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Israel Cyber Defence Methodology and Bank of Israel Directive 361: how the INCD and banking rules fit together

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 14 November 2026 15 min read
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Organisations operating in Israel face two overlapping cyber defence regimes: the Israel National Cyber Directorate's Cyber Defense Methodology for organisations, and, for banks, the Supervisor of Banks' Proper Conduct of Banking Business Directive 361 on cyber defence management. The methodology tells an organisation how to work out what to protect and which controls to apply; Directive 361 tells a banking corporation who must govern cyber risk, how often to assess it and what its monitoring and incident handling must look like. This guide explains both, shows how the two Bank of Israel companion directives on cloud (362) and supply chain (363) extend them, and turns the result into an implementation plan. It is written for CISOs, risk and compliance leads, auditors and suppliers serving Israeli banks and government bodies. For the wider country picture see the Global Cybersecurity Regulatory Map; for personal data duties see the Israel Privacy Protection Law guide, which this page does not repeat.

Key takeaways

  • Two layers, one direction: the INCD methodology is a risk based control framework built on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, while Directive 361 is a binding governance and operations directive for banking corporations.
  • Classification drives effort: version 1.0 of the methodology splits organisations into Category A (low damage potential) and Category B (significant damage potential) using a single cost of incident question.
  • Directive 361 sets clocks: strategy revised at least every three years, policy reviewed annually, a risk and control assessment at least once a year, and a monitoring array staffed 24 x 7 x 365.
  • Named accountability: the board approves the cyber defence strategy and framework, and a Chief Cyber Defense Officer reports to a senior executive with authority to influence decisions that affect cyber exposure.
  • Suppliers and cloud are in scope: Directives 362 and 363 add encryption, monitoring, exit and contract duties, including strong authentication for supplier remote access and maintenance.

The two regimes and who they bind

The Cyber Defense Methodology for an Organization was first published in English as version 1.0 in June 2017 by the body then called the National Cyber Security Authority, now part of the Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD). A NIST success story records that INCD published version 2.0 in 2021, that the whole Israeli government adopted the methodology as its required cyber risk methodology that year, and that many other organisations adopted it voluntarily. INCD also described dialogue with sectoral regulators about using it as the basis of sector guidance.

Directive 361, Cyber Defense Management, is part of the Supervisor of Banks' Proper Conduct of Banking Business directives. It was first issued on 16 March 2015 (Circular 2457) and updated on 30 September 2021 (Circular 2669). It applies to banking corporations licensed under the Banking (Licensing) Law, 5741-1981, and to certain corporations they control, which are treated as if they were banking corporations.

AspectINCD Cyber Defense MethodologyBank of Israel Directive 361
IssuerIsrael National Cyber DirectorateSupervisor of Banks, Bank of Israel
NatureMethodology and control catalogue; required across government, voluntary or regulator adopted elsewhereBinding supervisory directive
Who it bindsGovernment bodies; organisations whose regulator or customer requires itLicensed banking corporations and controlled corporations named in the directive
Core questionWhich controls does each asset need, and where are the gaps?Is cyber risk governed, assessed, monitored and handled through its lifecycle?
StructureNIST CSF functions, control families, asset levels 1 to 4Governance, strategy, risk assessment, control framework, incident management, reporting
Companion textsINCD supply chain methodology and questionnairesDirectives 357, 355, 307, 362 (cloud), 363 (supply chain)

How the INCD methodology classifies an organisation

Version 1.0 frames planning as five questions: what is there to defend, what is the impact on business objectives, how to protect correctly, where the gaps lie between the ideal and actual state, and what the project plan is. The cycle then repeats through execution and monitoring.

  • Category A: low damage potential. A simpler process: review control implementation against a short list of control areas and obtain a prioritised plan, often from the IT service provider. The work plan is approved by the CEO.
  • Category B: significant damage potential, for organisations that rely heavily on cyberspace. A full asset based process with impact and exposure scoring.
  • The deciding question: version 1.0 asks whether the cost of handling an incident would exceed NIS 500,000, counting indirect costs such as reputational damage and sanctions. A regulator can move an organisation from A to B, and an organisation can require its suppliers to meet Category B requirements.
  • Version 2.0: the 2022 Inter-American Development Bank translation of the 2021 text keeps the Category A and B split, with Category B also triggered by legal, regulatory or contractual obligations, and describes a "depth of implementation" for each control. Confirm the current thresholds in INCD's own publication before relying on a figure.

Scoring assets in Category B

Category B organisations map assets, their functions and interfaces, then score each asset's value on a 1 to 4 scale from questions on confidentiality, integrity and availability. The asset value is the highest of the three scores. Exposure is the average of ten exposure questions, and version 1.0 combines them as risk level = (I) x 3 + (P). Controls are tagged with levels 1 to 4, and every control with a level less than or equal to the asset's score must be implemented. Gaps are listed per objective and the work plan is prioritised by asset risk, solution cost and speed of implementation.

