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Microsoft Teams Security Guide: SCuBA Baseline Controls

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 8 November 2026 16 min read
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Microsoft Teams has external access, unmanaged account chat and app installation turned on by default, so tune them before every user's chat window becomes an inbound channel for phishing and help desk impersonation. Threat actors have used exactly that path: Midnight Blizzard sent Teams messages from renamed tenants to talk users into approving sign-ins, and Storm-1811 posed as "Help Desk" in Teams to get remote control of laptops. This guide works through the CISA Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) baseline for Teams policy by policy, then adds the identity, app consent and detection controls the baseline assumes you already have. It is for Microsoft 365 administrators, identity engineers and SOC analysts; for the cross-product picture see the Collaboration Tool Security Guide.

This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.

Key takeaways

  • External access is the main attack surface. SCuBA MS.TEAMS.2.1v2 says external access SHALL only be enabled on a per-domain basis, and MS.TEAMS.2.2v2 says unmanaged users SHALL NOT be able to start contact with your users.
  • Four kinds of outsider behave differently. Federated users from other tenants, B2B guests, unmanaged personal accounts and anonymous meeting joiners each have their own setting, and closing one does not close the others.
  • Teams apps are non-human identities. Bots, connectors and apps with resource-specific consent can read channel and chat messages, so treat app approval as an access decision, not a convenience setting.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA is the real backstop. Both Microsoft write-ups of Teams social engineering end with the same advice: require phishing-resistant authentication with Conditional Access authentication strengths.
  • Detection depends on licence and on auditing being on. Unified audit logging, Defender for Office 365 Plan 1 for ZAP and user reporting, and Plan 2 for hunting tables decide what your SOC can actually see.

How identity and access work in Microsoft Teams

Teams has no identity store of its own: every user, guest and app is a Microsoft Entra ID object, and Teams policies decide what each can do. SCuBA defines five user types, and most misconfigurations come from treating them as one group.

User typeWho they areControlled byDefault state
Internal usersMembers of your tenantEntra ID sign-in, Conditional Access, Teams policiesFull access per policy
External (federated) usersMembers of another Microsoft 365 tenantExternal access organisation setting and user policy (Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -AllowFederatedUsers, -AllowedDomains, -BlockedDomains)On, all domains allowed
B2B guest usersOutsiders invited into your directory as guestsEntra external collaboration settings, Microsoft 365 Groups and SharePoint settings, Conditional AccessOrganisation-wide setting; restrict per team with sensitivity labels
Unmanaged usersPersonal Microsoft accounts outside any tenant-AllowTeamsConsumer and -AllowTeamsConsumerInboundOn
Anonymous usersMeeting joiners not authenticated through your tenant, including dial-in callersSet-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -AllowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting, lobby settingsAllowed

Microsoft documents that each external access option has both an organisation setting and a user policy, both on by default, and a user needs both to use the feature. Three details catch teams out:

  • Subdomains: blocking contoso.com does not block marketing.contoso.com unless you set -BlockAllSubdomains $True.
  • Blocked does not mean absent: users from a blocked domain can still join meetings anonymously if anonymous join is allowed, and the SCuBA text notes the same for unmanaged users.
  • Trial tenants: -ExternalAccessWithTrialTenants defaults to Blocked; check nobody changed it.

Guests are different again. Guest access creates an Entra ID account with full team participation, Conditional Access and MFA policies apply to guests through B2B collaboration, and a guest who leaves a team keeps their directory account until an Entra administrator removes it. Shared channels let you work with outsiders without creating a guest account at all. Cross-tenant access and guest lifecycle are covered in the Entra B2B Cross-Tenant Access Guide.

Choosing a collaboration model

  • Federation allow list (per-domain external access): right for a known set of partner tenants that need chat and calls. The list needs an owner and a review date.
  • B2B guests: right when outsiders need files, channels and long-running membership. Guests need sponsors, access reviews and removal.
  • Shared channels: right for project work with another Entra tenant without importing identities.
  • Anonymous meeting join only: right for organisations that run public webinars or meet many one-off contacts. Keep the lobby on and consider email verification.

Small organisations with a few partners get most of the benefit from an allow list plus lobby-controlled anonymous join. Large organisations usually need all four models, assigned through custom policies, with the Global (Org-wide default) policy restrictive.

Admin roles and privileged access

Teams administration runs on Entra ID directory roles. Microsoft lists seven Teams-specific roles and recommends using the one with the fewest permissions, keeping Global Administrator for emergencies where no other role works.

