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IEC 62443-2-1 Asset Owner Security Programme Guide: Building an IACS Programme to the 2024 Edition

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 12 min read
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Most asset owners have IEC 62443 requirements in their supplier contracts but no structured security programme of their own for the control systems they operate. IEC 62443-2-1 is the part of the series that sets out what that programme must contain: the policies and procedures an asset owner, including the operator, needs to run an industrial automation and control system (IACS) securely over its life. The second edition, published by IEC on 7 August 2024 and by ISA as ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1-2024, restructured the requirements into security program elements, removed duplication with information security management system (ISMS) requirements and added a maturity model. This guide explains what the standard covers, how the 2024 edition is organised, how to build and evidence a programme against it, and how it relates to ISO/IEC 27001, NIST and the new ISASecure ACSSA scheme. It is written for OT security managers, site leaders and the consultants who support them; the series as a whole is introduced in the IEC 62443 Guide.

Key takeaways

  • It is the asset owner's part. IEC 62443-2-1 sets policy and procedure requirements for the organisation that owns and operates the IACS, while other parts cover service providers (2-4), system design (3-2, 3-3) and products (4-1, 4-2).
  • The 2024 edition is a rewrite, not an update. Requirements are grouped into security program elements, ISMS overlap was removed, and a maturity model is defined for evaluating them.
  • Legacy is expected, not excused. The standard does not require legacy systems to have technical capabilities they lack; it requires policies and procedures for those cases, which may include compensating measures.
  • Pair it with an ISMS. Because ISMS duplication was removed, most organisations run 62443-2-1 alongside an ISMS such as ISO/IEC 27001 that supplies the management system.
  • It can now be certified at site level. ISASecure ACSSA 1.0.0, effective 17 February 2026, inspects or certifies a deployed IACS and the asset owner's programme against 62443-2-1, 2-4, 3-2 and 3-3.

What it is and who it applies to

IEC 62443-2-1:2024 (edition 2.0) is titled "Security for industrial automation and control systems, Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners". IEC's published abstract describes it as specifying the policy and procedure requirements for an asset owner's security programme for an IACS in operation, with the asset owner understood to include the operator of the IACS. The abstract also notes that IACS can operate for more than twenty years, so many legacy systems run on unsupported hardware and software, and their programmes may implement only a subset of the requirements.

Role in the 62443 seriesPartWhat it requires
Asset owner and operator62443-2-1 (2024)A security programme of policies and procedures for operating the IACS
Asset owner (protection scheme)ISA-TR62443-2-2-2025Technical report on an IACS security protection scheme
Asset owner (patching)ISA-TR62443-2-3-2015Patch management in the IACS environment
Service providers (integration, maintenance)62443-2-4Security programme requirements for IACS service providers
System design62443-3-2 (2020), 62443-3-3Risk assessment, zones and conduits, target security levels; system security requirements
Product suppliers62443-4-1, 62443-4-2Secure development lifecycle; component technical requirements
  • Who uses it: operators of manufacturing plants, utilities, oil and gas, water, pharmaceuticals, building systems and transport, and any organisation asked by a regulator or customer to show an OT security programme.
  • Who it does not cover: product suppliers and integrators have their own parts. The asset owner's programme must, however, set requirements for them, and 62443-2-4 is the usual reference for service providers. See the OT Third-Party and Integrator Access Guide.
  • Edition status: the first edition dated from 2010 and followed the older cyber security management system model. Check that contracts and audit plans reference the 2024 edition.

Structure and key requirements

IEC lists three significant changes in the 2024 edition: requirements restructured into security program (SP) elements, removal of duplication with ISMS requirements, and a maturity model for evaluating the requirements. The standard text is copyrighted and sold by IEC and ISA; the descriptions below are based on the public abstract and scheme documents, so read the standard itself before writing audit criteria.

