Service providers hold your data, run your platforms and often keep live tokens into your tenants, yet many organisations cannot produce a complete list of them, let alone show which ones were assessed or offboarded properly. This guide is the implementation page for Control 15 (Service Provider Management) of the CIS Critical Security Controls v8.1. It covers the seven Safeguards with their Implementation Groups, the annual cycles CIS writes into them, the identity side of supplier risk (integration tokens, cross-account roles and vendor accounts), and the evidence an assessor will ask for. It is for GRC, procurement, TPRM and security teams. For the full third-party risk life cycle, regulation and tiering models, read the Third-Party Risk Management Guide; for the view across all 18 Controls, read the CIS Controls Guide.
Key takeaways
- Only the inventory is IG1. Safeguard 15.1 applies to everyone; policy, classification and contracts (15.2 to 15.4) start at IG2; assessment, monitoring and decommissioning (15.5 to 15.7) are IG3.
- Everything runs on an annual cycle. The inventory, policy, classifications and contracts are reviewed at least annually, and providers are reassessed annually or with new and renewed contracts. The Assessment Specification fails 15.1 to 15.3 when the last review is more than twelve months old.
- The policy has five required parts. 15.2 must address classification, inventory, assessment, monitoring and decommissioning, and the Assessment Specification scores completeness out of five.
- Integrations are the access that matters. OAuth grants, API keys, cross-account roles and vendor user accounts are how provider incidents reach you; record them against each provider and remove them at exit, as 15.7 requires.
- IG levels are a floor, not a ceiling. An IG1 organisation still benefits from asking critical providers for a SOC 2 report and from removing a departing provider's accounts the day the contract ends.
What it is and who it applies to
CIS defines Control 15 as developing a process to evaluate service providers who hold sensitive data, or are responsible for an enterprise's critical IT platforms or processes, to ensure these providers are protecting those platforms and data appropriately. The CIS rationale points to third-party breaches that reached enterprises through smaller suppliers, ransomware at a provider that disrupts its customers, and fourth parties: providers that rely on other platforms to serve you. CIS also observes that smaller firms are often a greater risk than the large cloud providers that receive most scrutiny.
In scope are cloud and SaaS providers, managed service providers and MSSPs, outsourced development and support, payment processors, consultancies with system access and any provider that stores or processes enterprise data. CIS notes that sector rules already extend protection to providers, citing HIPAA Business Associate agreements and FFIEC requirements, and that sector assessment standards exist, such as Shared Assessments in finance and HECVAT in higher education.
- Small organisations (IG1): keep a list of every provider with a classification and a named internal contact, reviewed once a year. A spreadsheet is enough if it is complete.
- Mid-sized organisations (IG2): add a written policy, a classification scheme with criteria, and standard security clauses in contracts, reviewed annually.
- Large or regulated organisations (IG3): assess providers in proportion to their classification, monitor them continuously, and run a formal decommissioning process. Regulations such as DORA and NIS2 make many of these IG3 activities mandatory anyway; see the Third-Party Risk Management Guide.
CIS states that v8.1 did not change Implementation Group assignments, so the levels below hold for v8 and v8.1.
Structure and key requirements
Titles are as CIS publishes them; the requirement column summarises the Safeguard text in the CIS Controls Assessment Specification.
| Safeguard | Title | IG | What it requires |
|---|---|---|---|
| 15.1 | Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Service Providers | IG1 | List all known service providers, include classification(s) and designate an enterprise contact for each; review annually or after significant enterprise change |
| 15.2 | Establish and Maintain a Service Provider Management Policy | IG2 | Policy addressing classification, inventory, assessment, monitoring and decommissioning of providers; review annually |
| 15.3 | Classify Service Providers | IG2 | Classify using characteristics such as data sensitivity, data volume, availability requirements, applicable regulations, inherent risk and mitigated risk; review annually |
| 15.4 | Ensure Service Provider Contracts Include Security Requirements | IG2 | Contract requirements such as a minimum security programme, incident and breach notification and response, data encryption and data disposal, consistent with the policy; review contracts annually |
| 15.5 | Assess Service Providers | IG3 | Assess consistent with the policy; scope may vary by classification and may include SOC 2 reports, PCI Attestations of Compliance, custom questionnaires or other rigorous processes; reassess annually at minimum or with new and renewed contracts |
| 15.6 | Monitor Service Providers | IG3 | Monitor consistent with the policy; may include periodic reassessment of compliance, monitoring provider release notes and dark web monitoring |
| 15.7 | Securely Decommission Service Providers | IG3 | Considerations include user and service account deactivation, termination of data flows and secure disposal of enterprise data within provider systems |
Classification that drives the rest
Classification (15.3) decides how hard you assess (15.5) and watch (15.6). A three-tier scheme built from the CIS criteria works for most organisations.