Control families

The version 1.0 control chapter opens with management responsibility, risk management and assessment, monitoring, review and compliance, access control, information protection, workstation and server protection, malicious code prevention, encryption and network security. The Hebrew edition on gov.il continues with environment separation, public cloud and industrial control systems. Version 2.0, according to NIST, adopts NIST CSF 1.1, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 and other NIST standards, together with threat-informed defence and zero trust paradigms, and each control carries a requirement, a maturity model layer, explanations and examples, templates, its relevance to confidentiality, integrity and availability, and a mapping to selected standards.

What Directive 361 requires of a bank

AreaRequirementParagraph
BoardSet and approve a corporate wide cyber defence strategy, approve the framework and policy, define oversight of senior management, receive reports on significant incidents15
Senior managementCreate and resource the framework, formulate policy, monitor effectiveness, receive threat and incident reports14, 16
Chief Cyber Defense OfficerReports to a senior executive, can influence decisions affecting cyber exposure, no conflicting duties17 to 19
Internal audit and interfacesPeriodic audit; documented interfaces with risk, information security, continuity, legal and external bodies20 to 24
StrategyCapabilities in prediction, detection and deception, and resilience; revised at least once every three years25 to 28
Policy and work planPolicy reviewed annually; multi-year work plan prioritising controls and resources30 to 33
Risk assessmentAt least once a year: inherent risk, control effectiveness, residual risk; KRIs, KPIs and scenario analysis34 to 39
Control assessmentCoordinated with vulnerability assessments, resilience and penetration tests (Directive 357) and internal audit (Directive 307); scope includes remote access, identity management and suppliers40 to 45
MonitoringArray staffed 24 x 7 x 365 (exceptions by the Supervisor); log retention that supports detection of low-and-slow attacks68 to 73
Incident managementLifecycle handling to closure, incident log, situation room, alert level scale, exercises74 to 80
ReportingInternal reporting policy; report incidents and incident alerts to the Supervisor under the Reporting to Banking Supervision directive81, 82

The directive defines incident management in five stages (detection, analysis, containment, eradication and recovery) followed by post-incident investigation and tracking of lessons learned. It treats a cyber incident as including attempted attacks that cause no damage, and a cyber incident alert as a notice of an imminent incident or one not yet identified by the targeted entity. Directive 361 itself sets no reporting deadline: the timing comes from the separate reporting directive, so check that text for the clock that applies.

The control framework in Part 5 asks for a mapped operational environment, proactive defence (threat research, situational awareness, deception, resilience and investigation), attack surface reduction through hardening, secure development and least privilege, defence in depth, a process view with maturity assessed at least once a year, human factor controls including segregation of duties, and intelligence sharing that may help other banking corporations handle threats. Business continuity planning under Directive 355 must include cyber scenarios.

Cloud and supply chain: Directives 362 and 363

  • Directive 362 (Cloud Computing): version 4 dated 13 June 2022 (Circular 2715). It distinguishes material from non-material cloud use, requires a board approved cloud policy and multi-year plan, encryption in transit and at rest (at least for sensitive data), attention to key location and management, real-time monitoring for early incident detection, controls over all access channels, cyber exercises with worst case scenarios, and an exit plan reviewed every three years. Sensitive data stored or processed outside Israel requires confirmation of GDPR level protection. The main filing is an annual report to the Banking Supervision Department.
  • Directive 363 (Supply Chain Cyber Risk Management): version 1 issued 24 April 2018, updated with Circular 2669. Banks map material service providers, set cyber principles in contracts and, depending on risk, require hardening, log transfer on request, vulnerability surveys and penetration tests, timely remediation, staff reliability checks, disclosure of secondary providers, data deletion at contract end and incident reporting. Strong authentication is required for remote access and maintenance, and access to production requires bank approval, with session timeouts and recorded maintenance as options.
  • INCD supply chain methodology: outside banking, INCD's supply chain questionnaire 1.4 grades suppliers at three levels: Basic (19 checks), Significant (57 checks) and Critical (63 checks), with remote access and cloud modules added by supplier role. The client chooses the level from its risk management or regulator guidance.

For the cross-sector view of supplier controls see the Third-Party Risk Management Guide, and for vendor sessions into production the Vendor Privileged Access Management (VPAM) Guide.

Where identity fits

Both regimes name access control and identity management directly: access control is a core INCD control family, and Directive 361 lists remote access and identity management in the scope of control assessment. In practice the highest risk identities are often not people: service accounts used by core banking integrations, API keys held by fintech partners, cloud workload roles and the maintenance accounts suppliers use. Include them in the asset map, apply least privilege and strong authentication to supplier and administrative paths, and log their use so the 24 x 7 monitoring array can see them. See the Service Account Security Guide and the Privileged Access Management Guide.