Security program elements

The security program elements group requirements by topic, so each can be owned, implemented and evaluated separately. In practice the topics an asset owner programme has to address are:

Programme areaWhat the programme has to defineTypical evidence
Organisational security measuresRoles, responsibilities, training, background checks, management of service providersOrganisation chart, RACI, training records, supplier requirements
Configuration managementInventory of IACS assets, baseline configurations, change controlAsset inventory under change control, change records
Network and communications securityZones, conduits, remote access and external connectionsArchitecture drawings, firewall rule reviews, remote access records
Component securityHardening, malware protection and patching of IACS components, including legacy compensating measuresHardening baselines, patch and exception registers
Data protectionClassification and protection of IACS data, including configuration and backup dataData classification, backup encryption and storage records
User access controlAccounts, authentication and authorisation for people and softwareAccount reviews, privileged access procedures
Event and incident managementLogging, monitoring, incident response and reportingMonitoring coverage, incident plan, exercise records
System integrity and availabilityBackup, restore, recovery and resilience of the IACSRestore test records, recovery time evidence

Maturity model

The 2024 edition defines a maturity model for evaluating each requirement, so an asset owner is assessed on how consistently a practice is performed, not only whether a document exists. This matches the approach used elsewhere in the series, for example the maturity levels applied to service providers under 62443-2-4. Practical consequences:

  • Set target maturity per element: not every element needs the same target. Critical sites may aim higher on access control and incident management than on lower-risk areas.
  • Show repetition: higher maturity needs evidence that a process ran repeatedly (for example several quarterly access reviews), not a single run before the audit.
  • Use it for planning: the gap between current and target maturity per element is a ready-made roadmap. See the OT Security Maturity Model.

Legacy systems and compensating measures

The standard does not require legacy systems to have the technical capabilities it describes. It requires policies and procedures for those cases, which may include compensating security measures. A good programme keeps a register of every legacy system that cannot meet a requirement, the compensating measure (segmentation, monitoring, restricted access, application allowlisting) and the date it will be reviewed.

Identity and NHI requirements

User access control in an IACS covers more than operators logging on to an HMI. Most OT intrusions and many audit findings involve accounts that are shared, never reviewed, or belong to software and suppliers rather than people. An asset owner programme should explicitly cover:

  • Human accounts: individual accounts for operators and engineers where systems allow, documented exceptions for shared station logins, and multi-factor authentication for remote and privileged access.
  • Service and application accounts: historian, OPC, backup, antivirus and monitoring accounts, often with non-expiring passwords. Inventory them, assign owners, restrict where they can log on and rotate credentials. See the OT and ICS Identity and Access Guide.
  • Device and protocol credentials: controller passwords, SNMP communities, certificates for OPC UA and secure fieldbuses. See the OPC UA Security Guide.
  • Vendor and integrator access: named accounts, time-limited access, session recording and removal at contract end. See the OT Remote Access Guide.
  • Shared secrets in documents: passwords in commissioning documents, project files and spreadsheets should be moved into a vault and changed.

Implementation steps

  1. Appoint ownership: a named programme owner with authority across sites, plus site security leads. Agree how the programme relates to the corporate ISMS.
  2. Define scope: which sites and IACS are in the programme, and how they are grouped (by site, by business unit or by system type).
  3. Baseline: assess each element against the standard and record current maturity. A CSET or CPG review can help structure the first pass. See the OT Security Assessment Guide.
  4. Set targets: agree target maturity per element based on risk, informed by IEC 62443-3-2 risk assessments for the main systems. See the IEC 62443-3-2 OT Risk Assessment Guide.
  5. Write the policies and procedures: short, site-usable procedures for each element, with templates for the records that will become evidence.
  6. Pilot at one site: run the procedures for at least two cycles, fix what does not work, then roll out. Keep the previous practice documented until the new one has run successfully, so a site can revert if a procedure disrupts operations.
  7. Extend to suppliers: put the programme's requirements for integrators and maintenance providers into contracts, referencing 62443-2-4. See the OT Product Procurement Guide.
  8. Review and improve: annual reassessment of maturity, with incidents, audit findings and exercise lessons feeding the plan.
  • Small organisations: one programme document with short sections per element, one owner, and the CPGs as a practical baseline.
  • Large organisations: a central programme with site-level procedures, common tooling for inventory and access reviews, and maturity reported per site to leadership.

Evidence and assessment

An asset owner can evidence its programme in three ways: internal assessment, third-party assessment against the standard, or the ISASecure ACSSA scheme.