RoleScope of changeSecurity note
Teams AdministratorWhole Teams service: meetings, messaging, org-wide settings, teams, devices; can publish apps to the tenant app catalogueCan change external access and app policy. Treat as privileged and activate just in time
Teams Communications AdministratorMeeting and calling policies, conference bridges, phone numbersControls lobby and anonymous join through meeting policies
Teams Telephony AdministratorCalling policies, numbers, voice applicationsNot a meetings or messaging role
Teams Device AdministratorTeams-certified devices and configuration profilesNo call analytics access
Teams Communications Support Engineer and Support SpecialistTroubleshooting with advanced or basic toolsCan see user call data; review who holds them
Teams ReaderRead-only Teams admin centreGood default for auditors and the SOC
  • Scope with administrative units: a regional admin then manages only their users.
  • Just-in-time activation: use Entra Privileged Identity Management so Teams Administrator is eligible, not permanently active, and require phishing-resistant MFA on activation. See the Entra ID Security Guide.
  • Remember the other admins: Exchange, SharePoint and Global Administrators also affect Teams data, and security administrators can now manage the Teams blocked domains list from the Defender portal (Tenant Allow/Block Lists, Teams domains), which needs Defender for Office 365 Plan 1 or 2; that list is the same list the Teams admin centre shows.

Integrations, API tokens and service accounts

Teams apps, bots, connectors and tabs run as Entra ID applications with their own permissions. An approved bot can keep reading a channel long after the person who added it has left.

App control

App permission policies give four options for each of Microsoft, third-party and custom apps: allow all, allow specific and block all others, block specific and allow all others, or block all. Microsoft notes that new tenants allow all apps by default, that these policies are assigned to users or org-wide rather than to groups, and that app-centric management (per-app availability) replaces permission policies, with only one method active per organisation. SCuBA MS.TEAMS.5.1v2, 5.2v2 and 5.3v2 say only agency-approved Microsoft, third-party and custom apps SHOULD be installable, and map the risk to ATT&CK T1195 Supply Chain Compromise and T1528 Steal Application Access Token.

Consent and data access

  • Resource-specific consent (RSC): lets an app access one team, chat or meeting rather than the whole tenant. Application RSC permissions such as ChannelMessage.Read.Group and ChatMessage.Read.Chat can be granted by a team owner or chat member, not only an administrator. Decide whether that delegation is acceptable and use the tenant controls (Entra-based for teams, Graph-based for chats and meetings).
  • Always-on permissions: TeamsActivity.Send is always enabled at tenant level, and delegated RSC has no tenant toggle. Your control point for those is app approval itself.
  • Tenant-wide Graph permissions: apps that request application permissions across all chats or channels need admin consent through Entra ID. Review them like any other high-impact app. See the Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide.
  • Email integration: each channel can get a Microsoft-owned teams.ms address. SCuBA MS.TEAMS.4.1v1 says this SHALL be disabled and the "Accept channel email from these SMTP domains" list left empty.

Automation accounts

Scripts that manage Teams through PowerShell or Graph run under app registrations. Give each its own registration, prefer certificates or workload identity federation over secrets, store the credential in a vault, and record an owner. Backup and archiving tools that read Teams data hold some of the most sensitive app credentials in the tenant, often with read access to every chat and channel, so they deserve the tightest credential handling of all. See the Azure Entra Client Secrets Security Guide.

Logging and detection

Microsoft is explicit that audit data exists only from the point auditing is turned on, and that retention depends on subscription and per-user licence. Confirm unified audit logging is enabled and forward records to your SIEM before you need them. See the Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log Guide.

SignalSourceWhat it can revealLicence
Team and channel created, deleted, settings changed; members added and roles changedPurview audit (Teams activities)Data exposure through new public teams, guests added to sensitive teamsMicrosoft 365 auditing
Teams tenant and policy changesPurview audit; Teams admin centreExternal access widened, app policy loosened, lobby bypass enabledMicrosoft 365 auditing
App installed, bot added, app consent grantedPurview audit; Entra audit logsNew non-human identity with message accessMicrosoft 365 auditing; Entra ID
User-reported Teams messages, calls and participantsDefender portal, reporting mailboxImpersonation attempts reaching usersDefender for Office 365 Plan 1
ZAP removals and Safe Links verdictsDefender portal, Teams message entity panelMalicious links and files delivered in chatPlan 1
MessageEvents, MessagePostDeliveryEvents, MessageURLInfoDefender advanced huntingHunting across Teams messages with URLs, first contact from external sendersPlan 2 or Microsoft 365 E5
Sign-ins and MFA approvals following an external chatEntra sign-in logsMidnight Blizzard style code approval (T1621)Entra ID

Two investigation caveats: when membership changes through Entra ID, the admin centre or the Groups Graph API, the Teams record shows a team owner as initiator, so check Entra or Group audit logs for the real actor; and ZAP-quarantined Teams messages are admin-only, so users are not told.

