EU entities with an ISO/IEC 27001 certificate are often told it "covers" NIS2 and DORA, and then find during supervision that specific points in the legal texts are not met by the ISMS as built. The certificate is a strong starting point: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 states in recital 3 that its Annex is based on European and international standards such as ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27002 and ETSI EN 319401, and the DORA ICT risk management RTS, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, tells financial entities to consider leading practices and standards. But both texts fix things that ISO leaves to the organisation: review frequencies, named records, scan cadences and reporting mechanisms. This page gives a control-level table from ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A to the 2024/2690 Annex points and the 2024/1774 articles, and flags each place where a typical ISMS falls short. It is for ISMS managers, compliance leads and auditors in digital infrastructure providers, managed service providers and financial entities. For which regime applies to which entity in a group, see the DORA and NIS2 Overlap Mapping Guide; for the 2024/2690 Annex and its incident thresholds in full, see the NIS2 Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 Guide.
Key takeaways
- ISO is the base, not the answer. Both EU texts draw on ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002, so most Annex A controls have a matching Annex point or RTS article, but conformity with the legal text is assessed by a competent authority, not by your certification body.
- The gaps are mostly parameters. DORA RTS 2024/1774 sets weekly automated vulnerability scans and six-monthly firewall rule checks for systems supporting critical or important functions, and six-monthly access reviews for those systems. ISO lets you choose; the law has chosen.
- Some gaps are named artefacts. A directory of direct suppliers (2024/2690 point 5.2), a simple reporting route for employees, suppliers and customers (point 3.3), a certificate register (RTS Article 7) and a person reporting directly to the management body on security (point 1.2.3) must exist as things an inspector can see.
- The SoA cannot exclude what the law requires. A justified Annex A exclusion that removes a control the legal text expects becomes a regulatory gap. Re-test every exclusion against the legal mapping.
- Machine identities are explicitly in scope. RTS Article 20 requires a unique identity for each person or system, and 2024/2690 point 11.5 requires unique identities and deactivation of unneeded identities without delay, which reaches service accounts, API keys and AI agents.
Regulations and frameworks at a glance
| Instrument | Type and status | Who it applies to | Relationship to ISO/IEC 27001 |
|---|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Voluntary international standard; certification by accredited bodies | Any organisation | The base ISMS; Annex A lists reference controls, detailed in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 |
| NIS2, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 | Directive; Member States had to transpose by 17 October 2024 and apply from 18 October 2024 | Essential and important entities under national law | Article 21(1) refers to relevant European and international standards; Article 25 asks Member States to encourage their use |
| Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 | Directly applicable regulation, adopted 17 October 2024 | DNS providers, TLD registries, cloud, data centre, CDN, managed service and managed security service providers, online marketplaces, search engines, social networks, trust service providers | Recital 3: Annex based on ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27002 and ETSI EN 319401 |
| DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 | Directly applicable regulation, applies from 17 January 2025 | Financial entities listed in Article 2 | Lex specialis for financial entities; see the overlap guide |
| Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 (RTS on ICT risk management) | Directly applicable, adopted 13 March 2024 | DORA financial entities; Title III simplified framework for entities under DORA Article 16 | Article 2: ICT security policies consider leading practices and, where applicable, standards |
| ENISA Technical Implementation Guidance | Guidance, 26 June 2025; ENISA states it is not legally binding | Entities under 2024/2690 | Comes with a separate spreadsheet mapping the requirements to standards and frameworks (version 1.2) |
Scope: who and what is covered
- Which column applies to you: use the 2024/2690 column if you are one of the digital provider types in its Article 1. Other NIS2 entities follow national transposing law based on Article 21(2) points (a) to (j), which is less detailed; the 2024/2690 points are still a useful benchmark for them. Use the DORA RTS column if you are a DORA financial entity. Groups may need both.
- ISMS scope vs legal scope: the legal duty attaches to the network and information systems used for the regulated services. Check that the clause 4.3 scope covers every one of them, including group shared services and outsourced operations, before reading anything below.
- Proportionality: both texts allow scaling (2024/2690 uses "where appropriate" and ties measures to risk; the RTS has a simplified framework in Title III). Record proportionality decisions in the risk assessment, not as silent omissions.
Key obligations
The table maps Annex A controls to the 2024/2690 Annex points and RTS 2024/1774 articles with the closest intent, and flags what the legal text adds. Annex point and article numbers and the "law adds" wording are taken from the EUR-Lex texts. The alignment itself is an NHI Mgmt Group interpretation for gap analysis; ENISA's own mapping spreadsheet and your competent authority's guidance take precedence.
