Most supplier risk guidance assumes a dedicated team, a risk platform and hundreds of assessments a year, so small organisations either copy a process they cannot sustain or do nothing at all. The UK government's Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026 found that only 15% of businesses had reviewed the risks posed by their immediate suppliers, and 6% had looked at their wider supply chain, with the immediate supplier figure at 12% for micro businesses. Yet a small firm usually depends on a handful of suppliers for almost everything: email, accounting, payroll, the website, the IT provider and the payment processor. This guide gives organisations of roughly 5 to 250 people a supplier check process that one person can run in a few hours a quarter, without a platform or a 300-question questionnaire. It is written for owners, office and operations managers, and the IT lead or outsourced provider who supports them. The full programme view is in the Third-Party Risk Management Guide; this page is the small organisation version and does not repeat it.
Key takeaways
- Start with a list, not a questionnaire. A one-page supplier register built from bank statements, card payments and sign-in data finds the suppliers that matter faster than any assessment.
- Sort suppliers into three groups. Spend real effort only on the few that hold your customer data, run a critical service or can log in to your systems.
- Reuse evidence that already exists. A Cyber Essentials certificate, an ISO/IEC 27001 certificate with the right scope, a SOC 2 report or a CSA STAR listing answers most questions you would ask.
- The settings you control matter as much as the supplier. Multi-factor authentication, admin accounts, OAuth app approvals and data exports on your side of each service close most of the risk.
- Offboarding is part of the process. Removing access, keys and data when a supplier leaves is the step small organisations skip most often.
Why the usual TPRM process does not fit
Programme-style third-party risk management rests on dedicated staff, a governance committee, inherent risk scoring models, platform workflows and contract leverage. A 20-person firm has none of these, and most of its suppliers are large SaaS providers that will not answer a custom questionnaire or negotiate security terms. Trying anyway produces three predictable results: a questionnaire nobody returns, a spreadsheet nobody updates after the first month, and false comfort that the job is done.
The small organisation version keeps the same purpose, knowing which suppliers could hurt you and doing something proportionate about each, but changes the method:
| Programme TPRM | Small organisation version |
|---|---|
| Risk platform with workflows | One spreadsheet or shared table with eight columns |
| Inherent risk questionnaire with weighted scoring | Four yes or no questions that place a supplier in group A, B or C |
| Custom security questionnaire to every supplier | Public evidence check for SaaS providers; a short question set only for small local suppliers with access |
| Negotiated security schedule | Read the standard terms and data processing agreement; negotiate only with local providers such as your IT support firm |
| Continuous monitoring feeds | Quarterly 30-minute review plus supplier breach notifications to a shared mailbox |
| Board reporting | A short note to the owner or directors once a year |
This is consistent with NIST SP 1305, the CSF 2.0 quick-start guide for supply chain risk management, which applies the GV.SC category in a way scaled to the organisation, and with the four stages of the NCSC supply chain security guidance: understand the risks, establish control, check your arrangements and improve continuously.
Step 1: build the supplier register in an afternoon
Small organisations rarely have a procurement process, so suppliers arrive through a card payment, a free trial or a staff member clicking "Sign in with Google". Find them from four sources rather than from memory.
- Payments: export 12 months of bank and card transactions and list every recurring payee. This finds paid SaaS, hosting, domain registrars and the IT provider.
- Sign-ins and app grants: in Microsoft 365, review Enterprise applications in Entra ID; in Google Workspace, review the third-party app access list under Security, API controls. These show free apps staff have connected with company accounts. The How to Inventory third party oauth apps in google workspace guide walks through the Google view.
- DNS and website: your DNS records (MX, SPF includes, CNAMEs) name your email provider, mailing tools and website host, and the website's plugins and embedded scripts name more.
- People: ask each team lead one question: "Which outside services would stop your work if they disappeared tomorrow?"
