Most third-party security failures are contract failures first: the supplier was never obliged to tell you about the breach, let you audit, flow your terms down to its subcontractors or hand back your data. This template gives you model security clauses to attach to a master services agreement, a data processing agreement or a security schedule. It covers security baselines, access and credentials, subprocessors, incident notification, vulnerability disclosure and SBOM delivery, audit and assurance rights, data return and deletion, resilience and exit. It is written for security, procurement and legal teams who need a starting text that maps to GDPR Article 28, DORA Article 30 and NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-05. Have your legal team adapt it before use.
How to use this template
- Replace text in square brackets, such as [Organisation], [Supplier] and [24 hours], with your own terms. Timings and thresholds shown are illustrative starting points, not legal or regulatory minimums.
- "Must" marks a mandatory obligation on the Supplier; "should" marks an expectation where the Supplier may agree an alternative in writing.
- Use the supplier tier from your third-party risk process to choose clauses: the table in Implementation guidance shows which sections apply to each tier. See the Vendor Tiering and Inherent Risk Questionnaire Template.
- This template governs what the Supplier must do. How your own staff grant and supervise supplier access is set out separately in the Third-Party Access Policy Template.
- Where a regulation prescribes contract content (for example GDPR Article 28(3) for processors, or DORA Article 30 for ICT services to EU financial entities), check that every mandatory element is present; this template covers the security elements, not every commercial or legal term those laws require.
1. Definitions and scope
- Services: the services, software and support described in [Schedule X], including any hosted, managed or cloud components.
- Organisation Data: all data, including personal data, credentials and configuration, that the Supplier or its Subprocessors receive, generate, store or can access in performing the Services.
- Security Incident: any event that has or is reasonably likely to have compromised the confidentiality, integrity or availability of Organisation Data or of systems used to provide the Services, including unauthorised access to Supplier systems that hold Organisation credentials, whether or not Organisation Data is confirmed as affected.
- Subprocessor: any third party, including affiliates, that the Supplier engages and that processes Organisation Data or has logical access to systems used to provide the Services.
- Non-human credential: any API key, OAuth client or token, service account, certificate, SSH key or other secret issued by [Organisation] to the Supplier, or by the Supplier to [Organisation], for system-to-system access.
- These clauses apply for the term of the agreement and survive termination for as long as the Supplier or any Subprocessor holds Organisation Data or Non-human credentials.
2. Security baseline
- The Supplier must maintain an information security programme that meets [ISO/IEC 27001:2022 or an equivalent agreed framework] and must implement the controls listed in [Security Schedule], as a minimum.
- The Supplier must enforce phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for all administrative and remote access to systems that store Organisation Data or provide the Services.
- The Supplier must encrypt Organisation Data in transit using [TLS 1.2 or later] and at rest using [AES-256 or an agreed equivalent], and must manage the keys under documented key management procedures.
- The Supplier must retain security logs for systems providing the Services for at least [12 months] and make relevant extracts available to [Organisation] within [5 business days] of a request during an investigation.
- Where the Supplier provides software, it should follow a secure development framework such as NIST SP 800-218 (SSDF) and, on request, provide evidence or a signed attestation of conformance. For US federal suppliers, the CISA Secure Software Development Attestation Form (released 11 March 2024) is the expected format. See the CISA Secure Software Attestation Form Guide.
3. Access, identities and credentials
- Supplier personnel must access [Organisation] systems only through named, individual accounts provisioned by [Organisation]. Shared accounts are prohibited unless approved in writing and managed through [Organisation]'s privileged access tooling.
- The Supplier must notify [Organisation] within [1 business day] when any person with access to [Organisation] systems leaves the Supplier or no longer needs access, so the access can be removed.
- The Supplier must store any Non-human credential issued by [Organisation] in a secrets manager or hardware-backed store, must not embed it in source code, tickets, chat or email, and must restrict it to the systems and personnel that need it.
- The Supplier must support rotation of Non-human credentials at least every [90 days] and on demand within [24 hours] of a request, without service interruption beyond [agreed window].
- The Supplier must tell [Organisation] within [24 hours] if it suspects that any Non-human credential issued by [Organisation] has been exposed, including through a compromise of the Supplier's own vendors or developer tooling. The Slack GitHub breach shows why: employee tokens held by a compromised third-party vendor were used to download private repositories.
- Where the Services integrate with [Organisation] SaaS tenants through OAuth, the Supplier must request only the scopes listed in [Schedule X] and must not request broader scopes without written approval. See the OWASP NHI Top 10 NHI3 Vulnerable Third-Party NHI Guide.
