When a customer loses money to a scam, the UK, Singapore and Australia give three very different answers to the question of who pays. The UK makes payment service providers reimburse most authorised push payment (APP) scam victims and split the cost between sending and receiving firms. Singapore's Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF) runs a duty-based waterfall in which a bank pays first, a telco second and the customer last, and only for a narrow class of phishing scams. Australia's Scams Prevention Framework (SPF) imposes duties across banks, telcos and digital platforms and routes compensation through dispute resolution where a duty is breached. This page compares the liability allocation side by side: scope, who pays, caps and excesses, time limits, and the duties placed on telcos and platforms. It is for fraud, risk, compliance and product leads at banks, payment firms, telcos and platforms operating in more than one of these markets. Scheme detail is in the single-country guides linked throughout.
Status line: checked on 14 November 2026 against the PSR's Specific Requirement 1 and notices of value, HM Treasury's April 2026 consultation response, the MAS Guidelines on the Shared Responsibility Framework and the Scams Prevention Framework Act 2025, with ASIC and Treasury updates on Australian commencement.
Key takeaways
- Three liability models: the UK is outcome-based (reimburse unless an exception applies), Singapore is fault-based through a fixed waterfall, and Australia is duty-based with compensation decided through internal and external dispute resolution.
- Scope differs most: UK reimbursement covers authorised Faster Payments scams of all kinds; the Singapore SRF covers only phishing where credentials were entered on a fake site; the Australian SPF covers scams across designated banking, telecoms and digital platform services.
- Only the UK has a fixed cap and excess: up to £85,000 per claim with an optional excess of up to £100. The SRF sets no cap; the Australian Act sets no reimbursement amount, and automatic reimbursement below A$3,000 was a government proposal in May 2026, not law.
- Telcos and platforms carry liability only in Singapore and Australia: a Singapore telco pays where the bank met its duties and the telco failed its SMS duties; in Australia telcos and designated digital platforms are regulated entities that can be liable through dispute resolution.
- Time limits run on different clocks: UK claims within 13 months of the last payment and closed within 35 business days; Singapore reports within 30 calendar days of the bank's alert and outcomes in 21 or 45 business days; Australian timelines depend on SPF rules and codes still being finalised, with most obligations from 31 March 2027.
Regulations and frameworks at a glance
| Item | UK APP scam reimbursement | Singapore Shared Responsibility Framework | Australia Scams Prevention Framework |
|---|---|---|---|
| Instrument | PSR Specific Direction 20 and Specific Requirement 1, under powers in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023; Faster Payments scheme rules; Bank of England for CHAPS | MAS Guidelines on Shared Responsibility Framework; telco duties set by IMDA | Scams Prevention Framework Act 2025 (No. 15, 2025), inserting Part IVF into the Competition and Consumer Act 2010; SPF rules and sector codes |
| Status | In force since 7 October 2024; expected to transfer to the FCA when the PSR is abolished (legislation pending) | Issued 24 October 2024, effective 16 December 2024; fraud surveillance duty six months later | Act commenced 21 February 2025; sectors designated May 2026; most obligations from 31 March 2027 |
| Liability model | Mandatory reimbursement unless an exception applies | Waterfall: bank, then telco, then account holder, depending on duty breaches | Duty breaches give rise to remedies through internal and external dispute resolution; civil penalties |
| Regulators | PSR (FCA after consolidation); Pay.UK monitors | MAS for banks and payment firms; IMDA for telcos | ACCC general regulator and digital platforms; ASIC for banks; ACMA for telcos |
| Dispute route | Firm complaints process, then the Financial Ombudsman Service | FIDReC for banks; IMDA for telco assessments | AFCA as the single external dispute resolution scheme |
Liability allocation compared
This is the core comparison. Each row states what the rule itself provides; where a point is still being set by rules or codes, the row says so.