Record each supplier with only the fields you will use:
| Column | Example | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Supplier and service | Payroll SaaS | What you are actually relying on |
| Internal owner | Finance manager | Someone who answers for it and notices changes |
| Data held | Staff bank details, salaries, NI numbers | Drives the group and any data protection duties |
| Access into your systems | None, or "remote admin to all laptops" | Suppliers with access are the highest risk |
| Business impact if unavailable for a week | Cannot pay staff | Drives continuity planning |
| Group (A, B, C) | A | Sets how much checking to do |
| Evidence held and expiry | ISO/IEC 27001 certificate, expires 2027-03 | Tells you when to look again |
| Next review date | 2027-02 | Keeps the register alive |
Step 2: sort suppliers into three groups
Ask four questions about each supplier. Any "yes" to questions 1 to 3 puts it in group A.
- Does it hold or process personal data about customers or staff, or your confidential business data?
- Can it log in to, manage or push software to your systems (remote support tools, managed IT, website admin, payment integrations)?
- Would losing it for a week stop you trading, paying people or meeting a legal duty?
- Does it handle money on your behalf (payments, invoicing, payroll)? A "yes" with no other "yes" makes it group B at least, and group A if it can change payee details.
| Group | Typical members | Checks | Review |
|---|---|---|---|
| A: critical | Email and file platform, IT support provider or MSP, accounting and payroll, payment processor, customer database or CRM, website host if it takes orders | Evidence check, your-side settings review, contract and data processing terms, exit plan | Yearly, and on any incident or major change |
| B: important | Marketing email tool, scheduling, e-signature, HR tool with limited data, backup service | Evidence check and your-side settings review | Every two years, or at renewal |
| C: low | Stationery, office cleaning with no system access, free tools with no company data | Record it; confirm no company account or data is used | When the register is reviewed |
Most small organisations end up with 5 to 15 group A suppliers. If you have more than 20, the questions are being answered too cautiously; if you have fewer than three, the payment and sign-in sources were probably missed.
Step 3: check what each group A supplier can prove
Large providers will not fill in your questionnaire, but most publish assurance material on a trust or security page. Check it in this order and stop when you have enough.
| Evidence | What it tells you | How to check it | Watch for |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cyber Essentials or Cyber Essentials Plus | The UK baseline of five controls: firewalls, secure configuration, security update management, user access control and malware protection. Plus adds independent technical testing | Search the certificate on the IASME certificate search, the NCSC delivery partner | Certificate expired or issued to a different legal entity |
| ISO/IEC 27001 certificate | An information security management system was audited by a certification body | Ask for the certificate and the scope statement | Scope that covers head office but not the service you buy |
| SOC 2 Type 2 report | Controls were tested by an independent auditor over a period | Request it under NDA; read the exceptions and the complementary user entity controls | Report older than 12 months with no bridge letter; controls you are expected to run yourself |
| CSA STAR Registry listing | Level 1 is a published CAIQ self-assessment; Level 2 adds third-party attestation or certification | Search the provider on the CSA STAR Registry and check the listing status | Status shown as expired or deprecated |
| Data processing agreement | How the supplier handles personal data, sub-processors and deletion | Usually published with the terms of service | No list of sub-processors or no breach notification commitment |
| Security page and status history | Incident communication, MFA and SSO options, data location | Read the provider's security and status pages | No way to subscribe to incident or status notices |
The How to Read a SOC 2 Report Guide explains which sections to read in under an hour. For the difference between the two most common certificates, see Cyber Essentials vs ISO 27001.
Small local suppliers with access
Your IT support firm, bookkeeper or web developer is often a business smaller than yours with privileged access to everything. These are the suppliers where a short set of direct questions is worth sending, because they will answer and the answers change your risk. Ask no more than ten:
- Do you hold Cyber Essentials or Cyber Essentials Plus? Please send the certificate number.
- Does every one of your staff use multi-factor authentication on the tools that reach our systems, including your remote management tool?
- Do your staff use individual named accounts in our systems, never a shared login?
- Which remote access or management tools do you use with us, and how is access to them controlled?
- Where do you store our passwords and keys, and who can see them?
- Do you subcontract any of the work for us? To whom?
