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Threat Intelligence Glossary: Plain Definitions from TTPs and IOCs to Diamond Model and TLP

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 18 November 2026 12 min read
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Threat intelligence only helps if the people producing it and the people acting on it agree on what words like "indicator", "campaign", "high confidence" and "TLP:AMBER" mean. This glossary gives short, plain definitions of the terms cyber threat intelligence (CTI) analysts, SOC teams, detection engineers, threat hunters, risk owners and executives meet when they collect, analyse, share and use intelligence: the intelligence cycle and requirements, analytic models such as the Cyber Kill Chain, the Diamond Model and the Pyramid of Pain, sharing standards such as STIX, TAXII and the Traffic Light Protocol, actor naming and attribution, and the identity-centric tradecraft (stolen tokens, valid accounts, access brokers) that now drives many intrusions. Entries link to deeper NHI Mgmt Group guides where they exist. For response and forensics vocabulary, see the Incident Response and DFIR Glossary; for the programme view, see the Threat Intelligence Guide.

Definitions quoted from a standard (FIRST TLP, OASIS STIX, MITRE ATT&CK) follow that source as of November 2026. Other definitions are plain-English NHI Mgmt Group wording. Terms are listed alphabetically.

A to B

Actionable intelligence
Intelligence that is timely, relevant to a stated requirement and specific enough for someone to make a decision or change a control. A long feed of indicators nobody can use is data, not actionable intelligence.
Adversary
The person, group or organisation behind malicious activity. In the Diamond Model it is one of the four core features of an intrusion event, alongside capability, infrastructure and victim.
Analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH)
A structured analytic technique in which the analyst lists every plausible explanation, scores each piece of evidence against all of them, and favours the hypothesis with the least evidence against it. It counters confirmation bias, especially in attribution.
APT (advanced persistent threat)
A well-resourced actor, usually state-sponsored, that pursues long-term objectives such as espionage and maintains access over time. The label describes intent and persistence, not necessarily sophisticated tooling. See APT vs Cybercrime vs Hacktivists.
Alert enrichment
Adding intelligence context, such as actor association, first-seen date, reputation and related indicators, to a SOC alert at triage time so an analyst can decide faster. It is the most common day-to-day consumer of tactical intelligence and the easiest place to measure whether intelligence saves time.
Attack pattern
A STIX Domain Object describing a way adversaries try to compromise targets, typically mapped to an ATT&CK technique or CAPEC entry.
Attribution
Assessing who is responsible for activity, at levels from a tracked cluster to a named organisation or state. It is a confidence-rated judgement, never a certainty, and most defensive decisions do not need it. See the Cyber Threat Attribution Guide.
Bias (cognitive)
Systematic errors in judgement, such as confirmation bias, anchoring on the first hypothesis or mirror imaging (assuming the adversary thinks like you). Structured analytic techniques and peer review exist to reduce them.
Bulletproof hosting
Hosting providers that knowingly ignore abuse complaints and law enforcement requests, used to run command and control, phishing and leak sites. See the Bulletproof Hosting.

C to D

Campaign
A set of related malicious activity against a set of targets over a period, sharing objectives and often infrastructure or tooling. A STIX Domain Object in its own right.
Collection management
Planning and tracking which sources (telemetry, feeds, sharing groups, OSINT, vendor reporting) answer which intelligence requirements, and where the gaps are.
Command and control (C2)
The channel an attacker uses to send instructions to compromised systems and receive data back. C2 infrastructure is a frequent pivot point in analysis. See Beaconing and C2 Detection Guide.
Confidence
An analyst's stated degree of belief in a judgement, often low, moderate or high, based on the quality and corroboration of the evidence. It is separate from source reliability and from likelihood language. See the Intelligence Confidence and Source Reliability Guide.
CTI (cyber threat intelligence)
Evaluated, analysed information about threats, adversaries and their methods, produced to support a decision. OASIS describes STIX as "a language and serialization format used to exchange cyber threat intelligence (CTI)".
Cyber Kill Chain
Lockheed Martin's seven-phase model of an intrusion: reconnaissance, weaponisation, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on objectives. Lockheed Martin says the model "identifies what the adversaries must complete in order to achieve their objective", so defenders can aim to break any link. See Cyber Kill Chain and Diamond Model Guide.
Dark web monitoring
Watching criminal forums, marketplaces, leak sites and chat channels for mentions of your organisation, leaked credentials, stolen data or access for sale. See the Dark Web Monitoring Guide.
Diamond Model
An analytic model that describes every intrusion event by four linked features: adversary, capability, infrastructure and victim. Analysts pivot from a known feature to discover the others, for example from a C2 domain to other victims. See Cyber Kill Chain and Diamond Model Guide.
Data leak site
A website run by an extortion or ransomware group that names victims and publishes stolen data to pressure payment. Leak site monitoring gives early warning of incidents at suppliers and peers, and of your own data appearing.
Dissemination
The stage of the intelligence cycle that delivers finished intelligence to the people who need it, in a format and at a time they can use, with the right handling marking.

