Topic starter
11/06/2026 11:41 pm
TL;DR: Many organisations still grant broad, permanent access through static SSH keys, API tokens, and shared admin accounts, creating access creep, weak auditability, and a larger blast radius when credentials are compromised, according to JumpCloud. The real problem is not access itself but the assumption that privilege can safely persist until someone remembers to revoke it.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by JumpCloud: “The End of Standing Access: Hardening Cloud Infrastructure Through Least Privilege”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when cloud teams keep standing administrative privileges in place?
A: Standing privilege breaks least privilege because access persists after the task ends, which expands blast radius and leaves more time for compromise or misuse.
Q: Why do static SSH keys and API tokens create so much risk?
A: Static SSH keys and API tokens create risk because they are reusable, hard to track, and often survive long after the task or user changes.
Q: How do security teams know whether least privilege is actually working?
A: Least privilege is working when identities have narrowly scoped permissions, unused credentials are removed or quarantined, and repeated access reviews consistently shrink entitlements.
Practitioner guidance
- Eliminate standing administrative access Inventory privileged cloud accounts and remove any access that persists outside an active task or maintenance window.
- Replace static credentials with short-lived identity-based access Move SSH keys, API tokens, and similar static artefacts toward identity-based authentication that can be issued, bounded, and revoked in context.
- Apply just-in-time privileged access for cloud operations Require time-bound elevation for troubleshooting, deployment, and other privileged tasks so access expires immediately after the work is complete.
Bottom line: Standing cloud access turns routine administration into a persistent security liability because privilege remains available long after the original task.
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This topic was modified 4 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
12/06/2026 8:29 am
Standing privilege is a cloud governance assumption, not just an access pattern. Many programmes still act as if elevated access can remain available between tasks and be made safe through review alone. That assumption fails because cloud work is continuous, distributed, and highly reusable, so permanent privilege becomes part of the attack surface. The implication is that governance must treat time as a control dimension, not just role scope.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 92% of cloud identities are over-permissioned and 62% are dormant.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What is the difference between just-in-time access and standing privilege?
A: Just-in-time access grants privilege only for a defined task window, while standing privilege remains active until someone removes it. JIT reduces exposure by shrinking the time an identity can be abused, but standing privilege creates a constant attack surface. For NHI programs, the difference is often the difference between contained risk and persistent exposure.
👉 Read our full editorial: Static credentials and standing privilege are cloud security liabilities
This post was modified 4 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group