- How quickly will you tell us if you suffer a security incident that could affect us?
- Do you hold backups of our data, where, and have you tested a restore in the last year?
- Do you have cyber insurance?
- When we stop working together, how will you return our data and remove your access?
For managed IT providers specifically, the Choosing an IT Support Provider or MSP Securely guide and the MSP Security Questionnaire Template go deeper.
Step 4: secure your side of each service
With large SaaS providers, the biggest risks a small organisation can actually reduce sit in its own tenant. A supplier with excellent certifications still cannot stop an attacker who logs in with a reused staff password. For each group A service, check five things and record the result in the register:
- Multi-factor authentication: on for every user, and enforced rather than optional. Prefer phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys for admin accounts.
- Admin accounts: at least two named admins so you are never locked out, no more than needed, and none belonging to people who have left. Check whether the supplier's own staff hold admin access to your tenant, and remove it if they do not need it.
- Connected apps and API keys: review third-party apps granted access to email, files or the CRM; restrict who may approve new apps; revoke keys for integrations that are no longer used. The Consent Phishing and Illicit OAuth Grants Guide covers why this matters.
- Single sign-on: where the plan allows, sign in through Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace so leaver accounts are disabled in one place.
- Your own copy: confirm you can export your data in a usable format and, for group A services, keep a recent export or backup outside the supplier.
The Small Business Identity and Access Security Guide covers these settings across common platforms.
Step 5: contract terms worth checking
You will not renegotiate a large provider's terms, but you should read the parts that matter before you sign and know what you have agreed to. Where you can negotiate, usually with local IT, development and bookkeeping firms, ask for the terms below.
Personal data: under UK GDPR Article 28(3), as summarised by the ICO, a contract with a processor must cover processing only on your documented instructions, confidentiality of staff, the security measures required by Article 32, prior written authorisation for sub-processors, help with individuals' rights and breach notification, deletion or return of data at the end of the contract, and the information and audit rights you need to demonstrate compliance. Most SaaS providers publish a data processing agreement that covers these; check that one exists and is part of your agreement. If you need to ask a processor directly, the Data Processor Due Diligence Questionnaire Template helps.
For suppliers you can negotiate with: named accounts and MFA for their staff, notice of security incidents affecting you within an agreed number of hours, no subcontracting without telling you, return and deletion of data at exit, and removal of all access on termination. The Third-Party Security Contract Clauses Template has wording you can trim to two or three clauses.
Step 6: keep it running with a quarterly half hour
- Quarterly, 30 minutes: re-run the payments and connected apps review, add new suppliers, mark any that have gone, and check that group A evidence has not expired.
- Yearly, two to four hours: repeat steps 3 to 5 for group A, refresh the local supplier answers, and write the short note to the owner or directors.
- On a supplier incident: when a supplier notifies you of a breach, or one appears in the news, check the register for what data and access it holds, rotate any passwords and keys it held, review sign-in logs for its accounts, and decide whether customers must be told. The Small Business Incident Response Guide covers notification decisions.
- On change: treat a supplier acquisition, a new data location or a move to a new subcontractor as a trigger to look again.
Route supplier security and status notices to a shared mailbox rather than one person's inbox, so they are still seen when that person is away.
Step 7: offboard suppliers properly
NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-10 calls for supply chain plans to include activities after a relationship ends, and this is where small organisations most often leave risk behind. When a supplier leaves, especially an IT provider or developer:
- Disable their named accounts and any shared accounts they knew, and change passwords they held.
- Remove their remote management agent from every device and revoke its tenant-level permissions.
- Revoke API keys, app registrations and OAuth grants they created.
- Transfer domain registrar, DNS and hosting accounts into your own name if they were registered by the supplier.
- Obtain your data and written confirmation that their copies are deleted.
Domain and DNS ownership deserves its own mention: a web developer who registered your domain in their name controls your email and website. See the NHI Offboarding and Decommissioning Guide for the machine credentials side.
Small versus growing organisations
- Under about 20 people: the register, the three groups and your-side settings are enough. The owner or office manager runs it, with the IT provider checking tenant settings.