| Question | UK | Singapore | Australia |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which scams are covered | APP scams: authorised Faster Payments executed in the UK to a UK account not controlled by the consumer | "Seemingly authorised" phishing: impersonation of a business or government body, via a digital messaging platform, credentials entered on a fake platform, then used for unintended transactions | Any scam as defined in s 58AG (deception attempting to engage a consumer of a regulated service, causing loss or harm if successful), subject to SPF rules exclusions |
| Who is protected | Individuals, microenterprises (under ten staff and turnover or balance sheet up to €2 million) and charities with income under £1 million | Individuals holding a protected account (can hold more than S$1,000 or is a credit facility) | SPF consumers of regulated services, as defined in the Act |
| Who pays first | Sending PSP reimburses the victim | The bank or payment firm, if it breached any of its duties | The regulated entity whose breach caused the loss, as determined through IDR or AFCA |
| How cost is shared | Receiving PSP pays the sending PSP 50% on request; recovered funds split 50:50 subject to caps | Telco pays only for SMS scams where the bank met all its duties and the telco breached one; if both breached, the bank pays | Act provides for liability apportionment through SPF rules and proportionate liability provisions; detailed rules still being developed |
| When the customer bears the loss | Consumer standard of caution failed through gross negligence (not for vulnerable consumers), first-party fraud, or claim out of time | Where neither the bank nor the telco breached a duty | Where no regulated entity breached its obligations |
| Cap | £85,000 per claim (Faster Payments and CHAPS) | No cap stated in the Guidelines | No cap in the Act; any amounts set by rules or codes |
| Excess | Optional, up to £100 per claim; not for vulnerable consumers | None stated | None in the Act |
| Claim time limit | 13 months from the last payment | Report within 30 calendar days of the bank's notification alert; supporting documents within 3 calendar days | Set by IDR and AFCA processes and SPF rules |
| Decision time | Reimburse within five business days; stop the clock allowed; close by the end of the 35th business day | Written outcome in 21 business days, or 45 for complex cases | Set by IDR and AFCA processes and SPF rules |
| Telco duties | None in the reimbursement rules | Sender ID SMS only from authorised aggregators, block others, anti-scam URL filter on all SMS | Telcos are a designated sector with all six SPF principles; ACMA regulates |
| Platform duties | None in the reimbursement rules | None in the SRF | Designated digital platforms carry all six principles; ACCC regulates |
UK: reimbursement as the default
Threat model: authorised push payment scams of every type, from purchase and investment scams to impersonation and romance scams, where the victim authorises the payment. The rule assumes that firms on both ends of a payment are best placed to stop scams and that reimbursement creates the incentive.
Architecture in words: the PSR's Specific Direction 20 requires in-scope PSPs to follow the reimbursement requirement, and Specific Requirement 1 sets the rules. The sending PSP must reimburse within five business days of a claim. It may stop the clock only to gather information for five listed reasons, such as assessing vulnerability or suspected claimant fraud, and must close the claim by the end of the 35th business day. The receiving PSP then pays 50% on request. The cap is £85,000 per claim from 7 October 2024, matched by the Bank of England for CHAPS. Pay.UK runs a compliance monitoring regime under Specific Direction 19.
The exception: the consumer standard of caution has four parts: have regard to specific interventions from the PSP or a competent authority, report promptly and within 13 months, respond to reasonable information requests, and consent to a police report or report directly. A PSP can refuse only if it shows that a non-vulnerable consumer failed one of these through gross negligence, a higher standard than ordinary negligence, with the burden of proof on the PSP.
Failure modes for firms: treating every warning click-through as gross negligence; stopping the clock for reasons outside the five listed; failing to claim the 50% from receiving PSPs promptly; and weak mule detection on the receiving side, which now carries half the cost. See the Authorised Push Payment (APP) Fraud Guide and the Money Mule Detection Guide.
Regulatory change: HM Treasury's consultation response of 21 April 2026 confirms the PSR will be abolished and its functions moved to the FCA through primary legislation, with no date set. The reimbursement requirement is expected to transfer to the FCA through transitional provisions, after which the FCA will decide how to apply it.