RouteWhat it givesConsiderations
Internal assessmentMaturity per element, improvement planCheapest; independence limited
Third-party gap assessmentIndependent view, often for regulators or insurersQuality depends on assessor's OT and 62443 experience
ACSSA inspectionPoint-in-time cover letter and report from an ISO/IEC 17020 inspection bodySame criteria as certification; repeatable for internal use
ACSSA certificationThree-year certificate from an ISO/IEC 17065 certification body, with periodic surveillance; the owner may display the ACSSA symbolRequires an asset inventory under change control and a 62443-3-2 risk assessment; the owner must be accountable for all hardware, software and external connection points in scope

ACSSA evaluates the deployed IACS together with the asset owner's policies and procedures, roles and training, and the service providers who maintain or integrate it. Products and services already certified under other ISASecure schemes (CSA, SSA, SDLA or 62443-2-4) can partially satisfy its requirements. See the ISASecure Certification Guide.

Metrics

  • Maturity per element: current against target, per site.
  • Inventory accuracy: percentage of IACS assets in the change-controlled inventory confirmed by passive discovery.
  • Access review completion: percentage of human, service and vendor accounts reviewed in the last cycle.
  • Legacy exception health: exceptions with a documented compensating measure and a review date in the future.
  • Restore testing: critical systems with a successful restore test in the last 12 months.

Mapping to other frameworks

Programme areaNIST CSF 2.0NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A
Programme governanceGV.PO-01, GV.RM-01PM-1, PM-9A.5.1 Policies, A.5.2 Roles
Configuration management and inventoryID.AM-01, PR.PS-01CM-2, CM-3, CM-8A.5.9 Inventory, A.8.9 Configuration management
Network and communicationsPR.IR-01SC-7A.8.20, A.8.22
Component security and patchingPR.PS-02SI-2, SI-3A.8.7, A.8.8
User access controlPR.AA-01, PR.AA-05AC-2, IA-2, IA-5A.5.15, A.5.18, A.8.2
Event and incident managementDE.CM-01, RS.MA-01SI-4, IR-4A.5.24, A.8.16
Integrity and availabilityPR.DS-11, RC.RP-01CP-9, CP-10A.8.13
Service providersGV.SC-05SR-3, SA-9A.5.19, A.5.20

For organisations already certified to ISO/IEC 27001, the practical model is to bring the IACS into the ISMS scope (risk process, internal audit, management review, document control) and use 62443-2-1 for the OT-specific requirements that ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A states only generally, such as zones and conduits, legacy compensating measures and IACS service provider requirements. That avoids two risk registers and two audit programmes, and it is consistent with the 2024 edition's removal of ISMS duplication. Where no ISMS exists, start with 62443-2-1 and the CPGs and add management system elements as the programme matures.

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 is the main US companion for OT controls, and CISA's Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals provide a shorter baseline that many asset owners use as a first target. See the NIST SP 800-82 OT Security Guide.

Common pitfalls

  • Using the 2010 edition: audit criteria and contracts still written against the old management system structure.
  • A paper programme: policies written centrally that sites never adopt, so no evidence of practice exists and maturity stays at the bottom of the scale.
  • Treating legacy as out of scope: excluding unsupported systems instead of documenting compensating measures.
  • Forgetting machine and vendor accounts: access control limited to human operators, while historians, OPC servers and remote support tools use shared or non-expiring credentials. The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack started with an unused VPN account that had never been disabled.
  • Duplicating the ISMS: building a parallel management system for OT instead of extending the corporate ISMS, which doubles the overhead.
  • No supplier flow-down: programme requirements that never reach integrators and maintenance contractors.

Practitioner checklist

  • Confirm contracts, policies and audit plans reference IEC 62443-2-1:2024 (edition 2.0).
  • Appoint a programme owner and agree how the programme sits alongside the ISMS.
  • Baseline every programme element and record current and target maturity.
  • Maintain a change-controlled IACS asset inventory and a 62443-3-2 risk assessment for main systems.
  • Keep a legacy exception register with compensating measures and review dates.
  • Inventory and review human, service, device and vendor accounts.
  • Flow programme requirements down to service providers using 62443-2-4.
  • Pilot procedures at one site for two cycles before rolling out.
  • Decide whether internal assessment, third-party review or ACSSA inspection or certification fits your assurance needs.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: IEC 62443 Guide · IEC 62443-3-2 OT Risk Assessment Guide · ISA/IEC 62443 Certification Guide · Identity for OT Environments Guide · OT Security Maturity Model. This guide summarises IEC 62443-2-1:2024 from public sources and is not legal or certification advice; read the standard before relying on specific requirements.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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