- About 20 to 100 people: add the yearly evidence check and the local supplier questions, name an owner per group A supplier, and add a short supplier section to your security policy. The Supplier Security Policy Template can be cut down to a page.
- About 100 to 250 people, or selling to large customers: your own customers will start sending you their questionnaires. Hold Cyber Essentials, keep the register current and evidence-backed, and consider the Vendor Security Assessment Template for new group A suppliers. A dedicated platform is still unlikely to pay off at this size.
- Regulated work: if you supply financial services, healthcare or the public sector, contract terms may impose specific supplier controls on you; follow those, as they override this lightweight process.
Measuring whether it is working
| Measure | Target | How to count it |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring payees and connected apps found in the register | 100% of those seen in the quarterly review | Compare the quarter's payment export and app list against the register |
| Group A suppliers with current evidence | All | Evidence expiry dates in the register |
| Group A services with MFA enforced for every user | All | Tenant admin settings per service |
| Supplier accounts or apps found active after the supplier left | Zero | Quarterly review of accounts and connected apps |
| Quarterly reviews completed on time | Four a year | Date stamp in the register |
Framework mapping
| Step | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A |
|---|---|---|---|
| Register and grouping | GV.SC-04 | SR-3 | 5.19 Information security in supplier relationships |
| Evidence check before purchase | GV.SC-06 | SR-6 | 5.19, 5.20 Addressing information security within supplier agreements |
| Your-side settings and ongoing review | GV.SC-07 | SA-9 | 5.22 Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services; 5.23 Information security for use of cloud services |
| Offboarding | GV.SC-10 | SA-9 | 5.22 |
For UK organisations, Cyber Essentials does not assess supplier management directly, but holding it yourself answers the first question your own customers will ask. See the Cyber Essentials Guide.
Common failure patterns
- Sending large SaaS providers a custom questionnaire: it is ignored or answered with a link to the trust page. Read the trust page first.
- Accepting a certificate without reading its scope: an ISO/IEC 27001 certificate that covers the supplier's office IT says nothing about the product you buy.
- Ignoring free apps: a free note-taking or file conversion app connected to company email can read more data than a paid supplier. The Shadow SaaS and Unsanctioned App Discovery Guide covers how to find them.
- Trusting the IT provider without checking it: the managed IT firm usually holds the most access of any supplier, yet is the one least likely to be asked about MFA or its remote tools.
- Letting the register die after month one: without a calendar entry and an owner, the register is out of date within a quarter.
- No exit: a developer who still holds the domain registration, or an old remote support agent still on laptops, is a supplier relationship that never ended. The Top 10 Third-Party Risk Mistakes lists more.
Practitioner checklist
- Build the register from 12 months of payments, connected apps, DNS records and a question to each team lead.
- Place each supplier in group A, B or C using the four questions.
- For each group A supplier, record the evidence held, its scope and its expiry date.
- Send the ten questions to local suppliers with access to your systems, starting with the IT provider.
- Enforce MFA, review admin accounts and connected apps, and confirm data export for every group A service.
- Confirm a data processing agreement is in place for every supplier holding personal data.
- Route supplier security and status notices to a shared mailbox.
- Book the quarterly 30-minute review and the yearly group A review in the calendar.
- Offboard leaving suppliers with the five-step list, including domain and DNS ownership.
- Escalate to a fuller process, such as a Supplier Security Audit Guide approach, only for a supplier whose risk cannot be settled with evidence and settings.
Standards and references
- NIST: SP 1305, CSF 2.0 Quick-Start Guide for Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
- NIST: Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
- NIST: SP 800-161 Rev. 1, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations
- NCSC: Supply chain security guidance
- NCSC: Cyber Essentials overview
- ICO: What needs to be included in the contract
- Cloud Security Alliance: STAR Registry
- DSIT: Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Third-Party Risk Management Guide · Top 10 Third-Party Risk Mistakes · Supplier Security Audit Guide · Small Business Cyber Security Checklist