Australian energy organisations are being asked to prove cyber maturity against the AESCSF, and since 10 June 2026 the bar under the SOCI risk management rules has moved from Security Profile 1 to Security Profile 2. The Australian Energy Sector Cyber Security Framework (AESCSF) is the maturity model published by the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) for electricity, gas and liquid fuels. This guide explains how the framework is built, how criticality decides your target Security Profile, how to run a Full or Lite assessment well, and how the results feed your critical infrastructure risk management program (CIRMP). It is written for security leads, OT engineers and risk owners at generators, networks, retailers, gas and fuel businesses, and the consultants who assess them. Status checked 14 November 2026.
Key takeaways
- AESCSF V2 has 11 domains and 354 practices and anti-patterns, up from 282 in V1, with new Architecture and Privacy domains, according to AEMO's 2025 overview.
- Criticality sets the target: the E-CAT, G-CAT and L-CAT tools rate electricity, gas and liquid fuels criticality, and the highest sub-sector result decides how far up the Security Profiles you should aim.
- Anti-patterns cap your score: a single negative behaviour present in a domain stops that domain reaching the associated maturity level, and your overall MIL is the lowest MIL across all domains.
- The SOCI bar has risen: the enhanced CIRMP Rules name the 2023 AESCSF Framework Core at Security Profile 2, with the cyber framework measures due by 10 June 2028 for existing assets.
- Identity carries much of SP-1: the ACCESS priority practices on deprovisioning and privileged accounts, plus the new phishing-resistant MFA rule, put service accounts, vendor accounts and OT shared logins at the centre of the work.
What the AESCSF is and where it came from
AEMO publishes the framework and its resources. AEMO's overview records that V1 was developed in 2018 after the 2017 Finkel Review, and V2 was produced through 2022 and 2023 with an industry review working group of more than 50 members from 40 organisations, with input from ASD's Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water and the Department of Home Affairs. The ACSC helped define the Security Profiles and the priority practices.
The model is based on the US Department of Energy's Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) and aligns with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, while adding Australian content: the Essential Eight, the Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme. If you already know C2M2, the mechanics will feel familiar; the difference is the Australian control references, the Security Profiles and the criticality tooling. See the C2M2 Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Guide for the parent model.
AEMO is clear that the framework describes what an organisation should achieve, not how to achieve it. Treat it as a measuring stick, then use the Essential Eight, ISM, IEC 62443 and your own engineering standards to decide the controls.
Coverage spans the whole supply chain: electricity generation, transmission, interconnectors, distribution, retail and market operations; gas production, transmission, storage, distribution and retail; liquid fuels extraction, import, storage, refining, wholesale and retail; and distributed and consumer energy resources (DER/CER) such as solar and wind farms, batteries, metering agents, microgrids and virtual power plants. AEMO published DER/CER guidance in 2025.
Structure: domains, MILs and anti-patterns
V2 organises its practices into 11 domains. Each domain has objectives, and each practice sits at one of three Maturity Indicator Levels.
| V2 domain | What it measures | Example V2 priority practice IDs (AEMO) |
|---|---|---|
| RISK | Enterprise cyber risk identification, analysis and treatment | RISK-2A, RISK-3A, RISK-4A |
| PROGRAM | Sponsorship, strategy and resourcing of the cyber programme | PROGRAM-2A |
| ASSET | IT, OT and information asset inventories, change and configuration | ASSET-1A, ASSET-2A, ASSET-3A, ASSET-4D |
| ACCESS | Identity, credential and access management, including privileged accounts | ACCESS-1B, ACCESS-1F, ACCESS-2G, ACCESS-3H |
| ARCHITECTURE | Security architecture and network segregation (new in V2) | Covered in the low criticality guidance under segregation |
| THREAT | Threat response and vulnerability prioritisation | THREAT-2D, THREAT-2H |
| SITUATION | Logging, monitoring and situational awareness | SITUATION-1A |
| RESPONSE | Incident reporting, continuity of critical operations and restoration | RESPONSE-2G, RESPONSE-3C, RESPONSE-4E |
| THIRD-PARTIES | Supplier dependencies and supplier cyber risk | THIRD-PARTIES-1A, 1B, 2A, 2B |
| WORKFORCE | Roles, vetting for higher-risk roles, training | WORKFORCE-1A, 1B, 1C |
| PRIVACY | Personal information definition and handling (new in V2) | PRIVACY-1B |
- MIL-1: the practice is performed, assessed as yes or no.