Detection ideas

  • External first contact from a security-themed name: chats from onmicrosoft.com senders whose display name contains "Help Desk", "IT Support", "Security" or "Microsoft", followed within an hour by an MFA approval, a Quick Assist session or a remote access tool install (T1566.003, T1219).
  • Configuration drift: federation, meeting or app policy changes outside a change window.
  • New high-impact app: consent to an app with tenant-wide chat or channel read permissions.

Metrics

  • Percentage of SCuBA Teams policies passing in the latest ScubaGear run (target: every SHALL passing, deviations documented for SHOULD).
  • Number of domains on the federation allow list, and percentage with a named owner and review date.
  • Number of Teams apps allowed, split by Microsoft, third-party and custom, and how many hold application RSC or tenant-wide Graph permissions.
  • Count of standing (non-PIM) Teams Administrator and Global Administrator assignments (target: break-glass accounts only).
  • User-reported Teams messages per month and median time from report to triage.

Hardening baseline

The SCuBA Teams baseline assumes an E3 or G3 licence and is mandatory for US federal civilian agencies under BOD 25-01 for policies marked as required; for everyone else CISA presents it as an informational reference. The table summarises each policy as published in the current baseline (the baseline has no section 3; it jumps from external access to email integration).

PolicyRequirementSetting to checkBaseline mapping
MS.TEAMS.1.1v1External participants SHOULD NOT be able to request control of shared screensContent sharing: External participants can give or request control, OffAC-17a
MS.TEAMS.1.2v2Anonymous users SHALL NOT be able to start meetingsMeeting join and lobby: Anonymous users and dial-in callers can start a meeting, Off (the default)SC-15a; T1078.001
MS.TEAMS.1.3v1Anonymous users and dial-in callers SHOULD NOT be admitted automaticallyMeeting join and lobby: Who can bypass the lobby not set to Everyone (People in my org recommended)SC-15a
MS.TEAMS.1.4v1Internal users SHOULD be admitted automaticallyWho can bypass the lobby set to People in my orgAC-3
MS.TEAMS.1.5v1Dial-in users SHOULD NOT bypass the lobbyPeople dialling in can bypass the lobby, OffSC-15a
MS.TEAMS.1.6v1Meeting recording SHOULD be disabled in the Global policyRecording and transcription: Meeting recording, Off in Global; custom policy for approved recordersCM-7
MS.TEAMS.1.7v2"Record an event" SHOULD NOT be "Always record"Live events policies: Record an event set to Organizer can record or Never recordAC-21a
MS.TEAMS.2.1v2External access SHALL only be per-domainExternal access: Allow only specific external domainsAC-3; T1199, T1204.001
MS.TEAMS.2.2v2Unmanaged users SHALL NOT initiate contactUnmanaged accounts setting Off, or inbound contact clearedCM-7, SI-8
MS.TEAMS.2.3v2Internal users SHOULD NOT initiate contact with unmanaged usersUnmanaged accounts setting OffCM-7, SC-7(10)(a)
MS.TEAMS.4.1v1Email integration SHALL be disabledUsers can send emails to a channel email address, Off; SMTP domain list emptySI-8, SC-7(10)(a), AC-4
MS.TEAMS.5.1v2 to 5.3v2Only approved Microsoft, third-party and custom apps SHOULD be installableApp-centric management or permission policies; org-wide app settingsCM-11; T1195, T1528

Beyond the baseline, add these controls, which come from Microsoft's own guidance rather than SCuBA:

  • Phishing-resistant MFA: Conditional Access authentication strength requiring FIDO2 or Windows Hello for Business for administrators and high-value users. See the Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide and the Conditional Access Guide.
  • Defender for Office 365 Teams protection: turn on ZAP for Teams (Set-TeamsProtectionPolicy -ZapEnabled $true), Safe Links and Safe Attachments, and user reporting of Teams messages.
  • Anonymous join hygiene: Microsoft recommends leaving the org-wide -DisableAnonymousJoin at $false and controlling anonymous join per organiser with -AllowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting. Teams Premium adds email passcode verification (-AnonymousUserAuthenticationMethod OneTimePasscode).
  • Blocked subdomains and trial tenants: -BlockAllSubdomains $True if you use a block list, and keep trial tenants blocked.

