Pro-Russia hacktivist groups are logging in to internet-exposed industrial control panels through VNC with default or missing passwords, changing settings and posting the results online. In December 2025 the FBI, CISA, NSA and more than twenty international partners published joint advisory AA25-343A describing this activity against water, food and agriculture and energy operators. The techniques are simple, which is exactly why they work against small utilities and plants with remote access bolted on. This guide explains how the attacks unfold, where they appear, what impact operators have seen, and how to detect and close the exposure. It is written for OT engineers, utility IT staff, integrators and SOC analysts. For the wider hacktivist landscape, see the Hacktivism Guide.
Key takeaways
- The entry point is an exposed HMI. AA25-343A describes scanning for VNC on TCP 5900 and nearby ports, then guessing default, weak or blank passwords on human machine interfaces.
- The groups are linked to Russian state structures. The advisory links Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR) to GRU unit 74455 and NoName057(16) to a Kremlin-established organisation, and describes Z-Pentest and Sector16 as newer offshoots.
- Impact is real, though often exaggerated. Loss of view requiring manual intervention is the most common result; the advisory also reports some physical damage and remediation costs, while noting the groups overstate their claims.
- The fix is mostly basic hygiene. Removing OT from the public internet, changing default passwords, gating remote access behind VPN and MFA, and segmenting IT from OT address almost every step of the chain.
- Manual operation is the safety net. CISA and partners ask operators to keep backups of HMI logic and firmware and to rehearse running the process by hand.
How the attack works
AA25-343A describes an opportunistic, low-skill chain. The summary below is at the level the advisory publishes, for defenders to recognise each stage.
- Find exposed services: internet scanning for VNC, usually TCP 5900 or the range 5901 to 5910.
- Guess the password: password-guessing tools run from rented virtual private servers against devices with default, weak or no passwords.
- Take the screen: VNC gives the attacker the HMI's graphical interface, exactly as an operator would see it.
- Record proof: device details are logged and screenshots or recordings captured for later publicity.
- Change things: passwords, parameters, device names, instrument settings and alarms are altered, or the device is restarted or shut down.
- Publicise: the group disconnects and posts the claim, often with exaggerated impact, on social channels.
Who is behind it
| Group | What AA25-343A says | Typical activity |
|---|---|---|
| Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR) | Linked to GRU unit 74455, also tracked as Sandworm or APT44; expanded into ICS attacks in 2023 | HMI tampering, publicity videos |
| NoName057(16) | Linked to the Kremlin-established CISM; known for the DDoSia tool | Distributed denial of service, now alongside OT claims |
| Z-Pentest | Formed September 2024 from CARR and NoName057(16) members | Focus on OT intrusions |
| Sector16 | Formed January 2025 in collaboration with Z-Pentest; may have indirect Russian government support | OT intrusions and claims |
See the Sandworm Threat Actor Profile and the NoName057 DDoS Hacktivist Group Profile Guide. Iranian-linked CyberAv3ngers have used similar exposed-device approaches against water utilities; see the CyberAv3ngers Threat Actor Profile Guide.
ATT&CK mapping
The advisory lists techniques across ATT&CK Enterprise and ICS. Two of the ICS IDs it lists (for default credentials and unauthorised command messages) have since been revoked in ATT&CK v20; the current equivalents are shown.
| Stage | Technique |
|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | T1591 Gather Victim Org Information; T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning |
| Resource development | T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
| Initial access | T0883 Internet Accessible Device |
| Credential access | T1110.003 Password Spraying |
| Persistence, lateral movement | T0859 Valid Accounts; T1694.001 Default Credentials; T0886 Remote Services; T1021.005 VNC |
| Execution | T0823 Graphical User Interface |
| Inhibit response function | T0816 Device Restart/Shutdown; T0878 Alarm Suppression; T0892 Change Credential |
| Impair process control | T0836 Modify Parameter; T1692 Unauthorized Message |
| Impact | T0828 Loss of Productivity and Revenue; T0829 Loss of View; T0831 Manipulation of Control |
Where it shows up
- Sectors: AA25-343A names water and wastewater, food and agriculture, and energy. The earlier CISA-led fact sheet, Defending OT Operations Against Ongoing Pro-Russia Hacktivist Activity, also lists dams.
- Geography: the 2024 fact sheet describes targeting of North American and European critical infrastructure; the 2025 advisory is co-sealed by European, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand agencies.
- Typical victim profile: small utilities, farms and plants where an integrator or operator enabled VNC on an HMI for convenience, often behind a cellular router or with a port forward, and never set or changed the password.
- Typical asset: a panel HMI or a Windows workstation running HMI software, reachable directly from the internet.
Water operators should also read the Water and Wastewater Cybersecurity Guide.
Impact
AA25-343A is clear that these groups cause actual harm even though they routinely overstate it.
| Impact | What operators see | Cost driver |
|---|---|---|
| Loss of view | Operators cannot see or trust the HMI and must go to manual control | Staff time, overtime, site visits |
| Changed setpoints and alarms | Parameters, instrument settings or alarm limits altered | Process upsets, possible equipment damage |
| Lockout | HMI password changed by the intruder | PLC programmer labour to restore access |
| Restart or shutdown | Device rebooted or stopped | Downtime and lost production |
| Reputation | Video of your panel posted online | Public and regulator questions, even when the claim is exaggerated |
The advisory reports no injuries but notes that attacks on occupied facilities show disregard for human safety. The 2024 fact sheet describes most activity as nuisance-level but warns the actors are capable of techniques that pose physical threats to insecure OT.