F to I

Estimative language
Standard words of probability, such as "unlikely", "likely" and "almost certainly", each tied to a rough probability range, so readers interpret an assessment the same way. Pair it with a separate confidence statement rather than mixing the two.
False flag
Deliberately planting evidence, such as another group's tooling, language strings or infrastructure, to mislead attribution. A key reason attribution should rest on many independent lines of evidence.
Feedback
The final stage of the intelligence cycle: consumers tell the team whether a product met the requirement, which resets priorities and collection. Programmes without feedback drift into producing reports nobody reads.
Finished intelligence
An analysed product, such as an assessment, brief or report, as opposed to raw data or unprocessed indicators.
Hacktivist
An actor motivated by political or social causes, typically using defacement, distributed denial of service and data leaks. Some groups presented as hacktivists are fronts for state activity.
Initial access broker (IAB)
A criminal who gains access to organisations, often through stolen credentials, exposed remote access or session tokens, and sells that access to ransomware and extortion groups. IAB listings are a high-value early warning in dark web monitoring.
Indicator
In STIX, an Indicator object holds a detection pattern for suspicious activity. More broadly, an indicator is any observable that suggests malicious activity.
Indicator of attack (IOA)
A behavioural sign that an attack is in progress, such as a service account suddenly enumerating directory objects, regardless of the specific tool. See Indicators of Compromise vs Indicators of Attack Guide.
Indicator of compromise (IOC)
A concrete artefact showing a system may have been compromised: a file hash, IP address, domain, URL or registry key. IOCs are cheap to share and cheap for attackers to change. See IOC Scanners Guide.
Infostealer
Malware that harvests saved passwords, browser cookies, session tokens and API keys from infected machines and sends them to an operator. Infostealer logs feed account takeover and access broker markets, and often contain non-human identity secrets from developer workstations.
Intelligence cycle
The repeating process of direction (requirements), collection, processing, analysis, dissemination and feedback.
Intelligence requirement
A question a stakeholder needs answered, such as "which actors target our sector's cloud identities?". Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) are the few that matter most. See the Intelligence Requirements Template.
Intrusion set
A STIX object grouping adversary behaviours and resources believed to belong to one actor, used when the actor's real identity is unknown. Vendor cluster names are usually intrusion sets.

M to O

Malware family
A group of malware samples sharing code and behaviour, tracked under one name across variants. Families can be used by many unrelated actors, so a family match is not attribution.
MISP
An open source threat intelligence platform for storing, correlating and sharing indicators and events within trusted communities. See the MISP Threat Sharing Guide.
MITRE ATT&CK
A public knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations, used as the common language for mapping threat reports to detections. For example, T1078 Valid Accounts and T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain are both Initial Access techniques. See MITRE ATT&CK Coverage Mapping Guide and the MITRE Attack Flow Guide.
Observable
A fact seen on a network or host, such as a file, IP address or process, with no judgement about whether it is malicious. In STIX these are Cyber-observable Objects (SCOs).
OpenCTI
An open source platform that stores intelligence as a STIX-based knowledge graph of actors, campaigns, malware and indicators. See the OpenCTI Guide.
OSINT
Open source intelligence: intelligence derived from publicly available information such as websites, code repositories, certificate logs, social media and public records. See OSINT and Reconnaissance Guide.

