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24/06/2026 9:28 pm
TL;DR: Machine identities now span CI/CD pipelines, cloud services, microservices, and certificates, but Entro Security says the lifecycle is still too often handled with fragmented visibility, manual classification, and weak rotation discipline. That makes machine identity management a governance problem, not just an operational one.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Entro Security: Secure machine identity management 101
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams govern service accounts and API keys at scale?
A: Start by inventorying every service account, API key, token, and certificate with a named owner, expiry, and business purpose.
Q: Why do machine identities create more risk when they are long lived?
A: Long-lived machine identities extend the attack window and make revocation harder when teams change, systems are retired, or permissions drift.
Q: What breaks when machine identity inventory is incomplete?
A: Rotation, revocation, and decommissioning all break down when you cannot see the full population of credentials.
Practitioner guidance
- Build a complete machine identity inventory Track every service account, API key, token, and certificate with owner, expiry, system, and business purpose so no credential exists outside governance.
- Automate credential rotation and revocation Replace manual renewal with lifecycle automation for secrets, certificates, and service accounts so standing access does not outlive the workload that uses it.
- Centralise vaulting and usage monitoring Store machine credentials in a controlled vault, then monitor usage patterns for stale, duplicated, or unexpectedly broad access across cloud and pipeline environments.
What's in the full article
Entro Security's full blog covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Step-by-step examples of how machine identity lifecycle stages map to provisioning, monitoring, and decommissioning.
- Practical discussion of secrets, certificates, and service accounts in CI/CD pipelines and cloud environments.
- Examples of how Zero Trust principles apply to software-to-software authentication in enterprise systems.
- Vendor-specific platform details on automation and anomaly detection for teams that need implementation guidance.
👉 Read Entro Security's guide to secure machine identity management →
Machine identity management: what IAM teams are missing?
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25/06/2026 6:43 am
Machine identity governance fails when lifecycle ownership is fragmented. The article describes provisioning, documentation, monitoring, rotation, vaulting, and decommissioning as separate steps, but the real governance gap is that no single control plane is shown to own the full lifecycle. That leaves machine access easy to create and hard to retire. The implication is that NHI programmes need lifecycle accountability, not just more tooling.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 85% of organisations lack full visibility into third-party vendors connected via OAuth apps, according to The State of Non-Human Identity Security.
- Only 1.5 out of 10 organisations are highly confident in their ability to secure NHIs, compared to nearly 1 in 4 for securing human identities.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who is accountable when a machine credential is compromised?
A: Accountability should sit with the system or platform owner who approved the credential, but governance should also assign operational responsibility for rotation, monitoring, and retirement. If no owner can revoke or audit the credential quickly, the organisation has created an unmanaged identity. That is a governance failure, not just an incident response issue.
👉 Read our full editorial: Machine identity management exposes the NHI governance gap