- MIL-2: the practice is performed and documented, with identified stakeholders, adequate resources and reference standards or guidelines.
- MIL-3: MIL-2 plus policy and governance direction, skilled people, assigned responsibility, compliance requirements and periodic review.
- Implementation rating: implementation is rated as partially, largely or fully implemented. A domain reaches a MIL only when its practices at that level are met and none of its anti-patterns is present.
- Anti-patterns: nine of the 11 domains contain anti-patterns, each in its own objective. They describe negative security behaviours that should not be present, the opposite of good practice. Answer them honestly: they are the most common reason a well-resourced team scores lower than expected.
- Overall MIL: the lowest MIL achieved in any domain. One weak domain, often THIRD-PARTIES or PRIVACY, sets the headline.
Criticality and Security Profiles
Before assessing practices, eligible organisations run the Criticality Assessment Tool for each sub-sector they operate in: E-CAT for electricity, G-CAT for gas and L-CAT for liquid fuels (added in 2022). AEMO notes the tools are not directly comparable and that your overall criticality is the highest of your sub-sector rankings. AEMO also states that the CAT does not match the SOCI Act's criticality parameters, so a given CAT rating does not by itself mean SOCI obligations apply, and the reverse is also true.
| Security Profile | Practices and anti-patterns (V2, cumulative) | Priority practices | Typical use |
|---|---|---|---|
| SP-1 | 123 (62 at MIL-1, 57 at MIL-2, 4 at MIL-3) | 29 | Foundation every energy organisation should aspire to; small and low criticality participants start here |
| SP-2 | 275, including all of SP-1 | 28 | Medium and higher criticality organisations; the condition named in the enhanced CIRMP Rules |
| SP-3 | 354, the full framework | 13 | Highest criticality; achieving SP-3 is identical to achieving MIL-3 |
A profile is achieved only when every practice in it is attained and its anti-patterns are absent. That makes SP-2 a stricter test than "most of SP-2 done": plan the gap list to zero, not to a percentage.
Full or Lite assessment: choosing and scoping
AEMO describes a four-step process: assess criticality where applicable, choose the assessment model, decide the assets in scope, then complete the assessment.
| Factor | Full assessment (V2) | Lite assessment (V2) |
|---|---|---|
| Intended for | Medium and high criticality organisations | Smaller, emerging or resource-constrained organisations, including DER/CER participants |
| Format | All practices and anti-patterns in scope for your target profile | 28 multi-select questions mapped to the ACSC priority practices |
| Effort | A few hours to a few days | About 15 to 20 minutes if answers are known |
| SOCI use | Evidence towards the AESCSF item in the CIRMP Rules | A starting point; it does not demonstrate a full Security Profile |
| Moving on | Repeat annually; organisations with a previous Full assessment should stay on Full | Move to Full as the organisation grows |
- Scope at group level: AEMO advises that the ultimate Australian parent company should usually complete one assessment covering all operations. Separate assessments are acceptable only where there is no common network infrastructure, no integration and no common IT and OT management.
- Outsourced operations: third-party operations and maintenance providers must be integrated into your answers or answer for their part. Do not leave a contracted control room or asset manager out of scope.
- The right people: include IT, OT or engineering and shared services. A purely IT-run assessment typically overstates ASSET and ARCHITECTURE maturity for field sites.
- Record evidence as you go: AEMO recommends notes and a consistent gap marker. Link each "fully implemented" answer to an artefact (policy, inventory export, access review record, test report).
