Join our Newsletter — 33% off our NHI Course
Home› Guides› Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver and EDR Killers…
Guide Attack Techniques & Malware

Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver and EDR Killers Guide: How Drivers Blind Defences and How to Stop It

PDF for newsletter subscribers · free to read online

← All guides
By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 12 min read
On this page

Ransomware operators now routinely switch off endpoint detection and response (EDR) before they encrypt, and the most reliable way they do it is by loading a legitimately signed but vulnerable kernel driver. This technique, bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD), gives an attacker who already holds local administrator rights a path into the Windows kernel, where security agents can be terminated or their callbacks removed. Packaged "EDR killer" tools such as AuKill, EDRKillShifter and the driver mode in DragonForce's encryptor have turned it into a commodity sold to affiliates. This guide explains the mechanism at a defensive level, where it appears, what to log, and how the Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist, memory integrity (HVCI) and App Control for Business close the gap. It is for endpoint engineers, detection engineers and incident responders, and goes deeper on drivers than the broader EDR Evasion and Defence Guide.

Key takeaways

  • BYOVD is a post-compromise step, not an entry point. The attacker needs administrator rights to install a driver, so local admin control and privileged identity hygiene are the first line of defence.
  • Signed does not mean safe. Windows accepts the driver because a real vendor signed it; the flaw is in what the driver lets any caller do once loaded.
  • A small set of drivers does most of the damage. ESET found EDR killers rely on a limited pool of public vulnerable drivers and proof-of-concept code, which makes blocklisting effective.
  • The blocklist only works if it is enforced and current. Microsoft's in-box list is on by default on Windows 11 2022 update devices with memory integrity, but the downloadable list is more complete and already-running drivers are only blocked after a reboot.
  • Detect the driver load, not the aftermath. A new kernel service, a driver load from a user-writable path or a known-bad hash is the last reliable signal before the EDR goes quiet.

How the attack works

Windows requires kernel drivers to be signed. Over many years, hardware and software vendors have shipped signed drivers that expose dangerous functions to user mode: reading and writing arbitrary kernel memory, terminating any process, or mapping physical memory. These drivers remain validly signed after the flaw is published, so an attacker can bring an old copy onto a host and load it.

  1. Prerequisite: the attacker already has administrator or SYSTEM rights, typically from stolen credentials or an earlier exploit (MITRE ATT&CK T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation describes adversaries bringing a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine for kernel execution).
  2. Staging: the driver file is dropped to disk, often under a renamed or generic filename.
  3. Loading: the driver is registered as a kernel service (T1543.003 Windows Service) and started.
  4. Abuse: the EDR killer sends requests to the driver to terminate security processes, remove kernel callbacks or tamper with protected processes (T1685 Disable or Modify Tools). Some tools loop, killing the agent again whenever it restarts.
  5. Follow-on: with the sensor blind, operators run credential theft, stop services (T1489 Service Stop) and deploy ransomware.

A related variant is the malicious signed driver: attacker-written code signed with a stolen or fraudulently obtained certificate (T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates, T1553.002 Code Signing). The NVIDIA certificates leaked in 2022 are one example: the NVIDIA code-signing certificate theft led to malware, including a Windows driver, being signed with expired NVIDIA certificates, which Windows driver signing rules could still accept. Both variants end in the same place: attacker-controlled code in ring 0.

VariantWhat is abusedTypical control that stops it
Vulnerable legitimate driverExposed IOCTLs in an old vendor driver (for example Process Explorer, Dell dbutil, GIGABYTE GDrv, Intel iqvw64)Vulnerable driver blocklist, App Control deny rules, hash detection
Malicious driver with stolen certificateCode-signing trust in a compromised certificateCertificate-based deny rules, blocklist updates, revocation
Rootkit after kernel accessKernel hooks to hide files, processes or network activity (T1014 Rootkit)Memory integrity, Secure Boot, offline forensics

Where it shows up

EDR killing has moved from a rare skill to a standard ransomware stage. The tools below come from vendor research and government advisories that defenders can read in full.

Tool or actorDriver abusedReported useSource
AuKillOutdated Process Explorer driver v16.32, dropped as PROCEXP.SYSMedusa Locker and LockBit intrusions, early 2023; earliest sample November 2022Sophos
EDRKillShifterDrivers including rentdrv2.sys and TFSysMonBuilt by RansomHub, introduced 8 May 2024 and offered to affiliates; later used by an affiliate ESET calls QuadSwitcher across Play, Medusa and BianLianESET
Medusa ransomwareVulnerable or signed driversUsed to kill or delete EDRCISA AA25-071A
DragonForce encryptortruesight.sys, rentdrv2.sys (optional mode, drivers must already be present)Process termination before encryptionAcronis

Several drivers abused this way are in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, which helps prioritise blocking and inventory.