Implementation plan

  1. Confirm which texts bind you: banking corporation (Directives 361, 362, 363 and their references), government body (the INCD methodology), or supplier to either (contract terms and the supplier level your client assigns).
  2. Classify: answer the Category A or B question with finance and legal, record the reasoning and note any regulatory or contractual trigger.
  3. Map assets and interfaces: include cloud services, suppliers, controlled corporations and non-human identities; mark material cloud and material service providers.
  4. Score and derive controls: for Category B, score each asset 1 to 4 and list the required controls at or below that level; for banks, add the Directive 361 Part 5 controls.
  5. Gap analysis and work plan: compare required against implemented, prioritise by risk, cost and speed, and obtain approval (CEO for Category A; senior management, with board approval of strategy and framework, for banks).
  6. Stand up governance: appoint the Chief Cyber Defense Officer with a reporting line that avoids conflicts, document interfaces with risk, audit and legal, and set the annual policy and assessment calendar.
  7. Pilot monitoring and incident handling: run the incident log, alert level scale and situation room through a tabletop before relying on them; test supplier incident reporting paths.
  8. Assess and correct: run the annual risk and control assessment, coordinate with penetration testing and internal audit, report material findings to senior management and the board, and roll back or re-sequence work plan items that fail testing.

Decision guidance

  • Category A or B: if the honest incident cost estimate is near the threshold, or a regulator or major customer expects Category B, choose B. The asset based process costs more but produces defensible control choices.
  • Methodology or another framework: organisations already certified to ISO/IEC 27001 or mapped to NIST CSF can reuse that work, since the methodology is built on the CSF structure; keep a mapping so Israeli regulators and customers can follow it.
  • Small banks and controlled entities: Directive 361 allows the Supervisor to approve one Chief Cyber Defense Officer for related controlled entities and to grant exceptions to continuous staffing. Ask rather than assume.
  • Suppliers: a supplier serving several banks should build one control set to the strictest Directive 363 contract terms it sees, rather than answering each questionnaire separately.

Detection and measurement

Directive 361 requires metrics, KRIs and KPIs in the annual assessment and cyber risk in operational risk reporting. Useful measures:

  • Control coverage: percentage of required controls implemented for assets at each level 1 to 4.
  • Monitoring coverage: share of critical assets, cloud services and supplier connections sending logs to the 24 x 7 array, and retention in days against the low-and-slow requirement.
  • Incident lifecycle: median time from detection to containment, and percentage of incidents closed with lessons learned tracked to completion.
  • Supplier assurance: percentage of material service providers with current contract cyber clauses, test results and strong authentication on remote access.
  • Assessment cadence: policy reviewed within 12 months, strategy within 36 months, findings past due date.

Common failure patterns

  • Classifying by size, not damage: version 1.0 uses the cost of an incident, not revenue or headcount, so a small payments firm can still be Category B.
  • Treating the CCDO as an IT role: placing the officer under the CIO with competing duties conflicts with the independence paragraphs.
  • Monitoring without retention: a 24 x 7 team with short log retention cannot see low-and-slow intrusions the directive names.
  • Supplier contracts without operational follow-through: clauses on log transfer and penetration testing that are never exercised. See the Financial Services Incident Response Guide for supplier-originated incidents.
  • Cloud exit plans on paper: no tested route to switch provider or return on premises within the three year review cycle.
  • Forgetting machine identities: integration accounts and partner API keys left outside access reviews and monitoring.

Framework mapping

RequirementNIST CSF 2.0NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A
Board strategy, roles and CCDOGV.OC, GV.RRPM-2A.5.2, A.5.4
Policy reviewed annuallyGV.POPM-1A.5.1
Asset mapping and scoringID.AM, ID.RARA-2, RA-3A.5.9, A.5.12
Control assessment and testingID.IMCA-2, CA-8A.5.35, A.8.8
Supply chain (Directive 363, INCD questionnaire)GV.SCSR-6A.5.19, A.5.20
Access control and identityPR.AAAC-2, IA-2A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2
24 x 7 monitoringDE.CMSI-4, AU-11A.8.15, A.8.16
Incident management and reportingRS.MA, RS.COIR-4, IR-6A.5.24, A.5.26
Cyber scenarios in continuityRC.RPCP-2A.5.30

Practitioner checklist

  • Record which Israeli texts bind each entity and supplier relationship, and the version and date of each.
  • Document the Category A or B decision and its cost basis.
  • Keep an asset map with 1 to 4 scores that includes cloud services, suppliers and non-human identities.
  • Maintain a board approved strategy (revised within three years) and a policy reviewed annually.
  • Confirm the Chief Cyber Defense Officer's reporting line and freedom from conflicting duties.
  • Run the annual risk and control assessment with KRIs, KPIs and scenarios, coordinated with penetration testing.
  • Prove 24 x 7 monitoring coverage and log retention for low-and-slow detection.
  • Check the Reporting to Banking Supervision directive for the incident clock and rehearse it.
  • Apply Directive 363 contract clauses and strong authentication to supplier remote access.
  • Test the cloud exit plan and confirm GDPR level protection for sensitive data held abroad.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Global Cybersecurity Regulatory Map · Israel Privacy Protection Law · Financial Services Cyber Regulation Map · Banking Cybersecurity Programme Guide. This guide summarises the INCD Cyber Defense Methodology and Bank of Israel Directives 361, 362 and 363 as checked on 14 November 2026 and is not legal advice.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 14 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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