An ISASecure logo on a datasheet tells a buyer something specific and limited, and most procurement teams cannot say exactly what. ISASecure certifies automation products, systems, development organisations and, since 2026, deployed control systems against parts of the ISA/IEC 62443 series, and each scheme answers a different question. This guide explains what CSA, SSA and SDLA evaluate, how capability levels, versions and scopes appear on a certificate, where ICSA, HCSA and ACSSA fit, and how asset owners and suppliers should use the results. It is written for OT security leads, procurement and engineering teams evaluating suppliers, and product security teams planning certification. Facts are taken from ISASecure's own scheme pages, checked 27 October 2026. For the standard itself see the IEC 62443 Guide, which this page does not repeat.
Key takeaways
- Three core schemes, three questions. SDLA asks whether the supplier's development process conforms to IEC 62443-4-1, CSA whether a component meets IEC 62443-4-2, and SSA whether an integrated system meets IEC 62443-3-3.
- SDLA is the foundation. A supplier cannot obtain CSA, SSA or ICSA without an SDLA process certification, although both can be pursued in parallel.
- A certificate is narrow by design. It names a product version, a component type or system layout, a capability security level and a scheme version such as CSA 1.0.0 or SSA 4.0.0. Anything outside that scope is not certified.
- Capability is not deployment. CSA and SSA certify what a product can do; your site still needs a risk assessment, target security levels and correct configuration. ACSSA, effective 17 February 2026, is the scheme that looks at deployed systems.
- Verify, then contract. Check the listing on isasecure.org, match version and level to what you are buying, and write maintenance of certification into the contract.
Who runs ISASecure and how certification works
ISASecure was founded in 2007 and is a wholly owned subsidiary of ISA, the International Society of Automation, which develops and publishes the ISA/IEC 62443 standards. The programme is defined and maintained by ISCI, an interest area within ASCI, the legal entity owned by ISA. Its specifications are developed by a membership that includes both end users and suppliers.
- Who assesses: product and process assessments are carried out by a global network of certification bodies accredited to ISO/IEC 17065. For ACSSA inspections, inspection bodies are accredited to ISO/IEC 17020.
- What is published: certificate holders are listed publicly on isasecure.org by supplier, type, model, version, certificate and certification date, which is your primary verification source.
- Specifications: each scheme has a numbered document set, for example CSA-100 (scheme), CSA-300 (certification requirements), CSA-301 (maintenance), CSA-311 (functional security assessment) and SSA-420 (vulnerability identification testing). Scheme documents are free to members; several technical specifications are sold through the ISA Store.
- Tools: ISASecure's test tools page names Tenable Nessus for vulnerability identification testing, using the US National Vulnerability Database as the reference; suppliers must correct the known vulnerabilities the scan finds.
The schemes at a glance
| Scheme | Full name | Standard part(s) | What is certified | Current version (per ISASecure) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SDLA | Security Development Lifecycle Assurance | ISA/IEC 62443-4-1 | A supplier's development process, scoped to components, systems or both, and to listed sites | SDLA 3.0.0, effective 16 June 2020 |
| CSA | Component Security Assurance | ISA/IEC 62443-4-2 (and 4-1 via SDLA) | A component version: software application, embedded device, host device or network device | CSA 1.0.0, effective 28 August 2019 |
| SSA | System Security Assurance | ISA/IEC 62443-3-3 (and 4-1) | An integrated system of more than one component from a single supplier, at a specific version and layout | SSA 4.0.0, effective 28 August 2019 |
| ICSA | IIoT Component Security Assurance | ISA/IEC 62443-4-2 plus extra requirements | IIoT devices and IIoT gateways that connect to untrusted networks | See scheme page |
| HCSA | High Criticality Component Security Assurance | ISA/IEC 62443-4-2 plus six additional requirements | Components for high-criticality use | See scheme page |
| ACSSA | Automation and Control System Security Assurance | ISA/IEC 62443-2-1, 2-4, 3-2, 3-3 | A deployed control system and the asset owner's policies and procedures | ACSSA 1.0.0, effective 17 February 2026 |
Older certificates may carry EDSA labels (Embedded Device Security Assurance). ISASecure states that CSA 1.0.0 subsumes the former EDSA programme for embedded devices; version transitions are governed by ISASecure-117.
SDLA: the development process
SDLA certifies that a supplier's documented development lifecycle conforms to ISA/IEC 62443-4-1. A certifier evaluates the documented process against the SDLA specification and reviews representative artifacts produced by it. The process must declare whether it covers components, systems or both, and its product scope; listings show the covered development sites.
- Prerequisite role: to certify a product, the supplier must hold SDLA certification covering development of product updates going forward. The relevant criteria sit in CSA-300 and SSA-300.
- New processes: a process not yet fully executed may receive a time-limited certification after a readiness review under SDLA-300.
- Expiry: the programme defines an expiration period that certain actions can extend; ISASecure's page does not state the duration, so read the certificate itself.