CVEDriverKEV date addedKnown ransomware use (KEV)
CVE-2015-2291Intel Ethernet Diagnostics Driver (iqvw64.sys)10 February 2023Known
CVE-2018-19320GIGABYTE GDrv24 October 2022Known
CVE-2018-19321GIGABYTE GDrv24 October 2022Known
CVE-2021-21551Dell dbutil driver31 March 2022Unknown

The community LOLDrivers project, maintained by MagicSword with GitHub contributions, listed 706 entries (581 vulnerable, 125 malicious) covering 2,417 samples when checked, and publishes Sigma, YARA, Sysmon and App Control rules. It also records around 19.8% of samples as loading even with HVCI enabled, a reminder that memory integrity is not a complete answer on its own. Driver ownership is covered in the RansomHub Threat Actor Profile and Medusa Ransomware Threat Actor Profile.

Impact

  • Loss of visibility: once the agent is killed, the SOC loses process, network and file telemetry from that host, often for exactly the window in which credentials are dumped and ransomware runs.
  • Silent failure: some consoles show the host as merely offline or unhealthy. Without a specific "sensor stopped unexpectedly" alert, the gap looks like a network issue.
  • Kernel-level persistence: where a malicious driver is loaded, rootkit functions can hide artefacts and survive reboots, which forces a rebuild rather than clean-up.
  • Stability risk: abusing kernel drivers can crash hosts, which can cause outages independent of encryption.
  • Wider blast radius: EDR killers are often pushed by script or Group Policy to many hosts at once, so one compromised domain admin can blind a whole estate.

Detection

SignalLog sourceNotes
Driver loaded (hash, signer, signature status)Sysmon Event ID 6Match hashes and signers against LOLDrivers and the Microsoft blocklist; flag drivers loaded from user-writable or temp paths
New service with a kernel driver typeSystem log 7045; Security log 4697Rare on servers outside patch windows; correlate with the account that created it
Driver would have been blocked (audit mode)Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational 3076Use during blocklist pilots to find legitimate drivers that would break
Driver blocked (enforced)Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational 3077A block on a production host is a high-fidelity incident signal
Security agent stopped or heartbeat lostEDR console, SIEM heartbeat ruleAlert on loss of heartbeat from a host that is still sending other logs (for example DNS or proxy)
Known EDR killer file or behaviourEDR, antivirus PUA detectionESET recommends detecting potentially unsafe applications and the killers themselves, not only the driver

Correlation that works: new kernel service creation, followed within minutes by the EDR sensor stopping on the same host, followed by mass file changes or shadow copy deletion. Each event alone can be benign; the sequence is not. Because the agent may die first, forward driver load and service events to the SIEM in near real time through a separate channel such as Windows Event Forwarding. The EDR Guide covers sensor health monitoring in more detail.

Metrics

  • Blocklist enforcement coverage: percentage of Windows endpoints and servers with the vulnerable driver blocklist enforced (not audit).
  • Memory integrity coverage: percentage of capable devices reporting HVCI running.
  • Blocklist currency: days since the deployed blocklist version matched Microsoft's latest downloadable list.
  • Driver alert triage time: median time from a 3077 block or unknown kernel service to analyst review.
  • Silent sensor gaps: count of hosts losing EDR heartbeat while other telemetry continues, per month.

Prevention and hardening

Controls compared

ControlWhat it doesLimits
Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklistBlocks drivers meeting Microsoft's criteria (kernel privilege escalation flaws, malicious drivers or certificates used for malware, behaviour circumventing the security model). On by default since the Windows 11 2022 update and enforced with HVCI, Smart App Control or S modeIn-box list updates less often than the downloadable list; running drivers only blocked after reboot; Microsoft states it does not guarantee to block every vulnerable driver
Memory integrity (HVCI)Uses virtualisation-based security to enforce kernel code integrityIncompatible drivers can cause failures, even boot failure; some vulnerable drivers still load
App Control for Business driver allowlistOnly approved drivers load at allEffort to build and maintain; best for servers and Tier 0
Removing local admin rightsPrevents most users from installing driversDoes not stop an attacker holding domain or server admin
EDR tamper protectionStops user-mode attempts to stop the agentKernel-level attacks can bypass it, which is why driver controls matter

Rollout

  1. Inventory drivers. Export loaded driver lists from EDR or Sysmon Event ID 6 and compare with LOLDrivers and the Microsoft list to find what you actually run.
  2. Check memory integrity status. Microsoft documents the setting under Windows Security, Device security, Core isolation, Memory integrity, and reporting through the Win32_DeviceGuard WMI class.
  3. Pilot the downloadable blocklist in audit mode. Deploy the audit version of the policy to a pilot ring and collect CodeIntegrity 3076 events for two to four weeks. Microsoft documents copying the policy binary (SiPolicy.p7b) to %windir%\system32\CodeIntegrity and refreshing it.
  4. Fix or replace incompatible drivers. Update vendor drivers flagged in the pilot; do not create broad exceptions.
  5. Enforce in rings. Move to the enforced policy ring by ring, starting with servers that should have the fewest drivers. Reboot so running drivers are blocked.
  6. Enable memory integrity on capable devices after driver compatibility is confirmed.
  7. Add an App Control driver allowlist for Tier 0 (domain controllers, identity servers, backup servers). When merging Microsoft's block rules into your own policy, remove the Allow All rules as Microsoft instructs, or the merged policy allows everything.
  8. Schedule updates. Microsoft updates the list periodically; set a monthly check against the downloadable version.