P to S

Pivoting
Using one known data point, such as a domain, certificate, hash or email address, to find related infrastructure, samples or victims.
Pyramid of Pain
David Bianco's model ranking indicator types by how much pain denying them causes an attacker: hash values at the bottom, then IP addresses, domain names, network and host artefacts, tools, and TTPs at the top. See the Pyramid of Pain Guide.
Sighting
A STIX relationship object that "denotes the belief that something in CTI (e.g., an indicator, malware, tool, threat actor, etc.) was seen". Sightings turn a shared indicator into evidence of real activity.
Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS)
A criminal business model in which developers lease ransomware and leak site infrastructure to affiliates in return for a share of payments. Affiliates move between programmes, so TTPs often track the affiliate better than the brand name.
Sinkhole
Redirecting a malicious domain to a server controlled by defenders or researchers so infected systems connect there instead of to the attacker. Sinkhole data reveals victim populations and is a common source of shared notifications.
Source reliability
A rating of how trustworthy a source has proved over time, separate from how credible a particular piece of information is. Many teams use the Admiralty (NATO) system, which pairs a letter for reliability with a number for credibility.
STIX
Structured Threat Information Expression: the OASIS standard for representing CTI as JSON objects. STIX 2.1 defines 18 domain objects, including Attack Pattern, Campaign, Indicator, Intrusion Set, Malware, Threat Actor and Vulnerability, plus Relationship and Sighting objects. See the STIX and TAXII Guide.
Strategic, operational and tactical intelligence
Strategic intelligence informs leaders about trends and risk; operational intelligence describes specific campaigns and actor intent; tactical intelligence gives defenders indicators and TTPs for detection. See Strategic vs Operational vs Tactical Threat Intelligence.

T to Z

TAXII
Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information: the OASIS protocol for exchanging STIX content over HTTPS through collections and channels. STIX is the content, TAXII is the transport. See STIX/TAXII vs MISP Format.
Threat actor
An individual or group behind malicious activity, described by motivation, capability, sophistication and targets. Vendors give the same actor different names. See the Threat Actor Naming Conventions Guide.
Threat model
A structured view of what you are defending, who might attack it and how. Intelligence keeps threat models grounded in real actor behaviour rather than imagined attacks. See the Threat Modelling Guide.
Threat hunting
Proactive, hypothesis-led searching of telemetry for adversary activity that existing detections missed. Intelligence supplies the hypotheses. See the Threat Hunting Guide.
Threat intelligence platform (TIP)
Software that aggregates feeds, deduplicates and scores indicators, stores analysis and pushes intelligence to security controls. Its API keys and integrations are privileged non-human identities. See Threat Intelligence Platform Buyer's Guide and Securing the threat intelligence platform (TIP) itself.
Threat intelligence sharing community
A trusted group, such as a sector ISAC or national CERT community, whose members exchange indicators, reports and early warnings under agreed handling rules such as TLP. See ISACs and Information Sharing Communities Guide.
Threat landscape
A periodic assessment of the main threats facing a sector or region. See the ENISA Threat Landscape Guide.
TLP (Traffic Light Protocol)
FIRST's marking scheme for how far intelligence may be shared. TLP 2.0, "authoritative from August 2022 onwards", has five labels: TLP:RED (individual recipients only, no further disclosure), TLP:AMBER+STRICT (recipient's organisation only), TLP:AMBER (need-to-know within the organisation and its clients), TLP:GREEN (within the recipient's community) and TLP:CLEAR (no limit on disclosure).
TTPs
Tactics, techniques and procedures: the why, how and specific implementation of adversary behaviour. Detections built on TTPs survive infrastructure changes that defeat IOC blocking. See Intelligence to Detection Mapping Template.
Valid accounts
ATT&CK technique T1078: adversaries using legitimate credentials, including service accounts, API keys and cloud identities, for initial access, persistence and privilege escalation. Identity-focused intelligence tracks which credential types actors steal and how. See Threat Intelligence for Identity and NHI Guide.
Vulnerability intelligence
Intelligence about which vulnerabilities are being exploited, by whom and how fast, used to prioritise patching beyond severity scores. See the Vulnerability Intelligence.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Threat Intelligence Guide · Threat Intelligence for Identity and NHI Guide · Incident Response and DFIR Glossary · Threat Intelligence Analyst Career Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 18 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org