Topic starter
08/06/2026 4:15 pm
TL;DR: Segregation of duties examples across accounting, payroll, IT, healthcare, and ERP systems show that fraud and error usually appear when one person can both create and approve the same action, according to SecurEnds. The practical lesson is that clear role splits and continuous conflict checks matter more than policy language alone.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by SecurEnds: “Segregation of Duties Examples: How It Works in Real Business Scenarios”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when the same identity can both create and approve a transaction?
A: The control stops being preventive and becomes self-authorising.
Q: Why do SoD conflicts matter more in complex ERP environments?
A: Because risk no longer sits inside one application.
Q: How do organisations know whether segregation of duties is actually working?
A: Segregation of duties is working only if no identity can combine enough permissions to complete the full banking workflow without an independent check.
Practitioner guidance
- Map conflicting duties to actual entitlements Build SoD rules around the permissions that let one identity both initiate and approve high-risk actions, especially in finance, HR, and ERP systems.
- Separate approval from record creation Block the same user from entering invoices, setting up employees, or creating vendors and then approving the related payment or disbursement.
- Continuously check for role overlap Run automated conflict detection against active accounts so access changes that create SoD violations are flagged before they are reused in production.
Bottom line: Segregation of duties fails when a single identity can both start and approve the same action, because the control boundary collapses into self-authorisation.
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This topic was modified 5 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
08/06/2026 5:47 pm
Segregation of duties is really a permission-boundary problem, not a policy problem. The article shows that fraud and concealment appear when one identity can initiate and approve the same action. That means the real control failure is not missing documentation but overlapping authority across business workflows. Practitioners should treat SoD as an entitlement design issue, not a compliance checkbox.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should auditors and IAM teams check first when SoD gaps appear?
A: Start with the highest-risk workflows, such as payments, payroll, vendor setup, and privileged admin actions. Then check whether any role can both start and approve the same event, or hide the evidence after the fact. That reveals the control gap faster than reviewing every role in the organisation.
👉 Read our full editorial: Segregation of duties examples show where control gaps start
This post was modified 5 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group