| Tier | Typical criteria | Assessment depth (15.5) | Monitoring (15.6) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | Holds sensitive or regulated data at volume, has privileged or integration access to production, or an outage stops a key process | SOC 2 Type 2 or ISO/IEC 27001 certificate with scope check, plus a tailored questionnaire and evidence review; annual reassessment | Continuous: breach news and dark web monitoring, release notes, quarterly service reviews, access logs for its integrations |
| High | Holds internal or personal data, or has limited access to enterprise systems | Standard questionnaire plus independent report where available | Annual reassessment and event-driven checks after a public incident |
| Low | No enterprise data and no system access | Short due diligence questions at onboarding | Reassess at renewal |
Ready-made questionnaires and contract clauses are in the Vendor Security Assessment Template and the Third-Party Access Policy Template.
Identity and NHI requirements
The CIS text mentions identity only once, in 15.7 (user and service account deactivation), but most provider incidents that reach customers travel along identity paths. Record, for each provider in the 15.1 inventory, every identity it uses to reach you, and treat that list as part of classification, contracts, monitoring and exit.
| Provider access path | Example | Control to apply |
|---|---|---|
| OAuth app or SaaS integration | A chatbot or CRM add-on with consented scopes to your SaaS tenant | Inventory grants per provider; least scopes; in Microsoft Entra ID review admin and user consent under Enterprise apps > Permissions; user-consented grants can only be revoked through PowerShell or Microsoft Graph |
| Cross-account cloud role | A monitoring or backup vendor assuming an AWS IAM role | Require the provider-issued sts:ExternalId in the trust policy to prevent the confused deputy problem; scope permissions narrowly |
| API keys you issued to the provider | Keys for a payment, messaging or analytics service integration | Owner and expiry per key, vaulted storage, rotation on provider incident |
| Provider staff accounts | MSP engineers, contractors, support staff with named accounts | Named accounts only, MFA, time-bound access, removed in the leaver process; see the Contractor Identity Lifecycle Guide |
| Provider-held secrets for your systems | Service account passwords or tokens stored in a vendor platform | Contract clause on secrets storage and breach notification; rotate immediately after a provider breach |
- Why it matters: in the Salesloft Drift breach, OAuth tokens that customers had granted to the Drift integration were stolen from the provider's environment and used to export Salesforce data, with Google citing over 700 potentially impacted organisations. Customers whose 15.1 inventory listed the integration and its scopes could revoke and rotate quickly.
- Rotate everything after a provider incident: after the Okta support system breach, Cloudflare said it had failed to rotate one service token and three service accounts it believed were unused, and an attacker used them weeks later. See the Cloudflare 2023 breach and the Vendor SaaS Breach Response Playbook.
- Third-party NHIs are a named risk: see the OWASP NHI Top 10 NHI3 Vulnerable Third-Party NHI Guide and the Third-Party Access Guide.
Implementation steps
- Build the inventory from spend and access (15.1). Combine accounts payable and contract records with technical sources: identity provider enterprise applications and OAuth grants, cloud cross-account roles, SSO application lists and firewall or proxy logs for SaaS use. Record classification and an enterprise contact for each provider. The Assessment Specification scores the three components (provider, classification, contact) and accuracy against providers wrongly listed or missing.
- Write the policy (15.2). Cover the five required areas: classification, inventory, assessment, monitoring and decommissioning. Add who approves new providers, who accepts residual risk and how exceptions are recorded.
- Classify every provider (15.3). Apply the criteria above and record the inherent tier and, once assessed, the mitigated risk. Start with providers that have system access or hold sensitive data.
- Standardise contract clauses (15.4). Include a minimum security programme, incident and breach notification with a time limit, encryption of data in transit and at rest, data return and disposal at exit, subcontractor (fourth party) disclosure, audit or evidence rights and secrets handling. Review existing contracts annually and at renewal. See the AI Contract Clauses Guide for AI providers.
- Assess by tier (15.5). Accept independent reports where they fit: a SOC 2 Type 2 report covers operating effectiveness over a period, while a Type 1 report covers design at a point in time. Check the report scope matches the service you buy and implement the complementary user entity controls it lists, which are your responsibility. See the SOC 2 Guide.
- Monitor (15.6). Track provider breach disclosures, release notes and status pages, use dark web monitoring where justified, and review sign-in and API activity for each provider integration. Reassess after a material incident.
- Decommission (15.7). Run an exit checklist: disable provider user accounts, revoke OAuth grants and API keys, delete cross-account roles, stop data flows, obtain written confirmation of data return or disposal, and update the inventory.
Pilot and rollback: revoking a provider integration can break a business process, so run the exit checklist in report mode first (list what would be removed), confirm with the business owner, then revoke. Keep the configuration needed to restore a grant for the agreed rollback window, then delete it.