How the AESCSF links to the SOCI Act CIRMP Rules
The Australia SOCI Act Guide covers the Act's three positive security obligations. The AESCSF matters because the CIRMP Rules (LIN 23/006) name it as one of the cyber frameworks a responsible entity can comply with.
| Rules version | AESCSF item | Condition | Timing for existing assets |
|---|---|---|---|
| Original CIRMP Rules (section 8, from February 2023) | The 2020-21 AESCSF Framework Core | Meet Security Profile 1 | Within 12 months after the applicable grace period |
| Enhanced CIRMP Rules (section 8A, commenced 10 June 2026) | The 2023 AESCSF Framework Core | Meet Security Profile 2 | By 10 June 2028, per the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre factsheet |
- Who the enhanced rules cover: the CISC factsheet lists critical electricity, energy market operator, gas and liquid fuel assets alongside broadcasting, DNS, freight and water.
- Alternatives: the section 8A table also lists AS ISO/IEC 27001:2023, Essential Eight Maturity Level Two, NIST CSF 2.0 and C2M2 Version 2.1 at MIL-2. An equivalent framework is permitted only by reference to the Essential Eight, C2M2 or AESCSF items.
- Phishing-resistant MFA (section 8B): where your chosen framework does not require phishing-resistant MFA, the CIRMP must identify where it is required (internet-connected systems, privileged and unprivileged access to critical components, remote access), implement it and centrally log and review successful and failed MFA attempts.
- Lateral movement (section 8C): keep an inventory of critical systems and their connections, plan recovery, and segregate critical systems so they can stay operational for at least three months while other computers are rebuilt.
- Voluntary but expected: AEMO states completing the assessment is recommended, not mandatory. The legal obligation sits in the CIRMP Rules, not in AEMO's programme.
Practical consequence: an entity that met SP-1 against the 2020-21 core has to re-baseline against the 2023 (V2) core and close the gap to SP-2, while also checking 8B and 8C, which go beyond what the framework alone tests.
Where identity fits
The V2 ACCESS priority practices focus on removing identities that are no longer needed and strengthening privileged accounts. In energy environments the hardest identities are not staff accounts: they are SCADA and historian service accounts, shared engineering workstation logins, vendor remote support accounts, and API credentials used by market systems and DER aggregators. Build the ACCESS evidence around an inventory of these non-human identities with an owner, purpose and last-used date for each.
- Deprovisioning: include contractor and OEM accounts in leaver processes. See the Energy Sector Identity and OT Access Guide.
- Remote access: section 8B names remote access explicitly. See the OT Remote Access Guide and the Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide.
- Machine credentials that cannot take MFA: document compensating controls (vaulting, rotation, network restriction) so the CIRMP shows where MFA is not reasonably practicable and why.
Running an AESCSF cycle: phased approach
- Confirm obligations: check whether your assets are CI assets under the SOCI Act and which CIRMP sections apply. Record the framework you are relying on in the CIRMP.
- Run the CATs: complete E-CAT, G-CAT or L-CAT for each sub-sector and take the highest rating as your criticality.
- Set the target profile: SP-1 as the floor; SP-2 where the enhanced CIRMP Rules apply or criticality is medium or higher; SP-3 for the highest criticality.
- Agree scope: parent-level assessment, named in-scope sites, control rooms, OT networks and outsourced operators.
- Pilot one domain: run ACCESS or ASSET first with IT and OT together to calibrate how strictly the team rates "largely" versus "fully".
- Complete the assessment: answer every practice and anti-pattern in the target profile, attaching evidence.
- Prioritise gaps: priority practices first, then anti-patterns, then remaining profile practices. Cost and risk-rank each item.
- Feed the CIRMP and board: report the result in the annual CIRMP report process and the board approval. Keep the previous year's result for trend.
- Repeat annually: AEMO's low criticality guidance recommends an annual assessment. If a change made a score worse (for example a new acquisition with flat networks), record it rather than rolling the scope back to hide it.
Decision guidance
- AESCSF or another CIRMP framework: energy entities with significant OT usually choose AESCSF or C2M2, because both test OT practices directly. A business whose CI asset is mainly IT (a retailer or market system) may already run ISO/IEC 27001 or the Essential Eight; choose one primary framework and map the others rather than running three assessments.