Governance, risk and people
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | 2024/2690 Annex | RTS 2024/1774 | What the law adds (gap flag) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1 Policies for information security; clause 5.2 | 1.1 (review at least annually, 1.1.2) | Art. 2 (policy shows date of management body approval) | Gap if policy review is "periodic" without an annual minimum or approval date |
| 5.2 Roles and responsibilities; clause 5.3 | 1.2 (at least one person reports directly to the management bodies, 1.2.3) | Art. 28 for simplified entities (management body approves and oversees) | Gap if the CISO reports only through IT |
| Clauses 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 8.2, 8.3 | 2.1 (risk assessment and treatment plan reviewed at planned intervals and at least annually, 2.1.4) | Art. 3 (accepted residual risks reviewed at least once a year) | Gap if residual risk acceptance has no annual re-review |
| 5.36 Compliance with policies; clause 9.1 | 2.2 (compliance monitoring reported to management bodies) | Art. 27 (report on the review of the framework, set format) | DORA fixes the report content; map clause 9.3 outputs to it |
| 5.35 Independent review; clause 9.2 | 2.3 (reviewers with audit competence, outside the line of authority) | Art. 28 (internal audit plan for simplified entities) | Usually met by a well-run internal audit |
| 6.1 Screening; 6.2; 6.4; 6.5 | 10.1 to 10.4 (assignments reviewed at least annually, 10.1.3; checks to the extent feasible, 10.2.1) | Art. 19 (HR policy, return of assets at end of employment) | Gap if role assignments are not reviewed annually |
| 6.3 Awareness, education and training | 8.1, 8.2 (regular training for security roles, effectiveness assessed, 8.2.3) | Covered through Art. 19 responsibilities | NIS2 Article 20(2) adds training for members of management bodies |
Operations, technology and supply chain
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | 2024/2690 Annex | RTS 2024/1774 | What the law adds (gap flag) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.9 Inventory of information and other associated assets; 5.12; 5.13 | 12.1 classification, 12.4 inventory (complete, accurate, change history kept) | Art. 4 (unique identifier per ICT asset, owner, location, end of support; legacy records), Art. 5 | Gap if the inventory lacks end-of-support dates or links to the services it supports |
| 5.10, 5.14, 7.10 | 12.2 handling, 12.3 removable media (technical prohibition unless there is an organisational reason, 12.3.2) | Art. 14 (information in transit) | Gap if removable media is controlled by policy only |
| 5.19 to 5.22 supplier controls; 5.23 cloud services | 5.1 (contract clauses, including supplier incident notification without undue delay, 5.1.4(d)), 5.2 directory of suppliers | Register of information and contract terms sit in DORA Articles 28 to 30 and their standards | Gap if there is no directory of direct suppliers with contacts and the ICT services they provide |
| 5.24 to 5.28 incident management; 6.8 event reporting | 3.1 to 3.6 (3.3: simple mechanism for employees, suppliers and customers to report suspicious events) | Arts. 22, 23 (records protected from tampering; detection and response roles) | Gap if customers and suppliers have no reporting route. Legal reporting clocks are separate: NIS2 Article 23(4) early warning within 24 hours, notification within 72 hours |
| 8.15 Logging; 8.16 Monitoring; 8.17 Clock synchronisation | 3.2 (log items listed in 3.2.3, retention for a predefined period, 3.2.5) | Art. 12 (retention period set; clocks synchronised to a documented reference) | Gap if account changes, privileged access and backup file access are not logged |
| 5.29, 5.30, 8.13, 8.14 | 4.1 to 4.3 (backups outside the main network, integrity checks, regular recovery tests) | Arts. 24 to 26; Art. 40 (simplified entities test backup and restore at least once a year) | Gap if restore tests are not scheduled and recorded |
| 8.25 to 8.29 secure development and testing; 8.32 Change management; 8.9 | 6.2 SDLC, 6.3 configuration, 6.4 change management, 6.5 security testing | Arts. 16, 17 (approver independent of requester and implementer; emergency fall-back) | Gap if engineers approve their own changes |
| 8.8 Management of technical vulnerabilities | 6.6 patching (decision not to patch documented, 6.6.2), 6.10 (critical vulnerabilities without undue delay; coordinated vulnerability disclosure, 6.10.2(e)) | Art. 10 (automated scans at least weekly for assets supporting critical or important functions; patch deadlines) | Gap if scan cadence is monthly or there is no disclosure process |
| 8.20 to 8.22 network security and segregation | 6.7 (including secure email, DNS and routing security, 6.7.2(j) to (l)), 6.8 (separate admin networks, DMZ) | Art. 13 (firewall rules verified at least every 6 months for critical or important functions; network architecture reviewed once a year) | Gap if firewall rules are reviewed annually |
