Topic starter
08/02/2026 9:36 pm
TL;DR: One-time passwords reduce password reuse and replay risk, but they do not stop real-time phishing, SIM swapping, or the broader trust assumptions built into MFA flows, according to Okta. The practical question is no longer whether OTPs work, but where they remain acceptable in a passkey-first identity strategy.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Okta: “What is a One-Time Password (OTP)?”.
By the numbers:
- Most implementations use time-based algorithms that generate codes valid for only 30 to 60 seconds.
Key questions
Q: When is an OTP still acceptable in an MFA strategy?
A: OTP remains acceptable for lower-risk access, transitional deployments, and fallback authentication where stronger phishing-resistant methods are not yet available.
Q: Why does SMS OTP create more risk than many teams assume?
A: Because the trust boundary sits in the telecom and messaging path, not in the user’s device alone.
Q: Should organisations prioritise passkeys over OTPs and magic links?
A: Usually yes, when phishing resistance and device binding matter most.
Practitioner guidance
- Prioritise phishing-resistant authentication for high-risk access Move privileged, remote, and sensitive workforce access toward WebAuthn or passkeys where the environment supports them.
- De-risk SMS delivery as a primary factor Remove SMS from critical access paths where possible, and if it must remain, wrap it in stronger policy, monitoring, and recovery controls because carrier compromise and SIM swapping can defeat the channel.
- Review OTP recovery and fallback paths Inspect account recovery, device replacement, and help-desk reset workflows for the same trust assumptions as sign-in, because weak recovery often undoes the security benefit of the OTP itself.
Bottom line: OTPs still add security value, but they are strongest as a compensating control rather than as the end state of authentication design.
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This topic was modified 4 days ago by NHI Mgmt Group
08/10/2026 5:17 pm
OTP is a compensating control, not a terminal control: One-time passwords reduce replay and password reuse risk, but they do not close the trust problem in the authentication channel. SMS, app delivery, and recovery flows each create a different attack surface. The result is that teams still need to distinguish between 'adds friction' and 'resists phishing,' because those are not the same control outcome.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should teams do if OTP is the only fallback factor?
A: Treat fallback design as part of the control, not an afterthought. Limit who can invoke it, require extra verification in recovery flows, and test whether the fallback path is easier to attack than the primary login flow.
👉 Read our full editorial: One-time passwords still matter, but they are not enough