TL;DR: Passkeys improved banking sign-in completion and speed while resisting phishing, credential stuffing, and adversary-in-the-middle attacks, according to OneSpan. The gains depend on redesigning onboarding, sign-in, and recovery as one journey instead of treating passkeys as a drop-in login swap.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by OneSpan: “Passkeys for banking: A conversation with CyberRisk TV”.
Key questions
Q: When should banks prioritise passkeys over SMS or push MFA?
A: Banks should prioritise passkeys when the main goal is to reduce phishing and credential replay while also improving completion rates.
Q: What are the signs that a passkey deployment is failing?
A: A passkey deployment is failing when users cannot recover access after losing a device, when teams over-rely on a single device with no fallback, or when sign-in still depends on passwords for routine access.
Q: What breaks when banks replace passwords with passkeys too quickly?
A: Banks usually break the user journey, not the cryptography, when they switch too fast.
Practitioner guidance
- Design passkeys as a full journey Map onboarding, sign-in, and account recovery as one control path so the same assurance level is maintained across each user touchpoint.
- Roll out by channel or region Use a phased deployment to one platform, geography, or customer cohort first so you can measure completion, latency, and fallback behaviour before broader release.
- Make mobile the first adoption path Prioritise mobile for initial passkey adoption where biometric familiarity and device gestures reduce behavioural resistance.
Bottom line: Passkeys reduce banking friction and close off password-era attack paths, but only if the full authentication journey is redesigned around them.
Glossary terms: Passkey, Account Recovery, Sign-in completion rate, Coexistence
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Passkeys do not just improve authentication, they remove an entire class of shared-secret governance assumptions. Banking authentication has long assumed that a reusable credential can be protected, recovered, and re-entered safely across sessions. That assumption is weaker once authentication is device-bound, origin-bound, and resistant to replay. The practical consequence is that identity teams must stop treating password replacement as the main event and start treating control-plane redesign as the real work.
A few things that frame the scale:
- eBay's passkey data shows 55-60% of passkey adoption happens on mobile, against around 20% on desktop.
A question worth separating out:
Q: How should security teams roll out passkeys without disrupting existing authentication flows?
A: Start with applications where phishing risk and user friction are both high, then introduce passkeys alongside current methods while you preserve enrolment, recovery, and audit continuity. The goal is not a big-bang replacement. It is to reduce shared-secret exposure while keeping access stable for the users and systems that are not ready to move yet.
👉 Read our full editorial: Passkeys for banking reduce friction without weakening auth