4. Subprocessors and flow-down
- The Supplier must not engage a Subprocessor without [Organisation]'s prior written authorisation, either specific or general. Under general authorisation, the Supplier must give [30 days'] notice of any intended addition or replacement, and [Organisation] may object on reasonable security or compliance grounds.
- The Supplier must maintain, and provide on request, a current list of Subprocessors with each one's name, location, service and the categories of Organisation Data it can access.
- The Supplier must impose on each Subprocessor, by written contract, security, confidentiality, notification and audit obligations no less protective than these clauses.
- The Supplier remains fully liable to [Organisation] for the acts and omissions of its Subprocessors.
- Where the Services support a critical or important function, the Supplier must state whether subcontracting of that function is permitted and on what conditions, and must notify [Organisation] in advance of any change in the locations where data is processed or stored.
5. Security incident notification and cooperation
- The Supplier must notify [Organisation] of any Security Incident without undue delay and in any event within [24 hours] of becoming aware of it, by [phone to the security hotline and email to [email protected]].
- The initial notice must include, as far as known: the nature of the incident, the time of detection, the systems, Services and categories of Organisation Data involved, Non-human credentials possibly exposed and containment actions taken.
- The Supplier must provide updates every [24 hours] or as agreed until closure, and a written root cause report within [30 days].
- The Supplier must preserve relevant logs and evidence, cooperate with [Organisation]'s investigation and any regulator or law enforcement, and provide reasonable assistance so that [Organisation] can meet its own notification duties (for example the 72-hour notification to a supervisory authority under GDPR Article 33).
- Incident assistance must be provided at no additional cost or at a cost agreed in [Schedule X]. See the Third-Party Incident Notification Clauses Guide.
6. Vulnerability management and SBOM
- The Supplier must remediate vulnerabilities in the Services within these timeframes from public disclosure or discovery: critical [7 days], high [30 days], medium [90 days], and any vulnerability listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog within [14 days] or sooner where a regulator requires it.
- The Supplier must publish and operate a vulnerability disclosure process and notify [Organisation] of vulnerabilities that affect the Services and are not yet remediated where they are actively exploited.
- For software delivered to or run by [Organisation], the Supplier must provide a software bill of materials in [SPDX or CycloneDX] format with each major release and on request, containing at least the NTIA minimum data fields: supplier name, component name, component version, other unique identifiers, dependency relationship, author of SBOM data and timestamp.
- Each SBOM must cover top-level components and their transitive dependencies to the depth the Supplier can determine, and must flag known unknowns where dependency data is incomplete.
- The Supplier should provide VEX statements or equivalent advisories stating whether the Services are affected by newly published vulnerabilities in listed components. See the SBOM Guide.
7. Right to audit and assurance
- The Supplier must provide, at least annually and on request, current independent assurance covering the Services, such as [a SOC 2 Type II report, ISO/IEC 27001 certificate with Statement of Applicability, or an agreed equivalent], together with bridge letters covering any gap period. See the How to Read a SOC 2 Report Guide.
- The Supplier must make available all information reasonably necessary to demonstrate compliance with these clauses, and must allow and contribute to audits and inspections by [Organisation] or an auditor it appoints, on [30 days'] notice, no more than [once a year], except after a Security Incident or where a regulator requires it.
- Where these clauses relate to a critical or important function of a regulated financial entity, the Supplier must grant unrestricted rights of access, inspection and audit to [Organisation], its appointed third party and competent authorities, and must cooperate fully with on-site inspections.
- Findings rated high or critical by an audit must be covered by a remediation plan within [30 days], with progress reported until closure.
8. Data location, return and deletion
- The Supplier must store and process Organisation Data only in [approved regions or countries] and must not transfer it outside them without prior written approval and any safeguards required by law.
- On termination or on request, the Supplier must at [Organisation]'s choice return Organisation Data in [an agreed, machine-readable format] within [30 days] and then securely delete it, including from Subprocessors, unless law requires retention.
- Deletion must follow [NIST SP 800-88 or an equivalent] and the Supplier must provide written certification of deletion, including backups, within [60 days] of termination.
- On termination, the Supplier must return or destroy all Non-human credentials issued by [Organisation], and [Organisation] will revoke them. See the Vendor Offboarding and Termination Guide.
9. Resilience, testing and exit
- The Supplier must maintain and test, at least annually, business continuity and disaster recovery plans for the Services, with recovery time objective [X hours] and recovery point objective [Y hours], and share test summaries on request.
