Several of the strongest security controls in Proficy iFIX and CIMPLICITY are customer-side settings that must be turned on, and until they are, the network around the HMI does most of the work. Both products run supervisory control on Windows: SCADA nodes talk to PLCs, HMI clients write set points, and web and terminal clients extend that reach into the DMZ. This guide turns GE Vernova's own Secure Deployment Guides for iFIX and CIMPLICITY into a practical hardening baseline: accounts and roles, node trust, file and folder permissions, remote clients, ports, logging, patching and backup. It is for OT engineers, integrators and security teams who own GE Vernova HMI and SCADA estates. For the vendor-neutral baseline that applies to any supervisory server, start with the HMI and SCADA Server Hardening Guide; this page goes deeper on the product-specific settings.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on GE Vernova's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by GE Vernova. Product features change, so confirm settings against GE Vernova's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Turn on the product security layer first. iFIX Security Protection is disabled by default and is switched on per node in the Security Configuration application; CIMPLICITY projects need Configuration security and Start/Stop security enabled in project options.
- Use Windows or Active Directory authentication. Both Secure Deployment Guides point to Windows-integrated accounts so password, lockout and joiner-leaver policy live in one place, ideally a separate OT domain.
- Control which nodes may talk and write. In iFIX, set accept_unknown_host and accept_unknown_write to OFF in NETWORK.INI and turn on Enforce Trusted Computing; in CIMPLICITY, restrict AllowProjects.json and the redundancy and broadcast ports.
- Treat remote clients as a separate risk tier. WebSpace, terminal servers and Remote Projects belong in a DMZ, view-only where possible, with set points blocked by setting rather than by trust.
- Plan to rebuild, not just fail over. GE Vernova notes that redundant SCADA pairs share the same security posture, so encrypted, tested, offline backups are the real recovery control.
Architecture and where the risk sits
Both Secure Deployment Guides use the same zone model, ordered by trust: Control System Zone, Control System DMZ, Support DMZ, then Corporate Zone. Sessions should start from the more trusted zone, firewall rules should name specific source, destination and port, and TCP is preferred over UDP. The table below maps the main components to the zone the vendor guidance expects and the identity each one depends on.
| Component | Product | Expected zone | Identity it relies on |
|---|---|---|---|
| SCADA node (process database, I/O drivers) | iFIX | Control System Zone | Dedicated low-privilege Windows account; iFIX service account with SERVICE_START, SERVICE_STOP and SERVICE_PAUSE_CONTINUE rights |
| CIMPLICITY server and project | CIMPLICITY | Control System Zone | Dedicated runtime service account; project users mapped to roles and resources |
| Operator and engineering clients (WorkSpace, CimView, CimEdit) | Both | Control System Zone | Named Windows users; view-only accounts on plant-floor stations |
| WebSpace server | Both | Control System DMZ | Windows accounts signing in through the Application Publishing Service |
| Terminal server for emergency access | Both | DMZ | Named Windows accounts, RDP Web Connection over HTTPS |
| Historian collector link | Both | Push to Historian on TCP 14000 | Historian credentials set by the Historian administrator |
| Proficy Authentication and Configuration Hub | Both (newer releases) | Central node in the Control System Zone | Certificates and identity provider groups |
For zone and conduit design see the OT Network Segmentation, Purdue Model and IEC 62443 Zones and Conduits Guide.
Windows platform baseline for iFIX and CIMPLICITY nodes
Both guides ask for the operating system to be hardened and patched before the HMI or SCADA software is installed, because changes afterwards are harder to test.
- Reduce attack surface in order: remove unneeded software, set unneeded services to Disabled (preferred) or Manual, close listening TCP and UDP ports you cannot justify, and remove unneeded accounts, including the Windows Guest account. The CIMPLICITY guide suggests a baseline port scan before installation so later changes stand out.
- Apply a hardened configuration: Microsoft security baselines, Microsoft GPOs or CIS Benchmarks, plus "display login screen on resume" on the screen saver.
