Topic starter
29/08/2025 4:42 pm
TL;DR: Just-in-time access can reduce exposure windows, but it does not eliminate standing privilege if the underlying account or permission set remains persistent, according to Britive’s analysis. The practical distinction is between temporary access and temporary permissions, and that gap determines whether least privilege is real or only procedural.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Britive: “Zero Standing Privileges: Not All JIT Eliminates Standing Access”.
Key questions
Q: What breaks when privileged access is not governed with least privilege and JIT?
A: What breaks is containment.
Q: Why do standing privileges create a higher access management risk?
A: Standing privileges increase risk because they remain available outside the task that justified them.
Q: How can security teams tell whether JIT access is really removing privilege?
A: Check whether the workflow provisions permissions only for the task and removes them when the task ends.
Practitioner guidance
- Audit for resident privilege, not just short sessions Review whether elevated rights remain attached to the account or permission set after the user logs off.
- Replace vaulted sessions with task-scoped permissions Where the platform allows it, grant the exact permissions needed for the task and remove them automatically when the task ends or approval expires.
- Separate day-to-day and elevated access paths Keep routine work on basic accounts and make elevation an explicit permission change, not a switch to a permanently privileged identity.
Bottom line: JIT access can reduce how long a user is exposed to privilege, but it does not by itself eliminate standing privilege.
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This topic was modified 6 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
06/10/2026 9:36 pm
Temporary access is not the same as temporary privilege. Britive's article exposes a common governance mistake: teams treat JIT access as if it automatically removes standing privilege, when in practice it often only brokers entry to a privileged account. The account or permission set can remain permanently powerful even when the session is short-lived. For identity governance, the practitioner conclusion is simple: the control has to eliminate resident privilege, not just constrain how it is used.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 91% of organisations say at least half of their privileged access is always-on, and only 1% have fully implemented just-in-time privileged access, according to a CyberArk study.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should teams do when their PAM model relies on shared privileged accounts?
A: They should treat shared privileged accounts as a sign that standing privilege still exists somewhere in the access design. The safer pattern is task-scoped permission delivery on the primary identity, with automatic removal after completion. That reduces reuse, shrinks the attack surface, and aligns the access model with zero standing privilege.
👉 Read our full editorial: Zero standing privileges: why JIT alone does not remove access risk