, which uses it to read tickets for the user; anyone holding the key can mint tickets Entra accepts | Microsoft recommends rolling the key at least every 30 days; restrict who can modify the object |
| Pass-through authentication agents | On-premises to cloud | Agents validate cloud sign-ins against AD on Microsoft's behalf | Harden hosts as control plane; alert on new agent registrations |
| Federation (AD FS) | On-premises to cloud | Token-signing certificate lets the holder impersonate any federated user | Move to cloud authentication; see AD FS to Entra ID Migration |
| Cloud Kerberos trust (AzureADKerberos object) | Cloud to on-premises | Entra ID issues partial TGTs for the AD domain through an RODC-style object; the default Password Replication Policy keeps privileged accounts out | Microsoft advises against relaxing that policy because of attack vectors from Entra ID to AD |
| Password and group writeback | Cloud to on-premises | A cloud-side change writes into AD | Scope writeback to the OUs that need it; never to privileged groups |
| Intune management of hybrid-joined devices | Cloud to on-premises | Scripts and apps pushed from Intune run on domain-joined machines, including admin workstations | Restrict Intune admin roles; keep control-plane devices out of broad assignment groups |
In Microsoft's enterprise access model the old tier 0 "expands to become the control plane": every bridge above belongs there, on-premises or cloud. Sync hardening is in the Microsoft Entra Connect and Cloud Sync Hardening Guide.
Service accounts versus app registrations
| Need | Active Directory | Entra ID | What changes for security |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows service or scheduled task | gMSA (managed password) or user-based service account | Not applicable to cloud tokens; stays in AD or moves with the app | Convert user-based accounts to gMSAs; see How to convert AD service accounts to gMSA |
| Workload in Azure calling Azure or Graph | Service account password in config | Managed identity: system-assigned (lifecycle tied to one resource) or user-assigned (standalone, shareable) | Microsoft states credentials "aren't even accessible to you", so there is nothing to leak or rotate |
| Application or integration outside Azure | Service account with LDAP bind or Kerberos keytab | Application object (one, in the home tenant) plus a service principal per tenant, with a secret, certificate or federated credential | Credentials are added to the app, so anyone who can add one can impersonate it |
| Multi-tenant or third-party app | External trust or shadow account | Service principal created in your tenant on consent | Consent grants and app roles become the permission model; see the Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide |
| Permissions | Group membership and ACLs; the app inherits the account's rights | Delegated and application permissions on APIs, Azure RBAC role assignments, directory roles | Application permissions such as broad Graph write scopes are tenant-wide and act without a user |
Two details catch teams moving from AD. Legacy service principals exist without an app registration and can still hold credentials, so an inventory that walks only app registrations misses them. A managed identity is itself a service principal with no application object, and appears in sign-in logs under its own category. Use the Azure Managed Identities Security Guide, How to detect new credentials added to an app registration and Privileged Service Principal Check for the operational work.
Attack paths that cross the boundary
Test these as tabletop scenarios: each is defended by a control on the other side of the boundary from where the attack starts.
- On-premises admin to Global Administrator: a synchronised account or group holds a privileged Entra role, so domain compromise becomes tenant compromise. Defence: Microsoft says "No on-premises accounts should have administrative privileges in Microsoft 365" and that synchronised objects should have "no direct or nested assignment in trusted cloud roles or groups".
- Sync server to every password hash: the AD DS Connector account's replication rights are the same rights DCSync uses. Defence: control-plane management of the Connect server and alerting on replication requests from any host other than domain controllers and the sync server.
- Seamless SSO key to cloud sign-in: a stale AZUREADSSOACC key lets someone with domain access forge tickets Entra accepts. Defence: scheduled key rollover and monitoring of changes to the object.
- Federation certificate to any user: forged SAML tokens bypass MFA because the cloud trusts the federation server's assertion. Defence: move to cloud authentication, or protect the signing key in an HSM and correlate token use with on-premises authentication events.
- Cloud admin to domain-joined admin workstation: an attacker with Intune rights deploys a script to hybrid-joined devices used by Domain Admins. Defence: separate device management scope for control-plane devices and least-privilege Intune roles.
- App credential to tenant data: a client secret for a service principal with application permissions is found in a repository and used from anywhere. Defence: prefer managed identities or federated credentials, apply Conditional Access for Workload Identities where licensed, and alert on new credentials.
Decision criteria: cloud-only or hybrid
| Situation | Lean towards | What you accept |
|---|---|---|
| New or SaaS-first organisation with no domain-joined servers | Cloud-only Entra ID, Entra join and Intune | Legacy apps need Entra Domain Services, application proxy or replacement |
| Kerberos file servers, SQL Server with Windows authentication, many GPOs | Hybrid with password hash sync and a shrinking AD | Sync and Seamless SSO become control-plane assets to protect |
| Policy requires on-premises password validation | Hybrid with pass-through authentication, hash sync kept as a documented fallback | Agent hosts on-premises, outage dependency |
| Several disconnected forests from acquisitions | Entra Cloud Sync per forest | Microsoft notes this avoids cross-forest trusts "which can broaden the effect of an on-premises breach" |
| Small IT team | As little self-run identity infrastructure as possible | Less control over schema and protocol detail |
Small versus large: a 200-person firm with Microsoft 365 and a handful of SaaS apps can often run cloud-only and retire its domain controllers within a year. A large enterprise with OT and acquired forests should plan a long hybrid period and measure progress by control-plane bridges removed, not user counts.