- Patch first: apply operating system and third-party patches, then the latest cumulative product SIM (Software Improvement Module). In CIMPLICITY, installed SIMs are listed under Workbench, Help, About.
- Verify downloads: compare each installer's hash with the value GE Vernova publishes (the iFIX guide uses SHA256; the CIMPLICITY guide lists the hash GE provides).
- Turn on Windows Firewall before install: let the iFIX installer add its rule ("Enable iFIX through the firewall"), then narrow every product exception to named source and destination addresses.
- Enable Data Execution Prevention and antivirus: install antivirus on every node, update signatures and run a full scan before go-live. For CIMPLICITY, the guide confirms Microsoft Defender with automatic updates and excludes the project, data and log folders from on-access scanning.
- Install from an administrator account, run from a standard one: the iFIX guide is explicit that iFIX should not run under an Administrator account.
Application allowlisting and removable media control for these nodes are covered in the OT Endpoint Protection Guide.
Hardening Proficy iFIX
Installation access controls
From iFIX 6.5, the installer offers Install with Access Controls (Secure Mode), off by default, which limits the iFIX folders to the IFIXUSERS group or a custom group. After an Integrated Installer install (2022 and later), apply the same controls with ConfigureWizard.exe or the "Setup Access Controls" Start menu shortcut. On older releases, create an iFIXUsers group, grant it Modify, Read and Execute, List folder contents, Read and Write on the iFIX folder, apply the same group to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\FIX32 and the Fix Dynamics key, and remove the generic Users group. Repeat after every upgrade.
User-based security
- Accounts: remove the default Guest and Admin iFIX accounts, give each person a unique account, and tick "Use Windows Security" in the User Profile dialog. Native iFIX passwords are for legacy installs only.
- Groups and Security Areas: assign Security Areas (up to 254) and Application Features to groups, then add users to groups, so access is role based.
- Application Features to restrict: WorkSpace Configure (deny to Operators and View Only), Security Configuration (a few users, never zero), Project Backup-Restore (only users who also hold Security Configuration), iFIX System Shutdown and Background Task Exit.
- Login timeout: set one per account; the guide suggests 8.5 hours for an 8-hour shift.
- Security Synchronizer: the guide advises using it only where the environment justifies the extra complexity.
Node-based security
- Security Protection: enable it on every node in the Security Configuration application.
- Site-specific authentication: in the System Configuration Utility (SCU) Network Configuration dialog, enable Enforce Trusted Computing and set a Network Password, different for each system.
- NETWORK.INI: set accept_unknown_host=OFF with a list of permitted hosts, and accept_unknown_write=OFF with a list of nodes allowed to write, then protect the file with ACLs.
- Runtime Environment Protection: on Operator and View Only nodes, use the Environment Protection tab in User Preferences to disable task switching, the title and menu bar, the WorkSpace menu, VBE access, Ctrl+Alt+Del and the Open accelerator.
- Security path: keep shared security files on a Control System Zone file server with restrictive folder permissions and regular backups.
Automatic login and electronic signatures
Restrict automatic login to physically secure, staffed locations and to View Only or local control nodes with Environment Protection on. For critical tags, configure electronic signatures in the tag's Advanced tab as "Perform Only" or "Perform and Verify" (a second user), and keep Handle Unsigned Writes at its default of Reject.
Hardening CIMPLICITY
Project and folder security
- Folder ACLs: the guide's Appendix A PowerShell script (SetUpCIMPLICITYACLs.ps1) creates CIM_ADMIN_USERS, CIM_CONFIG_USERS, CIM_OPER_USERS and CIM_RUNTIME_USERS and removes the generic Users group from sensitive install folders. Run it for the install folders and again for each project.
- Project options: enable Configuration security and Start/Stop security.
- Project settings: keep password complexity on, set a failed-login limit, enable Resource Set Point Security and Level Set Point Security, and avoid the shared set point password.