Detection
The fastest detection is finding your own exposure before a scanner does. After that, watch the HMI and its network path.
- External exposure: run continuous external attack surface checks for VNC (TCP 5900 to 5910), and for other remote access ports on OT address ranges and cellular modems. See the Attack Surface Management Guide.
- Inbound connections: alert on any inbound VNC session from the internet, and on connections from VPS or hosting provider address space to OT assets.
- Failed logins: repeated authentication failures on HMIs or remote access gateways indicate password guessing.
- Allowlist violations: the advisory asks owners to monitor and alert on access attempts that fail IP or MAC allowlist criteria.
- Process values: alert when setpoints or tag values move outside safe ranges, and when alarm limits are changed outside a change window.
- Unexpected protocols and ports: collect OT asset and network traffic and flag unusual logins, protocols and non-standard ports.
Metrics
- Number of OT assets reachable from the internet (target: zero), measured weekly.
- Percentage of HMIs and controllers with default credentials removed.
- Percentage of remote access sessions to OT through a VPN or gateway with MFA.
- Time from a new exposure appearing in external scans to it being closed.
- Date of the last successful manual operation drill at each site.
Prevention and hardening
Phased rollout
- Find and remove exposure (days, not weeks): inventory internet-facing OT, including cellular routers and port forwards, and take it off the public internet. Before cutting access, agree a temporary, approved remote path with operations so nobody re-opens a port to keep working.
- Change default passwords: start with internet-facing devices that can control the process, as CISA's Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology advises, and set strong, unique passwords. Record new credentials in a managed vault, not a sticky note on the panel.
- Rebuild remote access: use a VPN or remote access gateway with phishing-resistant MFA, default-deny firewall rules and time-limited sessions. Give remote users view-only accounts unless control is required. See the OT Remote Access Guide.
- Segment: separate IT and OT networks and pass data through a DMZ. See the OT Network Segmentation, Purdue Model and IEC 62443 Zones and Conduits Guide.
- Back up and rehearse: keep backups of HMI logic, configurations and firmware, and practise manual operation. A tested backup is your rollback if a hardening step breaks the HMI.
- Test and verify: re-scan from outside after each change and confirm no OT service answers. Pilot changes at one site before rolling to others.
Decision guidance
- VPN versus vendor cloud remote access: a VPN you control keeps the trust boundary in-house but needs patching and MFA; a vendor platform reduces effort but adds a third-party identity you must govern. Small utilities without staff for VPN patching may be safer with a managed gateway, provided MFA and session logging are enforced.
- View-only versus control access: default every remote account to view-only and grant control for a time-boxed task. This blunts the parameter-change step even if a password leaks.
- When an HMI cannot take a strong password: place it behind a gateway that can, and restrict by source IP; do not leave it reachable while waiting for a firmware fix.
Where identity fits
Every step after scanning depends on a weak shared credential. HMI and VNC passwords are machine and shared accounts with no owner, no rotation and no MFA. Assign an owner to each, store them in a vault, rotate after any integrator visit, and disable default accounts, as the advisory asks. See the OT and ICS Identity and Access Guide.
Common failure patterns
- An integrator enables VNC for support and leaves it on with no password after commissioning.
- A cellular modem gives the panel a public address that never appears in the corporate asset inventory.
- Remote users all share one operator account with full control rights.
- Backups of HMI projects exist only on the HMI itself.
- Staff no longer know how to run the process manually because the drill has not been done in years.
Framework mapping
| Control | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 |
|---|---|---|
| Remove internet exposure, segment | PR.IR-01 | SC-7 |
| Remote access with MFA | PR.AA-03 | AC-17, IA-2 |
| Default credentials and accounts | PR.AA-01 | IA-5, AC-2 |
| Backups and manual recovery | PR.DS-11 | CP-9, CP-10 |
| Monitoring and exposure scanning | DE.CM-01 | SI-4, RA-5, CA-7 |
Manufacturers have a part too: AA25-343A asks them to eliminate default credentials, require MFA for privileged users, provide logging at no extra cost and publish SBOMs. Use that list in procurement; see the OT Product Procurement Guide.
Practitioner checklist
- Scan your public address ranges and cellular modems for VNC on TCP 5900 to 5910 and close every hit.
- Remove default, blank and shared passwords from every HMI and disable default accounts.
- Put all OT remote access behind a VPN or gateway with phishing-resistant MFA and time-limited sessions.
- Make remote accounts view-only by default.
- Apply IP or MAC allowlists to HMIs and alert on violations.
- Alert on setpoint, alarm limit and HMI password changes outside change windows.
- Back up HMI logic, configuration and firmware offline and test a restore.
- Run a manual operation drill at each site at least annually.
- Require integrators to follow the same remote access rules in contracts.
Standards and references
- FBI, CISA, NSA and partners: AA25-343A Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against US and Global Critical Infrastructure
- CISA and partners: Defending OT Operations Against Ongoing Pro-Russia Hacktivist Activity
- CISA, FBI, EPA, DOE: Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology
- MITRE ATT&CK: Remote Services: VNC (T1021.005)
- MITRE ATT&CK for ICS: Internet Accessible Device (T0883)
- NIST: SP 800-82 Rev. 3 Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security
- NIST: Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Hacktivism Guide · HMI and SCADA Server Hardening Guide · OT Remote Access Guide · Water and Wastewater Cybersecurity Guide