Worked scenario: a regional insurer
A 3,000-staff insurer runs one AD forest, Entra Connect with password hash sync and Seamless SSO, an old AD FS farm for two SaaS apps, and 140 user-based service accounts. Its Global Administrators are three synchronised accounts that are also Domain Admins.
- Week 1 to 4, split the admin planes: create cloud-only Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator accounts with phishing-resistant authentication through PIM, remove all synchronised accounts from Entra roles and role-assignable groups, and create two emergency access accounts. Test break-glass sign-in before removing the old assignments.
- Month 2, contain the bridges: move the Connect server to the control-plane management model, roll the AZUREADSSOACC key and schedule it every 30 days, alert on Directory Synchronization Accounts sign-ins from unexpected IPs, and switch the two AD FS apps to Entra SAML. Keep AD FS stopped for a full month-end before decommissioning.
- Month 3 to 6, fix machine identities: convert the Windows services to gMSAs, move Azure-hosted workloads to managed identities, replace client secrets with certificates or federated credentials, and assign an owner to every service principal.
- Month 6 onwards, cloud-first: new devices are Entra joined with Intune, new apps integrate with Entra ID only, and every remaining Kerberos or LDAP dependency has a named owner and a target date.
Rollback at each step is the previous state kept in reserve: documented role assignments, a stopped (not removed) AD FS farm, and vaulted service account passwords until each gMSA survives a release cycle.
Detection and measurement
- AD side: event 4662 for replication rights use from non-DC hosts, 4769 service ticket requests with RC4 encryption against user accounts, changes to AZUREADSSOACC and to the AzureADKerberos object, and GPO changes. See the Active Directory Security Monitoring and Event IDs Guide.
- Entra side: role assignment and PIM activation events, new credentials on applications and service principals, new federated domains, consent grants, and sign-ins by the sync account. See the Entra ID Audit Log Detection Guide.
Metrics:
- Synchronised accounts holding any privileged Entra role (target: zero).
- Days since the last AZUREADSSOACC key rollover (target: 30 or fewer).
- Percentage of service principals using managed identity, certificate or federated credential rather than a client secret.
- Percentage of user-based AD service accounts converted to gMSA or retired.
- Count of apps still authenticating through AD FS, NTLM or LDAP bind, trending down.
- Conditional Access exclusions with an owner and review date (target: 100 per cent).
Common failure patterns
- Assuming OUs carry over: teams look for OU-style delegation in Entra ID and grant tenant-wide roles instead. Use administrative units and scoped roles.
- Dual-use admin accounts: the same synchronised identity is Domain Admin and Global Administrator, making either compromise total.
- Unowned SSO key: AZUREADSSOACC keeps its original key for years because nobody owns the rollover.
- Disabling without revoking: an account is disabled in AD, sync runs later, and issued tokens keep working until revoked or expired.
- Copying the service account habit: one app registration with a long-lived secret and broad Graph application permissions is shared by several integrations, recreating a domain service account in the cloud.
- Treating Connect as a utility server: administered from ordinary workstations, with no alerting on its accounts.
Framework mapping
| Control area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | ATT&CK techniques addressed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Separate privileged accounts per plane | AC-6(5) Privileged Accounts, AC-2 Account Management | PR.AA-05 | T1078.002, T1078.004 |
| Protect sync, SSO and federation trust | AC-6 Least Privilege, CM-7 Least Functionality | PR.AA-01 | T1003.006, T1556.007, T1606.002, T1484.002 |
| Phishing-resistant authentication and Conditional Access | IA-2 | PR.AA-03 | T1078.004 |
| Machine identity credentials | IA-5 Authenticator Management, IA-9 Service Identification and Authentication | PR.AA-01 | T1558.003, T1098.001, T1528, T1550.001 |
| Monitoring both directories | AU-6 | DE.CM-03 | T1484.001, T1558.001 |
In ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A the same work falls under 5.15 Access control, 5.16 Identity management, 5.17 Authentication information, 8.2 Privileged access rights and 8.5 Secure authentication. In CIS Controls v8.1 it maps to Control 5 Account Management and Control 6 Access Control Management.
Practitioner checklist
- List every hybrid component (Connect, Cloud Sync agents, PTA agents, AD FS, writeback, application proxy connectors, NPS extension) and manage each as control plane.
- Remove every synchronised account and group from privileged Entra roles; use cloud-only admins with PIM and phishing-resistant authentication.
- Roll the AZUREADSSOACC Kerberos key on a schedule of 30 days or less, or retire Seamless SSO once devices are Entra joined.
- Keep the default Password Replication Policy on the AzureADKerberos object.
- Alert on Directory Synchronization Accounts sign-ins and on replication requests from hosts that are not domain controllers or the sync server.
- Inventory application objects, service principals (including legacy ones) and managed identities, each with an owner.
- Replace client secrets with managed identities, certificates or federated credentials; convert AD service accounts to gMSAs.
- Make session revocation part of every leaver and incident runbook.
- Track remaining Kerberos, NTLM and LDAP dependencies with an owner and a date.
Standards and references
- Microsoft Learn: Compare Active Directory to Microsoft Entra ID
- Microsoft Learn: Protecting Microsoft 365 from on-premises attacks
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra Connect accounts and permissions
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra Seamless Single Sign-On technical deep dive
- Microsoft Learn: Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust deployment
- Microsoft Learn: Application and service principal objects in Microsoft Entra ID
- Microsoft Learn: What are managed identities for Azure resources?
- Microsoft Learn: Enterprise access model
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Directory Service vs Identity Provider · Retiring Active Directory · Active Directory Fundamentals · Entra ID Security Guide · Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) Guide