- Allowed projects: set allow_all to false in AllowProjects.json, list only approved project paths, and restrict write access to those folders.
- Services: run CIMPLICITY services under a dedicated runtime account.
- SQL Server: where alarms are stored in SQL, install in mixed mode with a complex sa password and use TLS 1.2 on TCP 1433.
Roles, users and authentication
- Role privileges: restrict alarm modify and delete, set point, alarm disable and attribute modification (MANUAL_MODE, QUALITY.DISABLE_WRITE), and keep Start/Stop unselected for every role. Limit configuration and calendar rights, especially for the USER role.
- Unique accounts: issue named accounts, especially for SYSMGR and for sites that are not staffed around the clock; document accountability for any shared account.
- Windows authentication: map Active Directory groups to roles and resources and set group priority, preferably in a separate OT domain.
- Proficy Authentication: verify the server root certificate thumbprint before trusting it, and use the Authorization Code flow where multi-factor authentication is needed. Roles resolve by group rank, resources are cumulative across groups.
Clients, screens and computer options
- Saved credentials: add LOGIN_NOSAVE to the client Global Parameters, leave Client Properties User ID blank and Trusted cleared, and avoid the CimView /loadpassword switch.
- Restricted stations: use CimView /noopen on restricted stations and /nosetpoints on view-only stations; deploy runtime-only .cimrt screens to operators and keep editable .cim files with engineers.
- Screen integrity: use X509 screen signing, keep screens in access-controlled version control, and block .cim, .cimrt, .ctx, .cms, .bcl and .bclrt attachments at the mail gateway.
- Traffic protection: the guide recommends IPsec as the primary protection for client, server and redundancy traffic, with "Use secure sockets" as an additional option.
- Change Management: enable it for audit support, change any default credentials before connecting it, and turn on "Prompt for user name and password at login" so changes are attributed.
Remote clients: WebSpace, terminal servers and cross-zone data
| Path | Hardening settings from the vendor guides |
|---|---|
| WebSpace (iFIX and CIMPLICITY) | Server in the Control System DMZ; Windows authentication for all users; SSL/TLS for client connections; SandBox enabled by setting filesSandboxEnabled and programsSandboxEnabled to true in WorkspacePropertyDefinitions.xml on every server, including relay servers; restrict write-capable features (iFIX Database Save/Reload, Runtime VBE); for CIMPLICITY enable "Restrict screen opening" and "Disable setpoints"; "Disallow file open in CimView" is the emergency stop |
| Terminal services | Terminal server in a DMZ; RDP Web Connection over HTTPS with a valid certificate; firewall access only from approved devices; CIMPLICITY TERMSERV_ALLOW_SETPOINTS set to false; iFIX SCADA disabled on terminal server client nodes; Global Security Path for shared iFIX security |
| CIMPLICITY Remote Projects | Use only when needed, as they depend on the Remote Registry Service; prefer Point Bridge between zones, "Resident process use only", and read-only points on both sides |
| Historian and Alarm Cast | Push data and alarms out to the DMZ rather than letting Corporate users reach in; Historian on TCP 14000; dedicated Alarm Cast Gateway account with Trusted and Authorization Code set |
The vendor guides also ask sites to define an emergency remote access method in advance, so an unsafe one is not improvised during an outage. See the OT Remote Access Guide and the OT Third-Party and Integrator Access Guide.