Evidence and assessment
The CIS Controls Assessment Specification fails 15.1 to 15.3 if the inventory or policy is missing or the last review is more than twelve months old, scores inventory completeness against three components and policy completeness against five, and measures coverage for classification, up-to-date contracts, assessments and proper termination.
| Safeguard | Evidence an assessor expects | KPI |
|---|---|---|
| 15.1 | Provider inventory with classification and enterprise contact; date of last review; reconciliation with spend and SSO lists | Providers with all three components; providers found in spend or access data but missing from the inventory (target 0) |
| 15.2 | Approved policy covering the five areas; review date | Policy areas covered (5 of 5); months since review |
| 15.3 | Classification criteria and the tier recorded per provider | Providers with a classification |
| 15.4 | Contract clause library; contract review log | Critical and high providers with current security clauses |
| 15.5 | Assessment records, SOC 2 or ISO reports with scope review, risk acceptance | Critical providers assessed in the last 12 months |
| 15.6 | Monitoring records, incident follow-ups, integration activity reviews | Median days from public provider incident to internal decision |
| 15.7 | Exit checklists, account and token revocation records, disposal certificates | Exited providers with all identities revoked within the agreed period |
Detection
- Trusted relationship abuse: monitor provider accounts and integrations for activity outside the expected pattern, for example bulk exports, access outside support hours or new permissions. ATT&CK tracks this as T1199 Trusted Relationship, and stolen integration tokens as T1550.001 Application Access Token.
- Supply chain compromise: watch provider software updates and release notes for unexpected changes (T1195 Supply Chain Compromise). See the Software Supply Chain Security Guide.
Mapping to other frameworks
| Control 15 area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inventory and classification (15.1, 15.3) | SA-9 External System Services | GV.SC-04 | A.5.19 Information security in supplier relationships |
| Policy (15.2) | SR-3 Supply Chain Controls and Processes | GV.SC-01, GV.SC-02 | A.5.19 |
| Contracts (15.4) | SA-4 Acquisition Process, SA-9, PS-7 External Personnel Security | GV.SC-05 | A.5.20 Addressing information security within supplier agreements |
| Assessment (15.5) | SR-6 Supplier Assessments and Reviews, SR-5 Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods | GV.SC-06, GV.SC-07 | A.5.21 Managing information security in the ICT supply chain |
| Monitoring (15.6) | SA-9, SR-6 | GV.SC-07, GV.SC-08 | A.5.22 Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services |
| Decommissioning (15.7) | SA-9, AC-20 Use of External Systems | GV.SC-10 | A.5.19, A.5.23 Information security for use of cloud services |
The CIS Controls Navigator holds the authoritative mappings; check them before an audit. For deeper federal practice, see the NIST SP 800-161 Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Guide and the Control Mapping Guide.
Common pitfalls
- Inventory from procurement only: free SaaS tools, OAuth apps approved by users and integrations bought on credit cards never reach the contract register. Reconcile against identity provider and SSO data.
- Assessing once at onboarding: a questionnaire from three years ago says nothing about today. 15.5 expects annual reassessment for in-scope providers.
- Accepting a SOC 2 report without reading it: scope exclusions, qualified opinions and complementary user entity controls are often ignored, leaving gaps the report explicitly assigns to you.
- Exit without revocation: contracts end but OAuth grants, API keys and vendor accounts stay live. 15.7 names account deactivation for this reason.
- Partial rotation after a provider breach: as the Cloudflare case shows, credentials assumed unused are still credentials. Rotate everything the provider could have touched.
- Ignoring fourth parties: CIS calls out providers that depend on other platforms. Ask critical providers for their subprocessor list and notification of changes. See the Top 10 Third-Party Risk Mistakes.
Practitioner checklist
- Inventory every provider with classification and a named enterprise contact, and review it at least annually.
- Reconcile the inventory against spend, SSO applications, OAuth grants and cross-account roles.
- Publish a policy covering classification, inventory, assessment, monitoring and decommissioning.
- Classify providers by data sensitivity, volume, availability, regulation and access.
- Use standard contract clauses for security, breach notification, encryption, disposal and subprocessors.
- Assess critical providers annually and act on SOC 2 scope gaps and user entity controls.
- Record every identity and token each provider holds, and rotate them after any provider incident.
- Run a documented exit checklist that revokes accounts and tokens and confirms data disposal.
Standards and references
- CIS: Control 15 Service Provider Management
- CIS: CIS Critical Security Controls Version 8.1
- CIS: Controls Assessment Specification (source repository)
- NIST: SP 800-161 Rev. 1 Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- NCSC: Supply chain security guidance
- AWS: The confused deputy problem
- Microsoft Learn: Review permissions granted to enterprise applications
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: CIS Controls Guide · Third-Party Risk Management Guide · Third-Party Risk Management Maturity Model · SaaS Security Guide · CIS Control 14 Security Awareness and Skills Training Guide