Singapore: a duty-based waterfall
Threat model: phishing at scale through SMS and messaging, where the customer is tricked into giving credentials that the scammer then uses. Because the definition requires credentials to be used for transactions the customer did not intend, scams where the customer intends the payment fall outside it.
Architecture in words: banks and relevant payment service providers carry five duties: a cooling-off period of at least 12 hours after a digital token is activated or a new device logs in, during which high-risk activities (adding payees, raising limits, disabling notifications, changing contact details) are blocked; real-time alerts for those events; real-time outgoing transaction alerts; a reporting channel available at all times with a self-service kill switch; and, from six months after the effective date, real-time fraud surveillance that blocks or holds transactions for at least 24 hours when an account holding S$50,000 or more loses over 50% within 24 hours. Mobile network operators carry three SMS duties: deliver Sender ID SMS only from authorised aggregators, block other Sender ID SMS, and filter all SMS against a database of known malicious URLs.
The waterfall: if the bank breached any duty, it bears the loss, even if the telco also failed. If the bank met every duty and the scam came by SMS, the telco bears the loss where it breached an SMS duty. Otherwise the account holder bears it. Losses exclude lost profit and consequential losses.
Failure modes for firms: cooling-off periods that miss a high-risk activity added later; alert thresholds set so high that customers never see them; kill switches that block card use but not online banking; and telco evidence of URL filtering that cannot be produced per message. See the Singapore Shared Responsibility Framework Guide.
Australia: duties first, remedies through dispute resolution
Threat model: the whole scam supply chain, from the advert or message on a platform, through the call or SMS on a telco network, to the payment at a bank. The Act's premise is that every link should prevent, detect, disrupt and respond, not just the bank.
Architecture in words: regulated entities follow six principles: governance (documented policies, metrics and targets certified annually by a senior officer, records kept six years), prevent, detect (investigate actionable scam intelligence within 28 days), report actionable scam intelligence to the ACCC, disrupt (with a civil liability safe harbour for good faith action for up to 28 days), and respond (accessible reporting, internal dispute resolution and membership of an external scheme). AFCA is the external scheme; entities providing designated services had to be members by 1 September 2026. The scheme operator can make determinations with financial and non-financial remedies.
Penalties: tier 1 breaches (prevent, detect, disrupt, respond) carry up to the greatest of 159,745 penalty units, three times the benefit, or 30% of adjusted turnover for companies; tier 2 breaches (governance, report and code provisions) up to the greatest of 31,950 penalty units, three times the benefit, or 10% of turnover.
What is not yet settled: most obligations start on 31 March 2027 with more expected by the end of 2027, sector codes are still being developed, and the government's May 2026 proposal that victims with verified losses below A$3,000 be reimbursed automatically was released for consultation, not enacted. Plan for it, but do not build customer promises on it. See the Australia Scams Prevention Framework Guide.
Worked scenario: one scam, three answers
A customer receives an SMS that appears to come from their bank, clicks a link, enters online banking credentials on a fake site, and the scammer moves the equivalent of 20,000 in local currency to a mule account at another bank.
| Step | UK | Singapore | Australia |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is it in scope? | Not as an APP scam: the customer did not authorise the payment; it is handled as an unauthorised transaction under payment services law | Yes: it meets all four limbs of a seemingly authorised transaction | Yes: a scam involving regulated banking and telecoms services |
| Who pays? | The customer's bank under unauthorised payment rules, outside the APP regime | Bank if it breached any duty (for example, no cooling-off period after the new device login); telco if the bank complied and the telco failed SMS duties; otherwise the customer | Depends on whether the bank or telco breached SPF obligations, decided through IDR then AFCA |
| Evidence that decides it | Authentication logs and consent evidence | Device binding time, alert delivery records, kill switch availability, telco Sender ID and URL filter logs | Governance documents, actionable scam intelligence handling, disruption records |
Change the facts so the customer is persuaded to send the money themselves to a "safe account" and the answers swap. The UK APP regime now applies, with reimbursement up to £85,000 split 50:50 unless gross negligence is shown. The Singapore SRF does not apply because the customer intended the payment, so the loss falls under other routes. Australia's answer is unchanged in method: it depends on duty breaches.