Rollout

  1. Assess: run ScubaGear (interactive mode is needed to read the newer portal-based app settings), export current federation, meeting and app policies as your rollback record, and inventory the external domains, guests and apps in real use.
  2. Build custom policies first: create the permissive custom policies (approved recorders, partner-facing staff, webinar organisers) and assign them, so tightening the Global policy does not break those users.
  3. Pilot: apply the restrictive settings to a pilot group through custom policies for two weeks. Microsoft warns that external access changes take time to apply and cannot be rolled back immediately, so pilot rather than flip the Global policy.
  4. Enforce: switch external access to the allow list, close unmanaged inbound contact, disable email integration and move apps to an approved list.
  5. Roll back if needed: reapply the exported settings with Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration and the meeting policy cmdlets, expecting a delay before they take effect.
  6. Sustain: rerun ScubaGear monthly and review the allow list and app list quarterly.

Framework mapping

Control areaNIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5NIST CSF 2.0MITRE ATT&CK
External access and unmanaged contactAC-3, AC-4, CM-7, SI-8PR.AA-05T1199, T1566.003, T1204.001
Meetings, lobby and recordingSC-15, CM-7PR.PS-01T1078
Teams apps and consentCM-11GV.SC-07T1195, T1528
Admin rolesAC-6PR.AA-05T1078
Audit and detectionAU-2, AU-6DE.CM-03T1621, T1219, T1534

The wider Microsoft 365 baselines (Entra ID, Exchange Online, Defender, SharePoint) are covered in the CISA SCuBA Baselines Guide.

Common misconfigurations

  • Leaving "Allow all external domains" on: the default lets any tenant, including a freshly renamed one, message any user. Midnight Blizzard used compromised small business tenants with new onmicrosoft.com subdomains named to look like security or product teams, and Storm-1811 used tenants with display names such as "Help Desk IT". See the Email Bombing and Help Desk Impersonation over Teams Guide.
  • Blocking a domain and assuming the job is done: subdomains stay open without -BlockAllSubdomains, blocked users can still join meetings anonymously, and attackers simply create another tenant. An allow list scales; a block list does not.
  • Tightening the Global policy without custom policies: SCuBA says every custom policy must be checked too, and teams with no approved exception path push to reopen the Global policy.
  • Treating MFA as protection against chat lures: in the Midnight Blizzard campaign the attacker's chat message told the user which code to enter in Microsoft Authenticator, so a code-based approval did not stop it. Microsoft's own recommendation was phishing-resistant authentication for critical apps.
  • Letting team owners approve data-reading apps: application RSC lets owners grant channel message access. Without an approved app list, a well-meaning owner can add a bot that reads everything. Treat that bot as a non-human identity with an owner and a review date.
  • No audit or licence planning: auditing never enabled, or retention shorter than the investigation window, leaves a Teams incident unscoped.

Practitioner checklist

  • Run ScubaGear against the tenant and record every failing Teams policy with an owner and date.
  • Set external access to "Allow only specific external domains" with a reviewed allow list, and confirm trial tenants are blocked.
  • Turn off inbound contact from unmanaged Teams accounts, and outbound unless there is a documented need.
  • Stop anonymous users starting meetings and keep anonymous and dial-in participants in the lobby.
  • Disable Teams channel email integration and leave the SMTP domain list empty.
  • Move to an approved app list for Microsoft, third-party and custom apps, and review apps holding RSC or tenant-wide Graph permissions.
  • Make Teams Administrator and Global Administrator eligible through PIM with phishing-resistant MFA, and scope regional admins with administrative units.
  • Require phishing-resistant authentication strength for administrators and high-value users through Conditional Access.
  • Enable unified audit logging, ZAP for Teams, Safe Links and user reporting, and send Teams and Entra records to the SIEM.
  • Tell users how the real help desk contacts them and to report any unexpected "External" chat that asks for a code or a remote session.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Collaboration Tool Security Guide · Email Bombing and Help Desk Impersonation over Teams Guide · Microsoft 365 Security Guide · CISA SCuBA Baselines Guide · Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 8 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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