Rollback: keep the previous policy version ready to redeploy. Microsoft documents a recovery path for memory integrity by setting the HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity Enabled registry value to 0, and warns that a UEFI lock means Secure Boot must be disabled to recover. Test recovery on a pilot machine before you use the UEFI lock.

Decision guidance

  • Small organisations: confirm memory integrity and the default blocklist are on, remove local admin from users, and rely on EDR tamper protection and heartbeat alerts.
  • Mid-size organisations: add the downloadable blocklist with a quarterly or monthly update and SIEM rules for driver loads and kernel services.
  • Large or high-risk organisations: full App Control driver allowlisting on Tier 0 and servers, plus hash and signer hunting with LOLDrivers data.

Where identity fits

Every BYOVD attack starts with an administrator identity. Local administrator passwords reused across hosts, domain admin accounts used for routine work and service accounts with local admin on every server are what let one compromise turn into estate-wide EDR killing. Unique local admin passwords (Windows LAPS), tiered admin accounts and removing interactive rights from service accounts all cut the number of hosts an attacker can load drivers on. See the Service Account Security Guide and the AD Domain Controller Hardening Guide.

Lessons from incidents

  • Certificate theft becomes driver abuse. The NVIDIA certificate leak showed that expired signing certificates can still sign drivers Windows will load. Respond with certificate-based deny rules, not only hash blocks. See the Compromised Code Signing Certificate Playbook.
  • Blocklist in audit mode forever. Pilots that never move to enforcement give a false sense of coverage.
  • Exceptions for one old hardware tool. A single legacy utility driver allowed fleet-wide can be the exact driver an EDR killer brings.
  • No alert on sensor death. Teams that only alert on detections, not on agent loss, see the attack only after encryption.
  • Relying on HVCI alone. LOLDrivers data shows some vulnerable drivers still load with HVCI; layer the blocklist and allowlisting.

Framework mapping

ControlNIST CSF 2.0NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5MITRE D3FEND
Vulnerable driver blocklistPR.PS-05CM-7 Least FunctionalityD3-EDL Executable Denylisting
Driver allowlistingPR.PS-05CM-7, CM-14 Signed ComponentsD3-EAL Executable Allowlisting
Memory integrity and code integrityPR.PS-02SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information IntegrityD3-DLIC Driver Load Integrity Checking
Driver load and sensor health monitoringDE.CM-09SI-4 System MonitoringD3-DLIC
Malware and PUA detection of EDR killersDE.CM-09SI-3 Malicious Code ProtectionD3-EDL

Practitioner checklist

  • Inventory loaded kernel drivers across endpoints and servers and compare them with the Microsoft blocklist and LOLDrivers.
  • Confirm memory integrity is running on every capable device and report coverage monthly.
  • Pilot the downloadable vulnerable driver blocklist in audit mode, review CodeIntegrity 3076 events, then enforce ring by ring.
  • Add an App Control driver allowlist for domain controllers, identity servers and backup servers.
  • Collect Sysmon Event ID 6, System 7045 and Security 4697 centrally and alert on unknown drivers and kernel services.
  • Alert on EDR heartbeat loss when the host is still sending other telemetry.
  • Remove local administrator rights from users and deploy Windows LAPS for local admin accounts.
  • Block KEV-listed drivers (CVE-2015-2291, CVE-2018-19320, CVE-2018-19321, CVE-2021-21551) by hash and signer.
  • Document a rollback path for each policy change and test HVCI recovery before using the UEFI lock.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: EDR Evasion and Defence Guide · Top 10 EDR Evasion Techniques · Application Allowlisting Guide · Ransomware Prevention Guide · DragonForce Ransomware Profile Guide

PDF for subscribers

Take this guide with you

Every section, table and checklist in one PDF, with links to the sources and related guides. Subscribe to our weekly NHI & AI Identity Journal and we’ll email you a download link.

Free weekly newsletter

Subscribe to the NHI & AI Identity Journal

The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.

Bonus 33% off our NHI Course when you subscribe.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

PDF Downloads for Newsletter Subscribers

Get the guide

Enter your details and we’ll email you a download link.

The full guide is free to read online. The PDF is a thank you for subscribing.

Fill in all fields marked * and tick the PDF box to continue.