Ports to restrict
| Port | Product | Purpose | Firewall stance |
|---|---|---|---|
| TCP 2010 | iFIX | Node to node, WebSpace and terminal server traffic | Named hosts only; IPsec connection security rule in the guide's Appendix A |
| TCP 53014 (UDP 500 if UDP used) | iFIX | Enhanced Failover SCADA sync | Failover pair only |
| TCP 9444, 5000, 51400 | iFIX | Configuration web server, Configuration Hub, OPC UA Server | External facing: restrict to admin hosts |
| TCP 4855 to 5578 microservice ports | iFIX | Internal configuration and OPC UA services | Block from outside the server |
| TCP 14000 | Both | Push to Historian | Collector to Historian only |
| UDP 32000, TCP 4000, 5000 to 6000, 32000/32256/32512/32768 | CIMPLICITY | Project broadcast and redundancy | Inside the Control System Zone |
| TCP 9443 | CIMPLICITY | Web configuration (TLS 1.2) | Admin hosts only |
| TCP 8070 to 8089, TCP 491 | CIMPLICITY | Alarm Cast, WebSpace SSL | DMZ conduits only |
| TCP 443, 3389 | Both | WebSpace or terminal server access, RDP | From the DMZ entry point only |
For IPsec between iFIX nodes, the guide's Appendix A replaces its tested defaults with stronger settings (for example AES-GCM 256 for data protection and ECDH P-384 for key exchange) and uses Kerberos V5 or certificates rather than a pre-shared key. Check port numbers against the guide for your release before writing rules.
Where identity fits
Most of the durable risk in these systems sits in accounts that are not people: the iFIX service account, the CIMPLICITY runtime account, the Alarm Cast Gateway account, Historian credentials, the SQL sa login and auto-login view-only accounts on plant-floor stations. Each one should have an owner, a documented purpose, the minimum Windows rights the vendor guide lists, and a credential rotation date. Shared operator logins are the other weak spot: both guides ask for unique accounts, especially for privileged configuration roles and unstaffed sites. See the OT and ICS Identity and Access Guide.
Logging, detection and measurement
- iFIX: the security audit trail is written to the alarm path in YYMMDD.LOG files; the Alarm ODBC Service can write the same messages to a database. Watch logins and logouts, failed logins, Security Area or Application Feature denials, electronic signature failures and login timeouts.
- CIMPLICITY: forward $LOGIN, $LOGOUT and $LOGIN_FAILURE events to a SIEM, keep set point audit trails and alarm-change records, and note that account creation and removal appear as $DYN_CFG events.
- Windows and Active Directory: with Windows integration, logon events come from the domain controller and local Security log.
- Separation: store security logs on a separate system, use lower alert thresholds for Control System Zone events than Corporate events, and keep SIEM administration apart from HMI administration.
| Metric | Target |
|---|---|
| Nodes with iFIX Security Protection or CIMPLICITY Configuration security enabled | 100% |
| Shared or default accounts remaining (Guest, Admin, shared operator logins) | Zero, or each documented with an owner |
| Nodes on the latest cumulative SIM, DMZ nodes first | Tracked monthly against the site patch window |
| Annual user, role and resource review completed (as both guides ask) | Yes, with differences investigated |
| Restore test from backup within the agreed RTO | At least yearly per critical node |
| Failed login alerts reviewed within one shift | Over 95% |
For network-level detection see the OT Network Security Monitoring Guide.
Patching, auditing and recovery
- Inventory and support dates: keep a software inventory and review end-of-life dates for Windows, the product and third-party components each year.
- Patch in phases: test SIMs on a test system, patch DMZ and externally reachable nodes first, then patch one half of a redundant pair, observe, and roll out. See the OT Patch Management Guide.
- Audit configuration yearly or more often: compare security settings, users, roles and resources with the approved configuration and fix the process behind any gap.
- Back up what matters: iFIX Backup and Restore Wizard full backups on a schedule; CIMPLICITY project folders and the global data folder (or "Copy to Project"); full machine images updated after patches.
- Protect backups: encrypt them, keep copies off the network and offsite at least as often as the recovery point objective, and consider SQL Transparent Data Encryption or BitLocker for data at rest.
- Roll back safely: keep the pre-change image and project backup for each node until the change has run through a full production cycle. See the OT Backup, Recovery and Golden Image Guide.
Decision guidance: small sites and large estates
- Single stand-alone HMI: isolate it with a firewall, data diode or air gap as the iFIX guide describes; native local Windows accounts are acceptable if each person has one, with Environment Protection and NETWORK.INI restrictions still applied.
