Topic starter
12/06/2026 12:47 am
TL;DR: Break glass accounts are emergency access controls meant to restore control during MFA outages, account lockouts, or active breaches, but the Uber incident shows how hardcoded credentials and overprivileged admin access can turn them into a takeover path, according to Zluri. Emergency access only works when it is tightly governed, tested, and isolated from everyday identity workflows.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Zluri: “Break Glass Accounts: Emergency Access to Bypass Lockouts”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when break glass accounts are treated like everyday admin access?
A: When emergency access is treated like routine administration, it stops being an emergency control and becomes standing privileged access.
Q: Why do overprivileged break glass accounts increase incident impact?
A: Because the account can reach many systems from a single privileged entry point.
Q: How should organisations test emergency access accounts?
A: They should validate that the account can still be used when the primary control path fails, that the approved custodians can reach it, and that access can be restored and revoked cleanly after the test.
Practitioner guidance
- Define emergency access ownership and activation Assign named custodians, documented approvers, and explicit activation criteria for each break glass account so the control can be used without hesitation or confusion during an outage or breach.
- Remove hardcoded emergency credentials Search scripts, vaults, and admin runbooks for embedded secrets that could expose break glass access, then replace them with managed credentials that can be rotated and revoked cleanly.
- Isolate break glass credentials from normal workflows Keep emergency accounts out of daily admin use, conditional access paths, and shared provisioning processes so their access state remains exceptional and easy to audit.
Bottom line: Break glass accounts solve a real recovery problem, but they create a high-risk privileged path if they are shared, broad, or used outside emergencies.
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This topic was modified 4 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
12/06/2026 10:15 am
Break glass accounts are a governance exception, not a governance substitute: Their value comes from preserving a recovery path when primary controls fail, but that same exception can become permanent if it is reused for convenience. The article shows why emergency access must be treated as a tightly bounded lifecycle object rather than a standing administrative shortcut. Practitioners should judge these accounts by how quickly they can be activated, revoked, and audited under stress.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Who should own break glass procedures when access spans IAM and operations teams?
A: Ownership should sit with the team that can enforce the control end to end, usually identity security or privileged access management, with operations and application owners contributing requirements. The process needs clear approval criteria, monitoring responsibilities, and revocation authority. Shared ownership without explicit accountability often leads to inconsistent use, weak audits, and slower response when emergency access is genuinely needed.
👉 Read our full editorial: Break glass accounts expose the real problem in emergency access
This post was modified 4 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group