- What it tells a buyer: the supplier has a defined process for threat modelling, secure design, testing, vulnerability handling and patch management that an accredited body has examined. It says nothing on its own about any particular product. See the IEC 62443-4-1 and 4-2 Secure Product Development Guide for the practices behind it.
For suppliers planning certification
- Close the process gaps first: map your current lifecycle against 62443-4-1 and fix missing evidence before engaging a certification body, because SDLPA is a gate for every product scheme.
- Pick a pilot product: choose one component or system with a stable release train and a clear target level, and run SDLA and CSA or SSA in parallel as the schemes allow.
- Plan for maintenance: budget for annual registration fees, re-testing when changes cross ISASecure's thresholds, and transitions to new scheme versions.
- Publish accurately: follow the symbol and certificate use rules (CSA-204, SSA-204) and state version and level wherever the logo appears.
CSA: components
CSA certifies a single component against IEC 62443-4-2 and, through SDLA, against 4-1. The component must fit one of the four 62443-4-2 types: software application, embedded device, host device (a general-purpose device running an operating system such as Windows or Linux) or network device.
| Element | What it examines | Varies by level? |
|---|---|---|
| SDLPA-C: security development lifecycle process assessment | The supplier's development process; passing grants SDLA certification under SDLA-100 | No |
| SDA-C: Security Development Artifacts | Evidence that the process was actually applied to this component | Only the allowable residual risk for known issues |
| FSA-C: Functional Security Assessment | The component's security capabilities against 62443-4-2 requirements | Yes, more requirements at higher levels |
| VIT-C: Vulnerability Identification Testing | A scan for known vulnerabilities | Only the allowable residual risk |
- Capability security levels: CSA certifies at capability security level 1 to 4, each mapping to that level's requirements in 62443-4-2. A certificate names type and level, for example "ISASecure CSA Capability Level 3 (Software Application)".
- Maintenance: CSA-301 governs maintaining a certificate across updates. Annual registration fees on the scheme page are 1,200 US dollars per component and 1,500 per product family.
- Re-testing: the ISASecure FAQ says the Institute publishes thresholds that trigger product re-testing, so a minor patch may not need a new assessment while a significant change will.
SSA: systems
SSA certifies an integrated control system: more than one component, supported as a whole by a single supplier, under configuration control and version management, in a fixed or scalable layout. Its requirements include all system requirements in 62443-3-3 and all process requirements in 62443-4-1.
- Elements: SDLPA-S (process, which grants SDLA), SDA-S (artifacts for the system), FSA-S (functional security assessment, applied per zone) and VIT-S (vulnerability identification testing across all components).
- Zones and levels: a system consists of one or more security zones. The supplier picks a capability security level for each zone, and the certificate names each zone with its level. This mirrors how you will design zones and conduits on site.
- Scalable systems: tests run on a reference system that meets SSA-300 criteria, and analyses cover all layouts the certificate includes. If your planned architecture is not one of those layouts, you are outside the certified scope.
- Component certification: SSA 4.0.0 text does not require component certification; older SSA versions 2.x and 3.0.0 required embedded devices to be EDSA certified or meet EDSA requirements. Do not assume an SSA system is built from CSA-certified components unless the supplier shows the certificates.
- Maintenance: SSA-301 covers bug fixes, upgrades, added scalability options, later programme versions and higher levels. The annual registration fee is 1,200 US dollars.
ICSA, HCSA and ACSSA
ICSA for IIoT
ICSA certifies IIoT devices and gateways that connect directly to untrusted networks, which ISASecure defines to include the internet, cellular networks and enterprise networks the asset owner does not fully control. It reuses most of CSA and adds five development lifecycle sub-practices beyond 62443-4-1. The Core tier is based on capability security level 2 (all but two SL2 requirements, plus eight SL3 or SL4 requirements strengthening identification, authentication and attack monitoring, and a few ICSA-specific requirements); the Advanced tier is based on level 4. ICSA adds a Security Maintenance Audit, periodic surveillance of the supplier's security maintenance practices, and CSA-certified products have a streamlined path to it. See the Industrial IoT (IIoT) Security Guide.
HCSA
ISASecure describes HCSA as CSA plus six additional requirements for high-criticality components. Check the scheme page for the detail before relying on it in a specification.
ACSSA for deployed systems
ACSSA 1.0.0, effective 17 February 2026, evaluates a deployed IACS and the asset owner's security programme against 62443-2-1, 2-4, 3-2 and 3-3, including personnel roles and training and service providers. The system must be in operation or near it, and the asset owner must be accountable for all hardware, software and external ingress and egress points.
| ACSSA option | Performed by | Output | Validity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inspection | Inspection body accredited to ISO/IEC 17020 | Cover letter and formal inspection report (ACSSA-303 format) with conformity statements and nonconformities; no certificate or symbol | Point in time |
| Certification | Certification body accredited to ISO/IEC 17065 | Certificate and certification report; asset owner may display the ACSSA symbol | Three-year certificate with periodic surveillance; recertification to extend |
Required submissions include a change-controlled asset inventory and an ISA/IEC 62443-3-2 risk assessment. See the IEC 62443-3-2 OT Risk Assessment Guide. ISASecure also advertises a new Site Assessment Program for OT; its page did not describe the programme when checked, so confirm details directly.