| 8.7 Protection against malware | 6.9 | Art. 11 (secure baselines verified regularly) | Usually met |
| 8.24 Use of cryptography | 9 (full key lifecycle; state of the art, 9.3) | Arts. 6, 7 (certificate register for assets supporting critical or important functions; renewal before expiry) | Gap if there is no certificate register |
| 7.1 to 7.8, 7.11 | 13.1 to 13.3 | Art. 18 | Usually met |
Access control
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | 2024/2690 Annex | RTS 2024/1774 | What the law adds (gap flag) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.15 Access control | 11.1 | Art. 21 (need to know, need to use, least privilege) | Usually met |
| 5.16 Identity management | 11.5 (unique identities; shared only with approval and documentation; unneeded identities deactivated without delay, 11.5.4) | Art. 20 (unique identity per person or system; full lifecycle; automation where feasible) | Gap if shared automation accounts exist without a recorded approval |
| 5.18 Access rights | 11.2 (reviewed at planned intervals; rights management logged) | Art. 21 (reviews at least once a year, at least every 6 months for systems supporting critical or important functions) | Gap if all reviews are annual |
| 8.2 Privileged access rights | 11.3 (strong authentication such as MFA; dedicated admin accounts), 11.4 administration systems | Art. 21 (strong authentication for privileged access) | Gap if admins use day-to-day accounts for administration |
| 5.17 Authentication information; 8.5 Secure authentication | 11.6, 11.7 (multiple factors or continuous authentication where appropriate) | Art. 21 (strong authentication for remote, privileged, critical and public-facing access) | Gap if MFA is limited to remote access |
Timeline and current status
Status checked 13 November 2026 against EUR-Lex and ENISA.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 2022 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 published |
| 13 March 2024 | RTS 2024/1774 on ICT risk management adopted |
| 17 October 2024 | NIS2 transposition deadline; Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 adopted |
| 18 October 2024 | Member States to apply national NIS2 measures |
| 17 January 2025 | DORA applies |
| 26 June 2025 | ENISA publishes its Technical Implementation Guidance for 2024/2690, with a mapping spreadsheet |
| 31 October 2025 | End of transition to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certificates |
National transposition of NIS2 varies, and amendments to NIS2 have been proposed. Proposals are not law. Track them in the NIS2 Transposition Tracker and the NIS2 Amending Directive Proposal 2026 page before changing the mapping.
Enforcement and penalties
- NIS2: Article 34 requires Member States to provide administrative fines with a maximum of at least EUR 10,000,000 or 2% of total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher, for essential entities, and at least EUR 7,000,000 or 1.4% for important entities. Article 20(1) makes management bodies approve and oversee the measures, and they can be held liable for infringements.
- DORA: Article 50 requires Member States to lay down administrative penalties and remedial measures, and gives competent authorities supervisory, investigatory and sanctioning powers.
- The ISO certificate in supervision: neither text makes certification a safe harbour. Use it as evidence that a management system operates, and give the authority the legal mapping alongside it.
What it means for AI agents and non-human identities
The identity rows above are where ISMS-based programmes most often fail an inspection, because ISO access reviews and joiner-mover-leaver processes were designed around people.
| Legal point | Machine identity reading | Control that closes it |
|---|---|---|
| RTS Art. 20; 2024/2690 11.5 | Each service, pipeline and AI agent gets its own identity; shared automation accounts need documented approval | One workload identity per service and agent, owner recorded, shared accounts listed as exceptions |
| 2024/2690 11.5.4 | Unused service accounts, keys and agent credentials are deactivated without delay | Last-used telemetry and automatic disablement after an inactivity window |
| RTS Art. 21 review frequencies | Machine identities on systems supporting critical or important functions are reviewed at least every six months | Include non-human accounts in the same review campaign. See the Access Reviews Guide |
| RTS Art. 7; 2024/2690 point 9 | Certificates and keys are identities with a lifecycle | Certificate register, renewal before expiry, revocation tested |
| 2024/2690 3.2.3; RTS Art. 12 | Account changes and privileged actions by automation must be logged | Logs that attribute agent actions to the agent identity and the delegating human |
ISO Annex A 5.16 and 5.17 already apply to these identities; the legal texts make the frequencies and records explicit. See the Service Account Security Guide and the Secrets Management Guide.