Decision guidance for firms in more than one market
- Design to the strictest duty set: Singapore's cooling-off, real-time alerts and kill switch are explicit and testable; implementing them group-wide supports both UK reimbursement defence (fewer losses) and Australian prevent and detect duties.
- Keep evidence per decision: Singapore and Australia allocate loss by duty breach, so the record of what the firm did and when is what decides liability. Log alerts, holds and interventions with timestamps.
- Treat receiving-side controls as a cost centre: the UK 50% split makes inbound mule detection a direct financial line; Australia's disrupt duty pushes the same way.
- Telcos and platforms: UK telcos and platforms have no reimbursement exposure under these rules; in Singapore telcos carry second-line liability for SMS scams; in Australia telcos and designated platforms are fully regulated entities. Group telcos need market-specific programmes.
- Small firms: smaller UK PSPs face the same reimbursement requirement as large banks; Australian obligations apply to entities providing designated services. Budget for claims handling and dispute resolution, not only prevention.
Where identity fits
All three regimes turn on identity events. Singapore's duties are keyed to device binding, digital token activation and new device logins. UK claims often start with account takeover or remote access, which falls under unauthorised payment rules rather than APP reimbursement, so classifying the event correctly decides who pays. Australian detect and disrupt duties rely on signals such as new payees, device changes and mule account onboarding. See the Remote Access Scam Prevention for Banks guide and the Confirmation of Payee and Payee Verification Guide.
Measurement
- UK: percentage of claims reimbursed within five business days; percentage closed by business day 35; value recovered from receiving PSPs as a share of the 50% due.
- Singapore: percentage of new device logins with an enforced 12 hour cooling-off period; alert delivery latency; outcomes issued within 21 or 45 business days.
- Australia: median time to investigate actionable scam intelligence against the 28 day limit; reports made to the ACCC; disruptions reversed after clearance.
- All markets: loss rate per million payments and share of losses borne by the firm, customer and counterparties.
Practitioner checklist
- Map each product and payment rail to the regime that governs scam losses in each market.
- Classify every case as authorised or unauthorised first: it decides which rules apply in the UK and Singapore.
- In the UK, train claims staff on the four consumer standard of caution parts and the gross negligence burden.
- In Singapore, test the cooling-off, alerts, kill switch and rapid drain controls against the Guidelines' values.
- In Australia, confirm AFCA membership, document governance policies for annual certification and track code finalisation.
- Store timestamped evidence of each duty performed per transaction.
- Review the UK position when PSR functions move to the FCA, and the Australian reimbursement proposal as it develops.
Standards and references
- Payment Systems Regulator: Specific Requirement 1 (amended July 2024)
- Payment Systems Regulator: Consumer Standard of Caution Exception Guidance
- Payment Systems Regulator: PS24/7 Confirming the maximum level of reimbursement
- HM Treasury: A Streamlined Approach to Payment Systems Regulation, consultation response
- Monetary Authority of Singapore: Guidelines on Shared Responsibility Framework
- Federal Register of Legislation: Scams Prevention Framework Act 2025
- ASIC: Scams Prevention Framework
- Australian Treasury ministers: Government steps up industry protections to stop scams
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Online Fraud Regulation Map, Authorised Push Payment (APP) Fraud Guide, Singapore Shared Responsibility Framework Guide, Australia Scams Prevention Framework Guide. This guide summarises the UK APP scam reimbursement requirement, Singapore's Shared Responsibility Framework and Australia's Scams Prevention Framework and is not legal advice.