- Multi-node SCADA with redundancy: central Active Directory in the Control System Zone, a central security path or Proficy Authentication node, IPsec between nodes, and centralised backup and antivirus management.
- Remote visibility needed: push data out (Historian, Alarm Cast) before offering interactive access; when interactive access is needed, prefer WebSpace or a terminal server in a DMZ, view-only, over Remote Projects.
- Auto login versus named login: named login is the default choice; auto login only for staffed, physically secure, view-only stations.
Framework mapping
| Control area | Product settings | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accounts and roles | Unique accounts, Windows Security, groups, role privileges | AC-2, AC-6, IA-2 | PR.AA-05 |
| Node trust and segmentation | NETWORK.INI, Enforce Trusted Computing, AllowProjects.json, zone firewall rules | SC-7 | PR.IR-01 |
| Traffic protection | IPsec, TLS for WebSpace, SQL and web configuration | SC-8 | PR.IR-01 |
| Remote access | WebSpace SandBox, terminal server, set point blocking | AC-17 | PR.AA-05 |
| Hardened configuration | OS baseline, Environment Protection, folder ACLs, services | CM-6, CM-7 | PR.PS-01 |
| Patching | Cumulative SIMs, phased rollout | SI-2 | PR.PS-02 |
| Logging | Audit trail, $LOGIN_FAILURE forwarding, SIEM | AU-6 | DE.CM-01 |
| Backup | Backup and Restore Wizard, project folder backup, encryption | CP-9 | PR.DS-11 |
In IEC 62443 terms, these settings support foundational requirements for identification and authentication, use control, restricted data flow and timely response to events. See the IEC 62443-3-3 and 4-2 Security Levels Guide.
Common failure patterns
- Security layer never switched on: iFIX Security Protection and CIMPLICITY Configuration security are left at their off defaults, so anyone with a Windows session can configure the project.
- Open node acceptance: NETWORK.INI left accepting unknown hosts and writes, so any machine that reaches TCP 2010 can join and write values.
- Stored credentials on clients: CimView started with /loadpassword or "Save User ID + Password" left available, putting operator credentials in plain files.
- WebSpace in the Corporate Zone with write access: remote users get full set point rights because SandBox, "Disable setpoints" and feature restrictions were never applied.
- Redundancy treated as recovery: both halves of a failover pair are encrypted or corrupted together, and no offline backup exists.
- Access controls lost on upgrade: folder and registry ACLs are not reapplied after a new install or upgrade, as the iFIX guide requires.
Practitioner checklist
- Harden and patch Windows, verify installer hashes and enable Windows Firewall before installing iFIX or CIMPLICITY.
- Enable iFIX Security Protection on every node, or CIMPLICITY Configuration and Start/Stop security on every project.
- Remove default and shared accounts and switch to Windows or Active Directory authentication with role-based groups.
- Set accept_unknown_host and accept_unknown_write to OFF and enable Enforce Trusted Computing, or lock down AllowProjects.json.
- Apply installation access controls or the CIMPLICITY ACL script, and reapply after every upgrade.
- Place WebSpace and terminal servers in a DMZ, enable SandBox, and block set points from remote clients.
- Restrict every product port in the table to named hosts and protect node traffic with IPsec using strong settings.
- Forward audit trail and login failure events to a separate SIEM and review them each shift.
- Review users, roles and resources at least yearly and apply cumulative SIMs in phases, DMZ first.
- Keep encrypted, offline, tested backups of projects and full system images.
Standards and references
- GE Vernova: iFIX Secure Deployment Guide
- GE Vernova: CIMPLICITY Secure Deployment Guide
- GE Vernova: Webspace Secure Deployment and Whitelisting
- GE Vernova: CIMPLICITY Security Features
- GE Vernova: Configuration Hub Certificate Management
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5, Security and Privacy Controls
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: HMI and SCADA Server Hardening Guide · OT and ICS Identity and Access Guide · OT Remote Access Guide · OT Security Guide