Compliance steps
- Confirm which texts apply (weeks 1 to 2): per legal entity, record whether 2024/2690, national NIS2 law, DORA and the RTS (full or simplified) apply.
- Extend the SoA with two columns (weeks 2 to 4): for every Annex A control, add the 2024/2690 point and RTS article from the tables above. Add rows for legal requirements with no Annex A home, such as the supplier directory and the customer reporting route.
- Score every gap flag (weeks 3 to 6): met, partly met or not met, with evidence. Use ENISA's guidance and evidence examples for 2024/2690 points.
- Re-test SoA exclusions (week 5): any excluded Annex A control that maps to a legal requirement is reinstated or the legal basis for not applying it is documented.
- Change parameters, not controls (weeks 6 to 12): set scan, firewall review and access review frequencies to the legal values in the control text, and update tooling schedules.
- Fix identity first (months 2 to 6): unique identities for systems and agents, deactivation of unused identities, separate privileged accounts, certificate register.
- Feed internal audit and management review: add the legal mapping to the clause 9.2 audit programme and the clause 9.3 inputs, and for DORA entities, align the output to the Article 27 report format.
- Keep a rollback: retain previous schedules and control text for one audit cycle so a change that breaks a service can be reverted while the gap stays logged.
Small vs large organisations: a single MSP can hold the legal columns inside its SoA spreadsheet. A financial group with NIS2-regulated IT subsidiaries should run one control catalogue with entity tags, so a control owner sees which legal text each system is held to.
Detection and measurement
- Gap closure: percentage of gap flags scored as met, reported at management review.
- Scan cadence compliance: share of critical or important function assets scanned in the last seven days.
- Access review timeliness: share of critical-function systems, including machine accounts, reviewed in the last six months.
- Stale identities: count of enabled service accounts, keys and agent credentials unused for 90 days.
- Certificate expiry risk: certificates in the register within 30 days of expiry without a renewal ticket.
Common failure patterns
- Presenting the certificate as compliance: the authority asks for the 2024/2690 point or RTS article, and the team has only the Annex A reference.
- ISO frequencies kept: annual access and firewall reviews pass ISO audits and fail the six-monthly RTS requirements.
- Exclusions copied forward: a 5.13 or 7.10 exclusion justified years ago now conflicts with 12.1 classification or 12.3 removable media requirements.
- No customer reporting route: internal event reporting exists under 6.8, but suppliers and customers have no simple channel as point 3.3 expects.
- Machine identities outside the lifecycle: people are deprovisioned on exit, service accounts and agent tokens are never deactivated.
Practitioner checklist
- Record per legal entity which of 2024/2690, national NIS2 law, DORA and RTS 2024/1774 apply.
- Add 2024/2690 and RTS columns to the SoA and rows for requirements with no Annex A home.
- Set vulnerability scan, firewall rule and access review frequencies to the legal values for critical or important functions.
- Create a directory of direct suppliers and a simple reporting route for employees, suppliers and customers.
- Keep a certificate register and renew certificates before expiry.
- Give every system, pipeline and AI agent a unique identity with an owner, and deactivate unused ones without delay.
- Re-test every Annex A exclusion against the legal mapping.
- Add the legal mapping to the internal audit programme and management review inputs.
- Check ENISA's mapping spreadsheet and your competent authority's guidance before finalising.
Standards and references
- EUR-Lex: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690
- EUR-Lex: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, RTS on ICT risk management framework
- EUR-Lex: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2)
- EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA)
- ENISA: NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance
- ENISA: Press release on the NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance
- ISO: ISO/IEC 27001 Information security management systems
- INAB: Transition Requirements for ISO/IEC 27001:2022
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: DORA and NIS2 Overlap Mapping Guide · NIS2 Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 Guide · DORA ICT Risk Management Framework Guide · ISO 27001 Certification Guide · NIS2 Directive Guide. This guide summarises how ISO/IEC 27001:2022 relates to NIS2, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, DORA and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 and is not legal advice.