Topic starter
22/01/2026 5:07 pm
TL;DR: Traditional security models still assume trust once a user or device is inside the network, while zero trust requires continuous verification and least privilege, according to Keeper Security. That assumption gap matters because privileged access, segmentation, and monitoring determine whether a compromise stays contained or becomes lateral movement.
Editorial analysis by NHI Mgmt Group, based on content published by Keeper Security: “Zero Trust vs Traditional Security Models: Whatâs the Difference?”.
Key questions
A: The model breaks when internal placement becomes a substitute for verification.
Q: Why do privileged service accounts increase data breach risk in Zero Trust models?
A: Privileged service accounts often hold broad, persistent access that bypasses the containment benefits Zero Trust is trying to create.
Q: How do teams know whether zero trust controls are actually reducing privilege?
A: A useful test is whether access disappears when the work is done.
Practitioner guidance
- Rebuild privileged access around explicit verification Replace perimeter-based trust assumptions with access decisions that evaluate identity, device context, and session risk at every privileged request.
- Scope privileged roles to task-level access Use role design and JIT provisioning so administrators and operators only receive the permissions needed for the current task, then lose them automatically.
- Segment privileged resources by blast radius Separate sensitive systems and admin functions so compromise of one account does not imply broad movement across the environment.
Bottom line: Traditional security models still assume trusted placement inside the network, and that assumption creates broad access that is difficult to contain after compromise.
Explore further
View Full Forum → | NHI Foundation Course → | Our Services → | Read the full analysis →
11/10/2026 2:16 am
Implicit trust is the governance flaw that zero trust is designed to remove. Traditional privileged access models assume that once identity crosses a boundary, trust can be extended operationally. That assumption no longer holds in distributed environments where the useful security unit is the session, not the perimeter. Practitioners should read this as a governance reset, not a tool discussion.
A few things that frame the scale:
- 90% of IT leaders say properly managing NHIs is essential for a successful zero-trust implementation, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
A question worth separating out:
Q: What should organisations do when a privileged session can reach too many internal systems?
A: They should treat that as a segmentation failure, not just an account issue. The right response is to narrow the resource boundaries, reduce standing access, and make sure one admin credential cannot traverse the environment unchecked.
👉 Read our full editorial: Zero trust vs traditional security models for privileged access