TL;DR: Segregation of duties is described as a structural control that prevents one role from approving, executing, and recording the same action, and the article connects that model to finance, IT, HR, and automated access workflows, according to SecurEnds. The governance issue is now identity-centric: when access, approvals, and logging overlap, SoD becomes a detection problem rather than a control.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by SecurEnds: “Introduction to Segregation of Duties (SoD)”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when separation of duties is not enforced in IAM governance workflows?
A: When separation of duties is weak, the same person can request, approve, and retain conflicting access, which undermines control integrity.
Q: Why does overlap in access rights make segregation of duties ineffective?
A: Overlapping access lets the same person move through multiple checkpoints without independent review.
Q: How do organisations know whether segregation of duties is actually working?
A: Segregation of duties is working only if no identity can combine enough permissions to complete the full banking workflow without an independent check.
Practitioner guidance
- Define high-risk SoD conflict pairs List the exact combinations that must never coexist, such as approval plus execution, recordkeeping plus approval, or provisioning plus audit log administration.
- Separate admin and review functions Ensure the identities that grant access cannot also certify that access or alter the evidence used to prove compliance.
- Run SoD checks against inherited access Test whether role inheritance, emergency access, or temporary privilege creates hidden conflicts that the base role model does not show.
Bottom line: Segregation of duties fails when identity design lets one role approve, perform, and record the same action.
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Identity control points are where segregation of duties either survives or collapses. The article correctly shows that SoD is no longer just about business process design; it is about which identity can approve, execute, and record the same action. When those powers converge in IAM, the control becomes symbolic unless the access model enforces separation. The practical conclusion is that SoD has to be managed as an identity governance problem, not a policy statement.
A question worth separating out:
Q: Should organisations automate segregation of duties checks in IAM?
A: Yes, but only after the conflict model is well defined. Automation is useful for scale, yet it will miss the right problems if the organisation has not mapped approval, execution, logging, and exception paths correctly. The goal is to automate detection of real conflicts, not to digitise a weak process.
👉 Read our full editorial: Segregation of duties still breaks first at identity control points