Using certificates in procurement
- Set target levels first. Run the 62443-3-2 risk assessment and assign a target security level per zone before you write requirements. A level 1 certificate is not enough for a zone that needs level 2.
- Ask for the right scheme. Components: CSA (or ICSA for internet or cellular connected devices). Integrated systems from one supplier: SSA. Supplier maturity across a product range: SDLA. Integrators and maintenance providers: 62443-2-4 evidence.
- Verify the listing. Check isasecure.org for supplier, model, version, scheme version, level and date. Request the certificate and, where shared, the certification report.
- Match version and configuration. Confirm the firmware or software version you will receive, and for SSA the layout, matches the certified one.
- Contract for maintenance. Require the supplier to keep SDLA current, maintain product certificates under CSA-301 or SSA-301, notify you of re-certification, and publish advisories. ISASecure offers sample procurement language for end users.
- Configure to the certified capability. Certified features such as authentication, role-based access and audit only help if you enable them. Fold vendor hardening guidance into commissioning.
| Situation | What to ask for | Trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| Small site buying a few controllers or switches | CSA at the zone's target level, or SDLA plus a supplier security statement where no CSA exists | Narrower choice of models; evidence is lighter without CSA |
| Large DCS or SCADA platform | SSA for the system, SDLA for the supplier, CSA for key components where available | Certified layout may constrain your architecture |
| IIoT sensors on cellular or cloud links | ICSA Core or Advanced | Newer scheme, fewer certified products |
| Assurance on your own deployed plant | ACSSA inspection first, certification once gaps are closed | Inspection gives no certificate; certification needs surveillance |
See the OT Product Procurement Guide for the wider procurement question set.
Measuring the programme
- Coverage: percentage of zone-critical components and systems with a verified CSA, ICSA or SSA certificate at or above the zone's target level.
- Currency: percentage of installed versions that match a certified version, and number of suppliers whose SDLA certification has lapsed.
- Contract coverage: share of OT contracts that include certification maintenance and advisory obligations.
- Configuration conformance: share of certified assets commissioned with their security capabilities enabled, tested at acceptance.
- Exceptions: number of risk-accepted purchases without certification, each with a compensating control and review date.
Framework mapping
| Activity | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|
| Writing certification requirements into OT purchases | SA-4, SR-5 | GV.SC-05 |
| Relying on SDLA evidence of a supplier's development process | SA-15, SA-8 | GV.SC-07 |
| Relying on FSA and VIT test results | SA-11, RA-5 | ID.RA-09 |
| Ongoing supplier and certificate monitoring | SR-5 | GV.SC-07 |
Common failure patterns
- Logo equals secure: treating "ISASecure certified" as a property of the supplier, when the certificate covers one version, type and level. Always read the listing.
- Level mismatch: buying a level 1 component for a zone whose target is level 2 or 3, because the target was never set.
- Version drift: the certified firmware is three releases behind what ships, and nobody checks whether changes crossed the re-test threshold.
- Assuming SSA implies CSA: the SSA 4.0.0 text does not require certified components, so component evidence must be requested separately.
- Certified capability left switched off: authentication, logging and role controls disabled at commissioning, so the plant runs at a lower level than the certificate.
- No maintenance clause: SDLA lapses and the supplier keeps selling, with no contractual trigger for the buyer to notice.
Practitioner checklist
- Target security levels are assigned per zone from a 62443-3-2 risk assessment before procurement.
- Every OT purchase states the scheme (CSA, ICSA, SSA, SDLA) and minimum capability level required.
- Certificates are verified on isasecure.org, with supplier, model, version, scheme version, level and date recorded.
- Installed versions and SSA layouts are compared with the certified ones at acceptance and after upgrades.
- Contracts require continued SDLA, certificate maintenance, re-certification notice and security advisories.
- Certified security capabilities are enabled and tested during commissioning.
- Integrators and maintenance providers are assessed against 62443-2-4.
- Exceptions without certification have compensating controls, an owner and a review date.
- ACSSA inspection is considered for critical deployed systems once a security programme exists.
Standards and references
- ISASecure: CSA Component Security Assurance Certification
- ISASecure: SSA System Security Assurance Certification
- ISASecure: SDLA Security Development Lifecycle Assurance Certification
- ISASecure: ICSA IIoT Component Security Assurance Certification
- ISASecure: ACSSA Automation and Control System Security Assurance
- ISASecure: CSA Certified Components listing
- ISA: ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: IEC 62443 Guide · IEC 62443-4-1 and 4-2 Secure Product Development Guide · ISA/IEC 62443 Certification Guide · OT Product Procurement Guide · Third-Party Risk Management Guide