- The Supplier must notify [Organisation] of any development that could materially affect its ability to provide the Services, including change of control, insolvency risk or loss of a key Subprocessor.
- Where required for a critical or important function, the Supplier must participate in [Organisation]'s threat-led penetration testing and resilience exercises.
- The Supplier must support an orderly exit: continued provision of the Services for a transition period of up to [X months] after termination, and reasonable assistance to migrate to another provider or in-house solution. See the Cloud Concentration Risk and Exit Strategy Guide.
10. Remedies and review
- A material breach of these clauses, including failure to notify a Security Incident within the agreed time, gives [Organisation] the right to terminate the agreement for cause on [X days'] notice, in addition to any other remedy.
- The Supplier must maintain [cyber liability insurance of at least amount] and provide evidence on request. [Legal to align liability caps for data breach with the master agreement.]
Implementation guidance
Do not attach every clause to every contract. Match the clauses to the supplier's tier and the regulation in play, and record any clause the supplier refuses as a risk acceptance with a named owner.
| Section | Tier 1 (critical, holds sensitive data or privileged access) | Tier 2 (moderate) | Tier 3 (low, no data or access) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Definitions and scope | Required | Required | Required |
| 2. Security baseline | Full section | 2.1 to 2.3 | 2.1 only |
| 3. Access and credentials | Full section | Where access or credentials exist | Not usually needed |
| 4. Subprocessors | Full section | 4.1 to 4.4 | Not usually needed |
| 5. Incident notification | Full section, 24-hour notice | Full section, [48-hour] notice | 5.1 only |
| 6. Vulnerabilities and SBOM | Full section for software suppliers | 6.1 and 6.2 | Not usually needed |
| 7. Audit and assurance | Full section | 7.1 and 7.2 | Questionnaire only if risk changes |
| 8. Data return and deletion | Full section | Full section if data held | 8.2 if any data held |
| 9. Resilience and exit | Full section | 9.1 and 9.2 | Not usually needed |
Framework mapping
| Clause section | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | Regulation and other references |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2. Security baseline | GV.SC-05 | SA-4, SA-9 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.5.20 |
| 3. Access and credentials | GV.SC-05 | SA-9(2) | GDPR Art. 28(3)(b) confidentiality |
| 4. Subprocessors | GV.SC-07 | SR-3, SR-6 | GDPR Art. 28(2) and 28(4); DORA Art. 30(2)(a) and (b); ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.5.21 |
| 5. Incident notification | GV.SC-05 | SR-8, IR-6(3) | GDPR Art. 28(3)(f) and 33(2); DORA Art. 30(2)(f) |
| 6. Vulnerabilities and SBOM | GV.SC-05 | SR-4, SA-4 | NTIA SBOM minimum elements; CISA attestation form |
| 7. Audit and assurance | GV.SC-07, GV.SC-09 | SR-6 | GDPR Art. 28(3)(h); DORA Art. 30(3)(e); ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.5.22 |
| 8. Data return and deletion | GV.SC-10 | SA-9 | GDPR Art. 28(3)(g); DORA Art. 30(2)(d) |
| 9. Resilience and exit | GV.SC-10 | SR-5 | DORA Art. 30(3)(c), (d) and (f) |
Rolling it out
- Agree ownership: procurement owns the contract, security owns the security schedule, legal owns liability and regulatory alignment.
- Start with new and renewing Tier 1 contracts: retrofitting every existing agreement at once rarely succeeds.
- Pre-agree fallback positions: large cloud and SaaS providers often will not accept bespoke audit or notification wording. Decide in advance which alternatives you accept, such as relying on their SOC 2 Type II report and published incident terms, and which gaps need a risk acceptance.
- Test the clauses: in your next third-party tabletop, check whether the supplier's notice route, contact details and timings actually work. See the Third-Party Incident Response Playbook.
- Measure: track the percentage of Tier 1 suppliers with signed incident notification, audit and data return clauses, the median time from supplier incident to notice received, the number of Subprocessor changes notified versus discovered, and the number of open risk acceptances for refused clauses.
Common gaps: notification triggered only by confirmed personal data breaches, which misses credential theft; audit rights with no assurance alternative; no duty to revoke credentials at exit; Subprocessor terms not flowed down. See the Third-Party Risk Management Guide.
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Third-Party Access Policy Template · Vendor Security Assessment Template · Third-Party Risk Management Guide · DORA ICT Third-Party Risk and Register of Information Guide. This template summarises contract terms under GDPR, DORA and related frameworks and is not legal advice.