- Small DER or retail participants: start with Lite, fix the SP-1 priority practices, then move to Full when you take on network-connected assets at scale. See the Distributed Energy Resources and Solar Inverter Security Guide.
- Large integrated groups: one parent-level Full assessment with site-level evidence packs works better than separate business-unit scores that the board cannot compare.
- Self-assessment or independent assessor: self-assessment is cheaper and builds knowledge; an independent reviewer helps where the result feeds board attestation or a regulator conversation. Many teams alternate years.
Detection and measurement
- Profile attainment: percentage of target-profile practices fully implemented, and number of anti-patterns present (target zero).
- Lowest domain MIL: track the domain that sets your overall MIL year on year.
- Priority practice closure: open SP-1 and SP-2 priority practices, with owner and due date.
- Phishing-resistant MFA coverage: share of remote and privileged access paths to critical systems protected, with failed attempts logged centrally (section 8B).
- Dormant non-human identities: OT and vendor accounts unused for 90 days or more that remain enabled.
- Segregation test results: critical systems confirmed able to operate independently of internet-connected systems (section 8C).
Framework mapping
The table aligns AESCSF V2 domains with the closest NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes and SP 800-53 Rev 5 controls, as an editorial aid for organisations that also report against those frameworks.
| AESCSF V2 domain | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 |
|---|---|---|
| RISK, PROGRAM | GV.RM-01, GV.OV-01 | RA-3, PM-9 |
| ASSET | ID.AM-01 | CM-8 |
| ACCESS | PR.AA-05 | AC-2, IA-2 |
| ARCHITECTURE | PR.IR-01 | SC-7 |
| SITUATION | DE.CM-01 | SI-4 |
| RESPONSE | RS.MA-01 | IR-4 |
| THIRD-PARTIES | GV.SC-07 | SR-6 |
| WORKFORCE | GV.RR-04 | Personnel security (PS) family |
| PRIVACY | Privacy outcomes sit in the NIST Privacy Framework | PT-2 |
Common failure patterns
- Re-using the 2020-21 baseline: reporting SP-1 against the V1 core after the enhanced rules named the 2023 core at SP-2.
- Treating the CAT as the SOCI test: AEMO says the two criticality measures differ; confirm SOCI scope separately.
- Splitting scope to look better: separate business-unit assessments when networks and IT and OT management are shared, which AEMO's scoping rule does not support.
- Ignoring anti-patterns: scoring practices as fully implemented while an anti-pattern in the same domain is present, which caps the domain anyway.
- Staff-only ACCESS evidence: access reviews that cover employees but not vendor, service and shared OT accounts.
- Leaving out the O&M contractor: outsourced operators running control systems with no evidence in the assessment.
Practitioner checklist
- Confirm which of your assets are CI assets and whether the enhanced CIRMP Rules apply.
- Run E-CAT, G-CAT or L-CAT for each sub-sector and record the highest result.
- Set the target Security Profile and record the framework choice in the CIRMP.
- Re-baseline against the 2023 (V2) Framework Core and list every SP-2 gap.
- Scope the assessment at parent level, including outsourced operators.
- Check every anti-pattern in the target profile and plan to remove those present.
- Build an inventory of OT, vendor and service accounts with owners for the ACCESS domain.
- Map remote and privileged access paths for phishing-resistant MFA under section 8B.
- Test segregation of critical systems against section 8C.
- Schedule the next annual assessment and report trend to the board.
Standards and references
- AEMO: AESCSF framework and resources
- AEMO: AESCSF 2025 Overview
- AEMO: AESCSF Guidance Material for Low Criticality Organisations
- Federal Register of Legislation: Security of Critical Infrastructure (Critical infrastructure risk management program) Rules (LIN 23/006) 2023
- Federal Register of Legislation: CIRMP Rules compilation from 10 June 2026 (sections 8A to 8C)
- Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre: Enhanced CIRMP implementation factsheet
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Australia SOCI Act Guide · C2M2 Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Guide · Energy Sector Cyber Regulation Map · Essential Eight Guide · OT Security Guide. This guide summarises the AESCSF and related CIRMP Rules and is not legal advice.