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11/07/2026 8:29 pm
TL;DR: Passkeys replace shared secrets with public key cryptography and browser-platform authenticator flows, reducing password exposure while adding implementation complexity across registration, authentication, key storage, and authenticator metadata handling, according to Prove Identity. The security gain is real, but only if teams treat passkeys as an identity architecture change rather than a simple password swap.
NHIMG editorial — based on content published by Prove Identity: The Road to Passkey Adoption: A Developer’s Perspective
By the numbers:
- Most browsers are FIDO2 compliant, including Chrome, Edge, Safari, and Firefox, at more than 97% as of December 2023.
- Prove says it is trusted by 2,500+ leading companies to reduce fraud and improve consumer experiences.
Questions worth separating out
Q: How should security teams implement passkeys without creating new identity risk?
A: Start by defining which authenticators are acceptable, then verify that registration and authentication are fully bound to server-side public keys and challenges.
Q: When do passkeys actually improve IAM security?
A: They improve security when they replace shared secrets with device-bound cryptographic proof and the organisation can enforce authenticator policy, key storage integrity, and lifecycle controls.
Q: What do organisations get wrong about passwordless authentication?
A: They often treat passwordless as a front-end login change rather than an identity control change.
Practitioner guidance
- Define acceptable authenticator policy Specify which authenticators are allowed, which security properties are required, and which combinations must be rejected before enabling registration at scale.
- Validate server-side challenge binding Confirm that each authentication response is tied to the correct stored public key, user record, and challenge value, with replay resistance enforced.
- Build enrolment and removal workflows Support adding, listing, and revoking multiple passkeys per user so device replacement, recovery, and offboarding do not create unmanaged access.
What's in the full article
Prove Identity's full article covers the implementation detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- The exact registration and authentication sequence that maps browser, platform, and authenticator interactions.
- The server-side endpoint structure required to support passkey enrolment and login flows.
- Practical discussion of multi-authenticator management for users who need more than one passkey.
- Additional implementation detail on cryptographic challenge handling and public key storage.
👉 Read Prove Identity's technical guide to passkey authentication flows →
Passkeys and passwordless authentication: what IAM teams need to know?
Explore further
11/07/2026 8:58 pm
Passkeys remove shared-secret dependence, but they do not remove identity governance. The control surface shifts from password policy to authenticator assurance, key custody, and recovery design. That means the programme question is no longer how to harden a password, but how to govern a device-bound credential lifecycle with the same discipline IAM teams apply elsewhere.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 91.6% of secrets remain valid five days after the targeted organisation is notified, showing a critical gap in remediation procedures, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, which shows how often identity inventory falls behind operational reality.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How do IAM teams govern passkey recovery and offboarding?
A: They should manage passkeys like any other identity credential, with explicit inventory, recovery rules, and removal steps when a device is replaced or a user leaves. That prevents dormant authenticators from becoming long-lived access paths and keeps lifecycle control consistent.
👉 Read our full editorial: Passkeys shift authentication, but implementation still carries risk
